

WEBVTT

00:00:01.820 --> 00:00:05.480

<v SPEAKER_1>In this episode of Defence Deconstructed, which we're recording May 30th, I'm talking to Dr.

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<v SPEAKER_1>Jim Ferguson, who's a Professor Emeritus in the Department of Political Studies at the University of Manitoba and previous Deputy Director of their Centre for Defence and Security Studies, in addition to being a Canadian Global Affairs Institute Fellow.

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<v SPEAKER_1>Today, we're talking about the research and paper that came out of it on the Canadian Ballistic Missile Dilemma.

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<v SPEAKER_1>The paper focuses on Integrated Air and Missile Defence, which is now being positioned as a system that President Trump in late January labelled as the Golden Dome, as well as how that ties into the integration of Integrated Air and Missile Defence, Canadian defence implications and the relationship with the United States through Norad.

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<v SPEAKER_1>Jim, welcome back to Defence Deconstructed.

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<v SPEAKER_2>My pleasure.

00:00:45.860 --> 00:00:59.940

<v SPEAKER_1>We are having you on here to talk about a paper that you wrote for us through our Triple Helix Mines Collaborative Network, The Canadian Ballistic Missile Dilemma, which is very timely since we are, I think, now having a Ballistic Missile Dilemma.

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<v SPEAKER_1>Again, you can tell us for which number of times, in part because of the recent developments that have made this also topical with the US administration and President Trump talking about first an Iron Dome and now a Golden Dome.

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<v SPEAKER_1>So can you kick off this discussion by explaining to listeners what you understand the Golden Dome initiative to be?

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<v SPEAKER_2>Well, as best as we can understand, this is an Integrated Layered Air and Missile Defense Capability, which goes up from the

lower end drones, right up to Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles.

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<v SPEAKER_2>And it builds upon the developments that have occurred over the past decade or so, beginning with the US Army, which started to Integrate Air and Missile Defense as a function of high demand and low intensity, low density, probably, capabilities, which we've now seen in play, particularly in the Russo-Ukrainian War and in the Israeli conflict in the Middle East.

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<v SPEAKER_2>It's designed to Integrate all these layers to ensure that there's an effective and efficient application of limited interceptors against the variety of threats from long-range ballistic missiles, medium-range, short-range ballistic missiles, to hypersonics, to crews, and down to drones and even the smaller handheld stuff that we use.

00:02:25.940 --> 00:02:27.320

<v SPEAKER_2>So that's the key thing.

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<v SPEAKER_2>The key point of it all is integration, is integrating all these capabilities into single command and control capability for the United States in the context of North America, which we've seen in NATO, we've seen it played out in Israel, and we've seen it also in the Russo-Ukrainian War.

00:02:47.260 --> 00:02:57.100

<v SPEAKER_1>I guess one of the key points to that is, to your understanding, it's going to integrate defences against multiple types of air-breathing or airborne threats?

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<v SPEAKER_2>Airborne and ballistic missile threats, from one lower layer up to the upper layer, integrate it all together to provide an effective and efficient defence.

00:03:08.860 --> 00:03:13.520

<v SPEAKER_2>And we've seen this already in the context of NATO, we've seen it in Israel.

00:03:13.520 --> 00:03:19.040

<v SPEAKER_2>Unfortunately, Canada seems to be lagging as normal, far behind everyone.

00:03:19.040 --> 00:03:19.780

<v SPEAKER_1>Okay.

00:03:19.780 --> 00:03:51.940

<v SPEAKER_1>So you touched a little bit about how this kind of connects with technological developments, but in the paper you take some time to do this, can you just spell out for folks how broadly some of these airborne air-breathing or missile problems are, how widely some of this technology has proliferated, just to kind of contextualize the nature of the current landscape and why there's been so many moves in many different places as you were touching on, not just in the United States, towards developing and fielding integrated air and missile defense systems.

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<v SPEAKER_2>Well I guess the best empirical example we have is the Israeli conflict in Gaza which has expanded with the involvement of Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Iranians, and the Houthis in Yemen, and which Israel has faced at least on two occasions and more, but two particular occasions where they face a swarm of threats.

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<v SPEAKER_2>A launch of ballistic missiles, medium-range ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and drones, all in an attempt to overwhelm the defenses.

00:04:22.520 --> 00:04:45.360

<v SPEAKER_2>The idea of integrating it, and it's not just the integration of Israeli capabilities, you go from David Sling to the Iron Dome to Arrow to Patriot, which they all have, but also in terms of the four deployed capabilities, which are part of the anti-ISIS coalition, which still exists, which are defending critical assets in Iraq, and how to put this all together and integrate it.

