

**AN ANALYSIS OF THE
HILLARD HEINTZ AFTER-ACTION REVIEW
OF CITY AGENCIES' RESPONSES TO ACTIVITIES DIRECTLY
FOLLOWING GEORGE FLOYD'S DEATH ON MAY 25, 2020**



**By Communities United Against Police Brutality
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Executive Summary

The City of Minneapolis hired the firm Hillard Heintz (HH) to prepare an after-action report on the Minneapolis Police Department's (MPD) response to the uprising that followed the killing of George Floyd. Despite being paid a significant sum of taxpayer dollars to prepare this 86-page report, HH limited their review to an extremely small data set, spoke mostly to people selected by the city, and otherwise engaged in poor practices in preparing this biased report. Their focus on central command structure issues while erasing essential historical context, their tendency to frame protesters as outside of the community and not members of the community, and their lack of attention to violations of civil rights and civil liberties render this report invalid.

It would seem that this after-action report's purpose is to orchestrate a more efficient quelling of dissent rather than examining the root causes of that dissent. The HH report provides a city-friendly narrative that it's the *protesters* that are the real problem, not the continued police violence that the City enables and that the community is forced to protest. Thus, it takes us in the wrong direction entirely.

The city's reliance on a biased corporate entity to prepare this report is part of a trend of privatizing police reform, rather than listening to and adopting community recommendations. When the city contracts this work to outside entities, it is those firms -- not the public -- who shape the direction and scope of police "reform," which in this case looks like increased militarization and suppression of dissent.

A properly conducted after-action review is still needed, and not just for the uprising that followed George Floyd's murder, but for all police deadly force incidents.

Background: Who the hell is Hillard Heintz? Why did the city choose them?

The City of Minneapolis issued bids for an after-action report on the MPD's response to protests after the murder of George Floyd. Although they were not the lowest bid, on February 12, 2021 the City Council voted unanimously to accept the bid of security organization Hillard Heintze (now part of Jensen Hughes¹) to research and write this report.

In its advertising, Hillard Heintze (HH) bills itself as “one of the leading security risk management firms in the world, serving Fortune-ranked enterprises, professional sports leagues and law enforcement agencies as well as many of the world's most affluent families.” A key item on their website is the 8-page document *The Security Leader's Guide to Preparing for Civil Unrest*. The upshot, as outlined in this document, is that HH is against civil unrest for any reason. Preparing for and suppressing civil unrest is their core business—not by addressing the underlying causes but by telling police how to more effectively quash dissent.

Founder Arnette Heintze spent twenty years as a secret service agent², and Terry Hillard was a Chicago police officer for 35 years,³ including 5 years as its superintendent. Hillard was named in civil lawsuits totaling almost \$23 million dollars during his time on the force.⁴ Of particular relevance, while Hillard was superintendent, the Chicago Police Department paid out over \$10 million in damages after its abuse of Iraq War demonstrators in 2003.

HH has an ESG (environmental, social and governance) rating of 1 out of 5—the lowest possible score.⁵ For a city that prides itself on doing everything through an equity lens, this represents an especially bad choice.

The City paid \$229,490.55 for the 86-page report. Despite their claims of providing a thorough analysis of the response to the uprising, the HH report is written from the perspective of how police can organize more effectively to suppress dissent in the future.

This report is supposedly based on “what went wrong with aspects of the City's response to the protests and unrest” (page 5). But in their eyes, having millions of dollars of lawsuits against police due to their brutal behavior, is apparently not an indicator that anything went wrong. Instead, what this report suggests went wrong was that the police were not organized enough to crush the legions of people gathered to practice their constitutionally-protected rights to free assembly.