00:04:45.360 --> 00:04:49.960

<v SPEAKER_2>So if we think about North America, we're thinking about the same problem.

00:04:49.960 --> 00:04:54.900

<v SPEAKER_2>It's different because of the expanse of North America, but still it's the same problem.

00:04:55.120 --> 00:05:06.340

<v SPEAKER_2>How do you deal with these range of potential multiple threats coming at the same time to ensure your limited defence capabilities can be efficient and effective against them?

00:05:06.340 --> 00:05:22.700

<v SPEAKER_2>And you can think about potential of drones launched from merchant ships or from submarines or surface vessels to ICBMs or SOBMs who are armed with conventional warheads, hypersonics, cruise missiles, all potentially coming at you at the same time.

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<v SPEAKER_2>It's not that we necessarily know per se that this would happen, but the importance is to be able to plan for it and to be able to defend those critical infrastructure and defence assets vital for the defence of North America and the defence not just of North America but the global deterrence posture of the United States.

00:05:44.260 --> 00:06:00.440

<v SPEAKER_1>So as the Canadian expert who literally wrote the book on Canada and missile defence, ballistic missile defence in particular, can you take us view, I guess, a shortened relative to the book version of Canada's history in this space and why you're suggesting that we're presented with a dilemma today?

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<v SPEAKER_2>Well, the basic thing from the beginning of missile defence, which goes back to the 1960s, actually to 1950s, Canada has wavered upon it.

00:06:11.720 --> 00:06:17.820

<v SPEAKER_2>For most of the many decades since then, the Canadian policy position has been no position.

00:06:17.820 --> 00:06:18.840

<v SPEAKER_2>We're just dithered on it.

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<v SPEAKER_2>In the context of SDI, for example, in 1985, the Kilgore Commission set up by Prime Minister Mulroney, one of the advices or arguments given to them is that what Canada should do is do basically air defence, which is the Norad mission.

00:06:39.260 --> 00:06:45.620

<v SPEAKER_2>You jump to 2005 and Martin's decision to stay out of ballistic missile defence.

00:06:45.620 --> 00:06:47.120

<v SPEAKER_2>That's exactly what he said.

00:06:47.120 --> 00:07:04.960

<v SPEAKER_2>We're going to do this part of the Norad mission, but the ballistic missile defence, and again, it was a different strategic world back then, we're going to leave to the United States, but we have no decisions, we have no knowledge about how they plan to defend North America in the case of a ballistic missile attack.

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<v SPEAKER_2>Last week, when the Prime Minister was asked in a press conference about Canadian policy with regards to the Golden Dome, he actually read the same thing that goes back decades.

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<v SPEAKER_2>Oh, we'll do the Norad stuff.

00:07:21.960 --> 00:07:42.780

<v SPEAKER_2>And the assumption misplaced the assumption that if we can do that one component, which is aerospace warning against air breathing threats, cruise missiles, and ballistic missiles, but the intercept side of the ballistic missile, which would also, in my view, include the hypersonic question, that's the Americans going to do.

00:07:42.780 --> 00:07:46.080

<v SPEAKER_2>And somehow we're going to be get access and we'll have priorities.

00:07:46.080 --> 00:07:52.040

<v SPEAKER_2>We'll be able to introduce or influence the Americans in terms of defence priorities.

00:07:52.040 --> 00:07:53.700

<v SPEAKER_2>That's not on.

00:07:53.700 --> 00:07:59.660

<v SPEAKER_2>The fundamental thing Canada needs to do is very quickly reverse its no to BMD.

00:07:59.660 --> 00:08:03.800

<v SPEAKER_2>We are the only ally who is a no on this.

00:08:03.800 --> 00:08:05.660

<v SPEAKER_2>We need to open this door.

00:08:05.660 --> 00:08:08.060

<v SPEAKER_2>And again, we can't predict how negotiations.

00:08:08.520 --> 00:08:11.860

<v SPEAKER_2>And again, the Prime Ministers talked about discussions.

00:08:11.860 --> 00:08:20.880

<v SPEAKER_2>And I bring back to your mind that in 2003, in June, when the government entered into discussions with the Americans, they became a negotiation.

00:08:20.880 --> 00:08:24.380

<v SPEAKER_2>They are negotiations of what we want to get.

00:08:24.380 --> 00:08:29.760

<v SPEAKER_2>But until we reverse our current policy on this, we're not going to get access.

00:08:29.760 --> 00:08:32.120

<v SPEAKER_2>The Americans aren't going to tell us.

00:08:32.120 --> 00:08:34.440

<v SPEAKER_2>And that's not good for Canadian defence and security.

00:08:35.340 --> 00:08:45.620

<v SPEAKER_2>Why we should just defend against cruise missiles, maybe hypersonics and air breathing threats, but leave everything else to the Americans is beyond me.

00:08:45.620 --> 00:08:55.900

<v SPEAKER_2>Because the Americans will defend American critical infrastructure and defence assets before they defend ours, unless we engage fully in this.

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<v SPEAKER_1>So just a couple of points, just to underline a couple of things and look at clarity in a couple of them.

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<v SPEAKER_1>I guess, am I correct?

00:09:02.020 --> 00:09:12.480

<v SPEAKER_1>I've been characterizing this as Canada has decided that we are willing to defend Canada against a number of things coming towards our country that might cause us harm, make things go boom, kill people, etc.

00:09:12.480 --> 00:09:22.720

<v SPEAKER_1>But we will only watch one particular type of missile with a particular ballistic trajectory come into this country and have it go boom and we will not participate in its intercept.

00:09:22.720 --> 00:09:24.140

<v SPEAKER_2>That's our current policy.

00:09:24.140 --> 00:09:24.820

<v SPEAKER_2>You are dead right.

00:09:26.020 --> 00:09:33.780

<v SPEAKER_1>And then you said that in your view this current policy has an interconnection with hypersonic missiles which is a new consideration.

00:09:33.780 --> 00:09:38.060

<v SPEAKER_1>We have seen some of them be used in some of the current conflicts around the world.

00:09:38.060 --> 00:09:54.300

<v SPEAKER_1>Why do you think that the current know in that specific

way to that specific part of one type of missile defence has an interrelationship with hypersonics which is a newer technological development at least of which there is some significant concern?

00:09:54.300 --> 00:09:55.740

<v SPEAKER_2>Well, on two grounds.

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<v SPEAKER_2>First, hypersonics, whether they're land, air or sea base launched, they are basically launched by ballistic missiles and they are launched initially in a ballistic missile path, but a depressed trajectory roughly between 30 and 50 kilometers, slightly below the levels of space at 100 kilometers, but certainly at an area where air breathing assets cannot fly.

00:10:22.460 --> 00:10:27.240

<v SPEAKER_2>So are they ballistic or are they air breathing?

00:10:27.240 --> 00:10:35.180

<v SPEAKER_2>Now, the Russian systems that we know have been deployed in Ukraine are what they call hypersonic glide vehicles.

00:10:35.180 --> 00:10:43.760

<v SPEAKER_2>They aren't powered, they use the upper levels of the atmosphere to maneuver and then come down to their targets like cruise missiles.

00:10:43.760 --> 00:10:44.760

<v SPEAKER_2>So what are they?

00:10:44.760 --> 00:10:47.940

<v SPEAKER_2>Are they ballistic targets or are they air breathing targets?

00:10:47.940 --> 00:10:50.960

<v SPEAKER_2>Well, they're sort of one or both.

00:10:50.960 --> 00:10:57.440

<v SPEAKER_2>And that's a difficult thing to try to discern.

00:10:57.440 --> 00:11:12.100

<v SPEAKER_2>So when you say we're not involved in ballistic, and remember in the context of the Golden Dome or the Iron Dome as President Trump additionally announced, part of it is boost phase intercepts.

00:11:13.180 --> 00:11:15.700

<v SPEAKER_2>We're not going to be involved in that, I guess.

00:11:15.700 --> 00:11:25.840

<v SPEAKER_2>And then I don't know what we're going to be involved with in terms of this threat, which we have to take very seriously because we've seen it manifested in the Ukrainian War.

00:11:25.840 --> 00:11:28.260

<v SPEAKER_2>So the government needs to come clear.

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<v SPEAKER_2>And one of the important things I mentioned in the paper is we have no idea the government's rationale for saying no to participation.

00:11:37.300 --> 00:11:42.020

<v SPEAKER_2>They have never clearly expressed why they are against this.

00:11:42.020 --> 00:11:53.580

<v SPEAKER_2>We've heard recently, I've read in the paper today, for example, in the context of the speech of the throne, one of the Liberal members said, oh, the system won't work.