Given HH's origins and track record, it would appear that the city specifically chose this vendor, even over less expensive bids, to assure a whitewash of police violence in an attempt to escape liability for harms to the community and grievously injured individuals. Seriously investigating “What went wrong?” would mean closely examining the ongoing police brutality and lack of response to calls for service that prompted the protests. But all of this was outside the scope of the HH report, and this intentional oversight was the City Council's decision. After all, any real investigation into what caused the protests would implicate the Mayor's and City Council's refusal to hold police accountable again, and again, and again.

An Example of a HH Past After-Action Report—La Mesa, CA

The City Council and Mayor could have, and should have, looked at a previous similar report done by HH for the City of La Mesa, California.

Just as in their report for Minneapolis, the use of so-called less lethal weapons by police is glorified and the injuries caused by them to people exercising their First Amendment-protected rights are minimized. The report takes care to mention minor injuries to officers but whitewashes serious injuries to protesters. There is a mention of two lawsuits related to the use of these “less-lethal” munitions but makes the outlandish claim, “Although we recognize that some physical injuries occurred, including some sustained during clashes between police and protesters, the exhibited restraint by the police helped prevent more significant injuries or deaths.” The report provides no details about these injuries.

Among the injuries glossed over in the La Mesa HH report was an incident in which a protester was shot in the head with a beanbag round. “The beanbag round fractured Furcron’s skull and caused internal bleeding and severe swelling to her brain, according to a lawsuit she filed against Knudson and the city. Doctors placed her in a medically induced coma for several days until it was safe for a surgeon to remove the beanbag round from her skull. The lawsuit says Furcron still suffers from neurological symptoms, permanent facial scarring and loss of vision in one of her eyes. The suit also says doctors have told her she may not regain vision in that eye.”⁶

We learn far more about what actually happened during protests in La Mesa from a review of articles in area newspapers than from the HH after-action report about these same protests. A quick perusal of this information by the City Council should have led them to the conclusion that any after action report by HH would be biased against First Amendment-protected activities and the people who engage in them and would emphasize instructing police on how to suppress them. But, perhaps, that was the point.

Process and Bias

The HH report suffers from both a flawed process and a biased perspective, which undermines its fundamental analysis and casts doubt on its recommendations.

By its own admission, HH only looked at **30 hours** of Minneapolis Police Department body-worn camera footage captured between May 25 through June 3, 2020, out of many thousands of hours captured. In other words, **they looked at only 3 hours of footage per day**. This is unacceptable, given the 24-7 events and the hundreds of law enforcement officers on the scene. No legitimate researcher could ever think that they could extrapolate from 30 hours of BWC footage the depth of the many facets of the uprising and the city’s response. By contrast, the Minnesota Department of Human Rights reviewed over **700 hours** of body camera footage when conducting its analysis of the MPD. Further, there is nothing in the report to indicate how the footage they reviewed was selected. It is likely that it was hand-selected by the city.

HH claims to have interviewed 90 people, most of whom were elected officials, government staff, and members of the police department. They also stated they held two focus groups but it was unclear how many people participated or how they were selected.

Finally, they held two “listening sessions” where members of the community were asked to respond to very focused questions. They were held on back-to-back days: mid-day on a Thursday and early evening on a Friday. These were poorly advertised and promoted only through city channels; not surprisingly, they were poorly attended. Not a single person of color attended the Thursday event and only one attendee had participated in the protests following the murder of George Floyd. This pattern repeated itself at the Friday event, though there was one person of color at that event and two people who had participated in protests. In order to participate, one would have to have found out about the sessions, then had access to the internet and familiarity with using Zoom. HH claims that 85 people attended the listening sessions. Even if that is true, that represents a mere 0.0197% of the population of Minneapolis. A more robust – one might even say, rudimentary – approach to community engagement might include making trips to George Floyd square, door-knocking, flyer-ing, vigorously advertising on social media, deliberately going beyond the City’s hand-picked “community members,” and asking more open-ended questions. Any conclusions drawn from such a small, badly recruited sampling of residents are problematic. A bad process inevitably leads to a bad result.

By contrast, Communities United Against Police Brutality convened five People’s George Floyd Commission events at parks around Minneapolis, where the hundreds of people who attended were able to speak as freely as they wanted to, vent their frustrations, and state their solutions. We’re an all-volunteer group that didn’t get paid to provide community engagement opportunities and yet we were more effective in engaging the community and eliciting quality responses than a \$250 million dollar company with 1300 employees.

It was obvious from the report that HH lacked knowledge of the local community, including the historical and ongoing tensions between police and the community. The protests that followed the murder of George Floyd were certainly in reaction to his murder but also stemmed from long-simmering frustrations at the lack of accountability for continued police violence. Early protests sprang up organically but the strength of the movement was due to organizations that have served as bedrocks of the community and have been protesting this violence for many years.

Yet throughout the report, HH refers repeatedly to “violent protesters” and treats protesters as if they were disconnected from the community and not members of the community. They failed to recognize the many thousands of community members who were moved to join protests against the grotesque police violence that has plagued people of color and poor people in Minneapolis for generations.

If, according to HH, protesters aren’t actually community members, another sleight of hand occurs in the section on “community perspectives,” where city employees and elected officials are referred to as the “community.” The report often blurs together constituents, government officials, and even the MPD, as if these different stakeholders all occupy the same structural positions and have the same power, responsibilities, and interests. When “the community” *excludes* people who attend protests, but *includes* police officers who suppress protests, we have entered an alternate reality indeed.

The Community Oriented Policing Services of the US Department of Justice has developed a standard for the performance of after-action reviews. In it, they state “After action reviews are aimed at improving American policing’s response to similar critical incidents through changes in policies, practice, organizational culture, and increased understanding of the nature of preventable error.”⁷ By these standards the HH report fails miserably. As the analysis below will demonstrate, the HH report

completely erases some of the MPD's most blatant atrocities ("preventable errors") from the historical record. When the real problem is either not identified or actively suppressed, the solutions will not be promising. The HH report cannot and does not meet the required after-action report standard of "improving" the MPD "through changes in policies, practice, and organizational culture."

HH Report Lacks Historical Context

This report looked at 10 days from May 25 through June 3, 2020, yet it is impossible to provide a proper analysis of the uprising after the killing of George Floyd without placing those ten days into a broader context.

The report acknowledges that the "MPD and community have a history of strained relations" (page 5). But in addition to not interviewing enough people to draw valid conclusions, this framing is symptomatic of a bad historical analysis. The problem is not that the MPD and the community have a bad relationship, which puts half the responsibility on the less powerful party, the community.

The problem is that the long-simmering tensions between the community and the MPD are the result of racism, brutality, and the routine violation of people's civil rights for decades – and moreover, these tensions also stem from the fact that the City of Minneapolis has consistently refused to hold police accountable. The correct framing is the MPD's *lack of accountability* to the public. If the MPD were *accountable*, then better "relations" with the community would naturally follow.

Here is some of the history that the HH report abbreviates as "strained relations":

Minneapolis police have killed 64 people since 2000; the vast majority have been people of color and indigenous people.

In the aftermath of such killings, for years the community has had to deal with the BCA, the Police Federation, and MPD public information officers doing everything they can to control the narrative in order to justify MPD shootings and tilt public perception in favor of law enforcement: lying, making false statements, hiding evidence, disrespecting the reputation of the victims of their violence, stalking and harassing witnesses, failing to investigate, investigating selectively, making statements that seem to exonerate officers before the investigations have even started, violating policies, harassing unhoused people and destroying their belongings and identification, dragging people down to the river to beat them, refusing to talk, and covering for other officers.

For years, the community has watched as the failure to reign in out-of-control MPD officers has hardened into an iron-clad, impenetrable culture of impunity. To take a small sampling:

- The MPD officers who killed Terrance Franklin in 2013 had 19 prior complaints filed against them and received no discipline.
- The MPD officers who killed Jamar Clark in 2015 had 3 complaints filed against them and received no discipline.
- The MPD officers who killed Justine Damond Ruszczyk in 2018, had 6 prior complaints filed against them and received no discipline.