00:11:53.580 --> 00:11:57.080

<v SPEAKER_2>Well, I've heard that for 50 years now.

00:11:57.080 --> 00:11:57.900

<v SPEAKER_2>And you know what?

00:11:57.900 --> 00:11:59.440

<v SPEAKER_2>The systems do work.

00:11:59.440 --> 00:11:59.780

<v SPEAKER_2>You know what?

00:11:59.860 --> 00:12:03.480

<v SPEAKER_2>100%, no defence is 100%, but they do work.

00:12:03.480 --> 00:12:06.140

<v SPEAKER_2>So are we going to engage or aren't we going to engage?

00:12:06.140 --> 00:12:15.260

<v SPEAKER_2>And if we're not going to engage, from past history, that I understand it and researched about, was the Americans aren't going to tell us.

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<v SPEAKER_2>They're going to basically seal us out.

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<v SPEAKER_2>And that will have significant implications for our future defence relationship with the United States.

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<v SPEAKER_1>Okay, we're going to come back to that last point.

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<v SPEAKER_1>But before getting to that, you made a comment about, I think you were referring to the difference between 2005 and today, but maybe you were talking about 1985.

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<v SPEAKER_1>It's interesting that we seem to stick to precise cycles of 20 years from these discussions.

00:12:40.160 --> 00:12:46.480

<v SPEAKER_1>That's an interesting fact totem, that the strategic circumstances are different.

00:12:46.480 --> 00:12:56.100

<v SPEAKER_1>So I'm not sure which time period you're comparing to, but if it was either one of those, how do you think the strategic circumstances have changed and how is that material to the discussion?

00:12:57.060 --> 00:13:13.600

<v SPEAKER_2>Well, if you go back to the Cold War era, the era of ABM and SDI, the strategic circumstances was basically about the potential of a nuclear exchange, long-range ICBM, SLBM exchange between the two parties.

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<v SPEAKER_2>President Reagan's SDI initiative, which was just an research initiative, so it got confused with deployment by many people.

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<v SPEAKER_2>This idea was, how do we deal with this problem?

00:13:27.320 --> 00:13:29.620

<v SPEAKER_2>There was no sense, there was no hypersonics.

00:13:30.920 --> 00:13:35.840

<v SPEAKER_2>Cruise missiles, air-breathing threats were simply put on the back burner.

00:13:35.840 --> 00:13:36.600

<v SPEAKER_2>That wasn't the problem.

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<v SPEAKER_2>This was the big problem for them.

00:13:39.020 --> 00:13:50.760

<v SPEAKER_2>When you track to 2005 in the context of the political situation, again, you're in an era of what Krauthammer called American unipolarity.

00:13:53.340 --> 00:13:55.640

<v SPEAKER_2>There was no great threat to North America.

00:13:55.640 --> 00:13:57.780

<v SPEAKER_2>The Russians were prostrate.

00:13:57.780 --> 00:14:01.400

<v SPEAKER_2>The Chinese haven't really risen yet.

00:14:01.400 --> 00:14:05.680

<v SPEAKER_2>So this was sort of a bit of a marginal discussion.

00:14:05.680 --> 00:14:12.900

<v SPEAKER_2>And I can sort of understand for domestic political reasons why Martin decided, you know, let's put this to bed.

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<v SPEAKER_2>That's what he attempted to do.

00:14:14.760 --> 00:14:17.640

<v SPEAKER_2>And he did put it to bed because the Harper didn't do anything.

00:14:17.640 --> 00:14:18.760

<v SPEAKER_2>Trudeau didn't do anything.

00:14:18.760 --> 00:14:19.640

<v SPEAKER_2>They all put it to bed.

00:14:19.640 --> 00:14:23.580

<v SPEAKER_2>Well, now we're in a different strategic and technological world.

00:14:23.580 --> 00:14:27.300

<v SPEAKER_2>We have great power competition.

00:14:27.300 --> 00:14:40.120

<v SPEAKER_2>The Russians have developed technologies and the Chinese are falling very closely behind, if not in some places ahead of them, which provide a range of integrated threats to North America.

00:14:40.120 --> 00:15:05.440

<v SPEAKER_2>Whether you think of this in the idea of war in Europe or in the Pacific, where they may be able to threaten and destroy North American capabilities to come with assistance of allies and partners, or you think of it just simply as an attempt to deter us from engaging

on a global basis, particularly the United States, that's an entirely different context than it was in the past with different technologies.

00:15:06.400 --> 00:15:28.160

<v SPEAKER_2>So the real answer to this is in the under the new circumstances we face, is Canada going to be, let me put it this way, a faithful ally like the Europeans despite the problems with President Trump, which we can't ignore, which make it politically difficult, or are somehow we're going to try to isolate ourselves.

00:15:28.160 --> 00:15:31.980

<v SPEAKER_2>And the way Canadian policy right now is isolationist.

00:15:31.980 --> 00:15:37.240

<v SPEAKER_2>We believe if we don't engage implicitly in my view, that we'll be left alone.

00:15:37.240 --> 00:15:39.020

<v SPEAKER_2>Well, that's mythical.

00:15:39.020 --> 00:15:42.040

<v SPEAKER_2>That's folly, to say the least.

00:15:44.220 --> 00:15:47.660

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00:15:47.660 --> 00:15:50.180

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00:16:00.180 --> 00:16:03.900

<v SPEAKER_1>Again, one quick more thing before we move on to some of the implications for defence.

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<v SPEAKER_1>Do you think part of the folly is a mistaken belief that we will somehow be defended irrespective of our decision to opt out of involvement in the BMD system?

00:16:16.120 --> 00:16:30.560

<v SPEAKER_1>Living in Ottawa, I was quite struck at some of the reaction around town when the then Deputy Commander Norad testified before Parliament and basically said the understanding was that the US wasn't going to offer protection to Canada because we decided we didn't want to.

00:16:31.720 --> 00:16:45.520

<v SPEAKER_1>I interpreted that to be a bit of an aghast reaction amongst Canadians to something that to my mind was why would we have expected anything less after having been not just asked to join and opted not to, but we were kind of rude about it.

00:16:45.520 --> 00:16:51.200

<v SPEAKER_2>Well, I think the answer to that question is the belief, not least of all, because what's the number?

00:16:51.200 --> 00:16:57.040

<v SPEAKER_2>90% of the Canadian population is within 60 miles of the American border.

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<v SPEAKER_2>You certainly think about Eastern Canada, to the Northeastern United States, Detroit, Windsor, New York, Ottawa, Montreal, that the Americans will have no choice but to defend us.

00:17:11.140 --> 00:17:15.460

<v SPEAKER_2>So I guess the answer would be take a breath, we're okay.

00:17:15.460 --> 00:17:18.600

<v SPEAKER_2>The problem is that doesn't work.

00:17:19.820 --> 00:17:26.400

<v SPEAKER_2>A lot of it depends, and this you get into classified technological data, which we don't have any access to.

00:17:26.400 --> 00:17:50.820

<v SPEAKER_2>But a lot depends whether you think in terms of a North Korean attack or China or the Russians, the ability of limited defence assets, limited interceptors, whether in terms of the existing capability deployed in Fort Greely, Alaska, or what I have argued that the Americans will proceed with the third site in upstate New York.

00:17:50.820 --> 00:17:55.400

<v SPEAKER_2>How they make decisions relative to their knowledge of where the targets are.

00:17:55.400 --> 00:18:06.580

<v SPEAKER_2>And at the end of the day, unless we are fully engaged with the United States on this, and contribute significantly to the United States, the United States are going to prioritize themselves.

00:18:06.580 --> 00:18:13.620

<v SPEAKER_2>And yes, oh my God, we're going to lose Ottawa and Toronto, but that's okay because we're not going to lose New York, or Detroit, or Cleveland.

00:18:13.620 --> 00:18:14.660

<v SPEAKER_2>Well, maybe Cleveland.

00:18:14.660 --> 00:18:15.660

<v SPEAKER_2>Who cares about Cleveland?

00:18:15.820 --> 00:18:17.120

<v SPEAKER_2>Sorry.

00:18:17.120 --> 00:18:19.080

<v SPEAKER_2>That's not a nice thing to say.

00:18:19.080 --> 00:18:22.020

<v SPEAKER_2>So these are the problems we face.

00:18:22.020 --> 00:18:24.840

<v SPEAKER_2>We cannot rely definitely upon.

00:18:24.840 --> 00:18:37.700

<v SPEAKER_2>And one of the arguments that came back, came out in the past after the 2005 Martin decision was, well, the American will have to defend us because this is about credibility as an ally.

00:18:37.700 --> 00:18:39.800

<v SPEAKER_2>We're talking about homeland defense here.

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<v SPEAKER_2>That's a different game from overseas with the Europeans or the Japanese or the Filipinos or South Korea.