Would Terrance Franklin, Jamar Clark, Justine Damond, and so many others still be alive today if any of their killers had ever been disciplined? Shamefully, the Office of Police Conduct Review (OPCR), which the Minneapolis City Council cynically and secretly created in 2012 to replace civilian review, has such a low rate of sustaining complaints against MPD officers that it is a statistical outlier among outliers. At the point at which GF was killed, the OPCR had received 2,783 complaints from members of the public. Of those, only 13 had led to discipline - a 0.47% discipline rate, fewer than 1 out of 200. The OPCR essentially functions as a clearance center for brutal policing.

When, in 2016, the local organization, the Committee for Professional Policing, proposed a research-based plan for MPD officers to carry professional liability insurance, the City Attorney and City Council blocked the reform, preferring to subsidize brutal policing rather than disincentivize it. To add insult to injury, during his five-year tenure, Police Chief Arradondo consistently refused to implement highly effective peer intervention training, such as Ethical Policing is Courageous (EPIC), for MPD officers.

Other than the MPD's hubris – killing in broad daylight with the cameras rolling – May 25th, 2020 was no different:

- Derek Chauvin, one of the officers who killed George Floyd in 2020, had 26 complaints filed against him, and was involved in four prior deadly force incidents but received no discipline other than an oral reprimand and a letter of reprimand.

Given this history, after the video of the MPD killing of George Floyd went viral, tens of thousands of people had decided they'd had enough, and an even bigger protest movement grew. But it was not spontaneous. It was part of a rich history of protest in Minneapolis in response to the lack of meaningful measures to address poor policing.

This protest tradition in Minneapolis has included marches, rallies, and vigils in response to the MPD killings of Terrance Franklin, Jamar Clark, and Justine Damond Ruszczyk – all mentioned above – just as community members protested the MPD killings of Christopher Burns, Fong Lee, Thurman Blevins, David Smith, Chiaser Vue, Travis Jordan, and so many others whose lives have been stolen. It has included die-ins. It has included disrupting city council meetings. It has included taking over highways and interstates. It has included occupying the mayor's office. It has included locking down the 4th precinct for 18 days in 2015 after the MPD murder of Jamar Clark. And in the months and years since George Floyd's murder, the community has been forced to continue protesting in response to the MPD killings of Dolal Idd, Winston Smith, Leneal Frazier, and Amir Locke. Unfortunately, it has never been enough to get the MPD or their enablers in city government to change their ways.

Even now, in 2022, two years after Minneapolis became the epicenter for a global uprising against police brutality, the municipal power structure has done nothing to prevent another George Floyd-type incident from happening. The culture of policing is so deeply entrenched that, even today, not a single officer would intervene if another officer violated MPD policy or brutalized a Minneapolis resident. The HH report findings fail to consider these deeply entrenched, long-standing dynamics, which drove the uprising after Mr. Floyd's murder. People didn't just decide, all of the sudden, to erupt in spontaneous, angry protest. The blame for the uprising and all that followed sits squarely on

the shoulders of elected officials, who time after time failed to address the conditions that led to Mr. Floyd's murder. But nothing in this report analyzes "what went wrong" that led to this uprising. The report's strategically misguided focus, again, is "how to prevent violent unrest [sic] from occurring again" (page 5). There are no "key findings" about how to prevent the fatally violent policing that led to the protest.

After the uprising began, and other levels of law enforcement (the national guard, MN state troopers, etc) moved in to join the MPD, curfew was used not to arrest looters, but as an excuse to arrest everyone else and violate civil liberties.