00:18:47.060 --> 00:18:50.040

<v SPEAKER_2>That's entirely different from us.

00:18:50.040 --> 00:18:58.660

<v SPEAKER_2>For us, the US will prioritize themselves unless we basically force ourselves that they cannot ignore us.

00:18:58.660 --> 00:19:06.640

<v SPEAKER_2>And one other thing I think is important to remember, even though we think we are so important territorially to the defense of the United States.

00:19:06.640 --> 00:19:14.800

<v SPEAKER_2>And we are because we make any forward defense of the continent much more effective and efficient.

00:19:14.800 --> 00:19:21.580

<v SPEAKER_2>We have early intercept potentials if we deploy forces and capabilities in the North.

00:19:21.580 --> 00:19:22.720
<v SPEAKER_2>That's important.

00:19:22.720 --> 00:19:25.500
<v SPEAKER_2>But the United States doesn't need us.

00:19:26.780 --> 00:19:36.620
<v SPEAKER_2>If you think about Norad modernization and the over-the-horizon Arctic radar capability which we're developing, which is valuable to the United States, and they know that.

00:19:37.160 --> 00:19:41.040
<v SPEAKER_2>They can develop in the Northern States easily enough.

00:19:41.040 --> 00:19:53.600
<v SPEAKER_2>And they can, if you go back to the origins of Norad and air defence cooperation in the 1950s in Canada and the United States, the United States will happily violate Canadian airspace to defend itself.

00:19:53.600 --> 00:20:01.400
<v SPEAKER_2>So our interest is to make sure they defend us the way we want to be defended, rather than leaving it to them, which we won't know.

00:20:03.920 --> 00:20:09.420
<v SPEAKER_1>So you've made a couple of references to the wider considerations for Canadian defence.

00:20:09.420 --> 00:20:32.040
<v SPEAKER_1>Can you just kind of walk through what you see as being some of the implications for Canada, both within and outside of a Norad context, if we continue to stay outside of US homeland defence against ballistic missiles, which has implications, as you pointed out, for the wider integrated air and missile defence system they're looking to deploy?

00:20:32.040 --> 00:20:47.080
<v SPEAKER_2>Well, the key thing, in my view, is why would the United States, under the principle of integration of these capabilities, and this is really about integration, broader integration of North American defence.

00:20:48.240 --> 00:20:55.120
<v SPEAKER_2>So you're talking about not just air-based capabilities to intercept, you're talking and sensors, etc.

00:20:55.120 --> 00:21:00.720
<v SPEAKER_2>You're talking about ground-based and naval-based capabilities, which all have to be integrated.

00:21:00.720 --> 00:21:10.480

<v SPEAKER_2>Why would the United States, under this new system, the system of systems they're developing, why would the United States want to have two separate systems?

00:21:10.500 --> 00:21:21.180

<v SPEAKER_2>One for us, for Norad, in our little box, and the rest for everyone else, when integration says, no, no, it has to be entirely integrated.

00:21:21.180 --> 00:21:23.600

<v SPEAKER_2>So that's one of the major issues that we face.

00:21:25.440 --> 00:21:33.180

<v SPEAKER_2>The second is, under those conditions, and if I read the past properly, the United States will do it alone.

00:21:34.840 --> 00:21:36.220

<v SPEAKER_2>What does that mean?

00:21:36.220 --> 00:21:40.800

<v SPEAKER_2>It means Norad will be marginalised, pushed into a corner.

00:21:40.800 --> 00:21:47.280

<v SPEAKER_2>So if you think in terms of the current Ballistic Missile Defence Mission, that's a NORTHCOM mission.

00:21:47.280 --> 00:21:57.520

<v SPEAKER_2>We provide, through NORAD, the early warning information to the US NORTHCOM for them, for really Alaska.

00:21:57.520 --> 00:22:02.840

<v SPEAKER_2>But as this goes on, the Americans don't need us to do this either.

00:22:02.840 --> 00:22:10.620

<v SPEAKER_2>So what that means is the marginalisation of Canada, basically the re-nationalisation of North American defence.

00:22:10.620 --> 00:22:13.040

<v SPEAKER_2>The United States will decide to go it alone.

00:22:13.200 --> 00:22:23.680

<v SPEAKER_2>And if you read Trump, and again Trump is very hard to read these days, if you read Trump as a highly nationalist perspective on defence, he will go down this path.

00:22:23.680 --> 00:22:28.620

<v SPEAKER_2>And he will basically say, go away, we'll do it ourselves.

00:22:28.620 --> 00:22:33.060

<v SPEAKER_2>And we will be left, as I argue, in the dark.

00:22:33.060 --> 00:22:34.500

<v SPEAKER_2>And that's not good for us.

00:22:34.500 --> 00:22:45.580

<v SPEAKER_2>Because the fundamental principle of Canadian defence strategy since the end of World War II has been, we need to know and try to influence what the Americans are doing.

00:22:48.800 --> 00:22:50.360

<v SPEAKER_1>You touched on this a little bit.

00:22:50.360 --> 00:23:13.580

<v SPEAKER_1>But if you parse through the flurry, early flurry of executive orders and other statements from the administration, there does seem to be a real and genuine heightened emphasis of defence of the homeland as a key American defence priority, which I don't think has necessarily been highlighted or forefronted as much in the past, or at least consistently.

00:23:15.620 --> 00:23:33.320

<v SPEAKER_1>Does definitely seem that there is not just an interest in the NorthCom, Norad community, people with Colorado license plates in this issue set, but it is becoming a higher level, higher priority for US defence generally.

00:23:33.320 --> 00:23:47.960

<v SPEAKER_1>I don't know if you agree with that or not, but if you do, what do you think the implications of that are for this wider sentiment with the US administration that is nationalist in many other respects, but they do seem to be particularly seized with homeland defence as a priority.

00:23:47.960 --> 00:23:53.900

<v SPEAKER_1>That's in part, I think, tied in with the disengagement from a European theatre and some other things.

00:23:54.120 --> 00:23:55.960

<v SPEAKER_2>I think you're dead right now.

00:23:55.960 --> 00:24:08.340

<v SPEAKER_2>For both Canada and the United States, basically since the end of World War II and even through World War II, has there been this idea that the defence of North America begins overseas.

00:24:08.340 --> 00:24:13.780

<v SPEAKER_2>And that's been deeply embedded in the military cultures about Canada and the United States.

00:24:13.780 --> 00:24:26.180

<v SPEAKER_2>I suspect if you go back to 9-11, where we got the first push for homeland security, and we look as it tracks further, I think the Americans are really taking this seriously.

00:24:26.180 --> 00:24:29.800

<v SPEAKER_2>And if they do, that's problematic for us.

00:24:30.180 --> 00:24:32.320

<v SPEAKER_2>But I would add something else.

00:24:32.320 --> 00:24:36.600

<v SPEAKER_2>Look at one nation strong and free.

00:24:36.600 --> 00:24:40.620

<v SPEAKER_2>There's an emphasis on homeland defence as well.

00:24:40.620 --> 00:24:48.960

<v SPEAKER_2>Now, how deep that goes within the government and the National Defence, Department of National Defence and the Forces is difficult to know.

00:24:48.960 --> 00:25:20.080

<v SPEAKER_2>But there's a general sentiment now in the context of the competitiveness in the great power world we live in, that this is a vital, particularly in the United States, and I think, at least we talk about it in Canada, the need to be assured that we can deter and defeat threats to North America, because that's vital in order for us to be able to defend threats overseas rather than waiting until they come home.

00:25:21.200 --> 00:25:23.120

<v SPEAKER_1>Okay.

00:25:23.120 --> 00:25:25.700

<v SPEAKER_1>Jim, thanks for joining us to walk through this issue.

00:25:25.940 --> 00:25:34.280

<v SPEAKER_1>I guess the last substantive question I'd ask, is \$61 billion going to be the precise price of entry for Canadian involvement or is it too early to know?

00:25:34.280 --> 00:25:35.460

<v SPEAKER_2>It's much too early to know.

00:25:35.460 --> 00:25:37.180

<v SPEAKER_2>We have no idea.

00:25:37.180 --> 00:25:56.020

<v SPEAKER_2>But I'll tell you this, if we take \$61 billion, which is a number I think pulled out of Trump's hat, and again, I think it was the Congressional Budget Office who took the \$175 billion estimate that Trump and Trump can double it up to \$451 billion or triple it up.

00:25:56.020 --> 00:26:01.180

<v SPEAKER_2>And again, that depends upon the space side of the equation, which is another big problem for us.

00:26:01.180 --> 00:26:06.400

<v SPEAKER_2>We haven't talked about space and weaponization, but this is all coming down the pipeline as well.

00:26:06.400 --> 00:26:19.380

<v SPEAKER_2>But if you think, if you go back to \$61 billion, the Canadian government's response, I suspect, is, well, we're spending \$38 billion on Norad modernization, but not entirely, but we'll say that.

00:26:20.040 --> 00:26:23.040

<v SPEAKER_2>So we're going to owe you \$23 billion.

00:26:23.040 --> 00:26:30.940

<v SPEAKER_2>And what we're going to do is buy ground-based patriots, new missiles for the future combat ship.

00:26:30.940 --> 00:26:31.300

<v SPEAKER_2>What is it?

00:26:31.300 --> 00:26:32.100

<v SPEAKER_2>The River Class?

00:26:32.100 --> 00:26:33.100

<v SPEAKER_2>I think that's what we call it.

00:26:33.100 --> 00:26:34.160

<v SPEAKER_1>River Class Destroyer.

00:26:34.160 --> 00:26:35.340

<v SPEAKER_2>The River Class Destroyer.

00:26:35.340 --> 00:26:36.240

<v SPEAKER_2>We're going to do all this.

00:26:36.240 --> 00:26:37.400

<v SPEAKER_2>We'll spend all that.

00:26:37.400 --> 00:26:39.920

<v SPEAKER_2>And there we will contribute \$61 billion.

00:26:39.920 --> 00:26:42.220

<v SPEAKER_2>And we're good to go.

00:26:42.220 --> 00:26:43.940

<v SPEAKER_2>And it's not going to work that way.

00:26:43.940 --> 00:26:45.560

<v SPEAKER_2>It's just not going to work that way.

00:26:46.980 --> 00:26:49.940

<v SPEAKER_2>This is all numbers thrown out.

00:26:49.940 --> 00:26:51.900

<v SPEAKER_2>We'll have to wait and see.

00:26:51.900 --> 00:27:02.020

<v SPEAKER_2>The government, at the end of the day, if I can emphasize this, period, the government has to stand up and say, we want to participate.

00:27:02.020 --> 00:27:04.280

<v SPEAKER_2>And then we'll see how it plays out.

00:27:05.300 --> 00:27:05.820

<v SPEAKER_1>Okay.

00:27:05.820 --> 00:27:08.760

<v SPEAKER_1>Well, I think that's a good and clear note to end on.

00:27:08.760 --> 00:27:10.900

<v SPEAKER_1>The last question to you, Jim.

00:27:10.900 --> 00:27:13.720

<v SPEAKER_1>Thanks for doing all the work to put together this research paper for us.

00:27:14.540 --> 00:27:17.980

<v SPEAKER_1>When you weren't reading material for that, what else were you reading?

00:27:17.980 --> 00:27:19.440

<v SPEAKER_2>I'm reading two things right now.

00:27:19.440 --> 00:27:45.220

<v SPEAKER_2>One I'm finishing called The Founding Partisans, which is an interesting book based on primary documents, correspondence, letters, and debates in Congress in the first 20 years of the Republic

to the South between the Federalists under Alexander Hamilton and Samuel Adams versus what he calls the Republicans, the Whigs, the Decentralizers under Jefferson and Madison.

00:27:45.220 --> 00:27:53.940

<v SPEAKER_2>It's a fascinating study, very well-researched, and has lessons for us in this country with the provinces and the Feds.

00:27:53.940 --> 00:28:17.480

<v SPEAKER_2>And so that's what I'm finishing and now I've just started a book by Williamson Murray who passed away last year called The Dark Path, The Structure of War and the Rise of the West, which is really goes back to the 80s and 90s and the Revolution of Military Fairs, and he looks at social, political and economic revolutions which affected the nature of the war and how then war affected society.

00:28:17.480 --> 00:28:19.380

<v SPEAKER_2>Both are really great reads.

00:28:19.380 --> 00:28:20.160

<v SPEAKER_1>Okay.

00:28:20.160 --> 00:28:23.640

<v SPEAKER_1>Well, thanks again for joining us on Defence Deconstructed.

00:28:23.640 --> 00:28:24.800

<v SPEAKER_2>Anytime.

00:28:24.800 --> 00:28:26.040

<v SPEAKER_2>Thanks, Dave.

00:28:27.900 --> 00:28:30.100

<v SPEAKER_1>Thanks for listening to Defence Deconstructed.

00:28:30.100 --> 00:28:35.580

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00:28:35.580 --> 00:28:42.140

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00:28:42.140 --> 00:28:44.760

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00:28:44.760 --> 00:28:46.240

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00:28:46.240 --> 00:28:48.400

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