This report's emphasis is on Incident Command Structure and better coordination with the State Troopers, National Guard and other law enforcement agencies. Among its "key findings":

- "MPD didn't develop any formal crisis response plans" (11)
- MPD "did not capitalize on its training and experience from previous large-scale events" (11)
- They were "not adhering to a proper centralized command" structure (12)
- "MPD did not have a mass arrest plan" (16)

While these findings paint a picture of a bumbling, disorganized cadre of amateurs who were spread too thin, the reality is that after Mr. Floyd was murdered, Minneapolis had more law enforcement roaming our streets than there were soldiers in Afghanistan—and Afghanistan has 48 times the population and 415 times the area of Hennepin County. The per capita concentration of law enforcement in Minneapolis was well over 3 times greater than soldiers in Afghanistan at the height of the occupation. If Minneapolis residents felt that there was a military occupation of their city, it's because there was.

The report fails to even acknowledge the conduct of this occupying army toward community members and the media.

- The arrest of CNN reporter Omar Jimenez and his crew by MN State Troopers while they were on the air covering the protests.⁸
- A Black security guard working for CNN was arrested by State Troopers the next day. He is suing the State Patrol. The lawsuit points to a persistent pattern of arresting Black media members.⁹
- A WCCO reporter was shot with a rubber bullet by a State Trooper and arrested.¹⁰
- State troopers also slashed tires of parked media and resident's vehicles.¹¹
- National Guard troops and Minneapolis police shot paintballs at residents as they stood on porches in front of their homes.¹²

Harms to the Community Ignored

Readers of this after-action report learn a lot about how MPD officer wellness was supposedly compromised: officers who "received threatening phone calls" and "officers struck by objects thrown,"

and "objects landing near officers." We also learned that some officers felt "lonely" even while standing "shoulder to shoulder with fellow officers" (p. 56).

But we don't learn about Jaleel Stallings, who police brutalized after he defended himself from shots fired from an unmarked cargo van that he thought was occupied by white supremacists. It later turned out that these were MPD officers who were out "hunting" protesters and who violated MPD policy by using unmarked 40 mm crowd control rifles that could easily be mistaken as live-round rifles.¹³

Nothing is mentioned about how Mayor Frey, Police Chief Arradondo, and Hennepin County Prosecutor Mike Freeman would have had access to all of the BWC videos from that night, *knew that the MPD officers were in the wrong*, and nonetheless abused the legal process by prosecuting Stallings rather than disciplining the officers who brutalized him.

We don't learn about Soren Stevenson, who lost an eye to an MPD projectile, and who the City offered a \$2.4 million settlement.¹⁴ We don't learn about the 10 people who suffered serious eye injuries due to police violence. We don't learn about Linda Tirado, a photojournalist permanently blinded after being shot directly in the eye by a 40 mm projectile by Minneapolis police.¹⁵

We don't learn about Sharon Morora, a seventeen-year-old who was shot in the face and had to have reconstructive surgery.¹⁶ We don't learn about Ethan Marks, who lost an eye after being shot in the face by police with a tear gas canister.¹⁷

We certainly don't learn about the one Minneapolis resident, Norman Truman, who was shot with 40 mm rounds by police, fell into a coma, never fully recovered, and later died as a result of his injuries.¹⁸

According to hospital records, injuries as a result of police violence abounded:

Of the 6626 medical records identified during the initial search, 89 met the study criteria, with 45 (51%) indicating injuries from projectiles, 32 (36%) injuries from chemical irritants, and 12 (13%) injuries from both types of weapons. Patients reported 41 injuries from rubber bullets, 7 from tear gas canisters, 2 from beanbags, and 7 from unknown projectiles. Ten patients (11%) sustained eye trauma from projectiles (Figure 1). Seven patients (8%) underwent surgery for their injuries, and 16 patients (18%) had received traumatic brain injuries. A substantial percentage of projectile injuries were to the head, neck, or face (in 23 of 57 patients [40%]). The Injury Severity Score was used to classify the severity of trauma; the injuries were classified as mild in 77 patients (87%), as moderate in 8 (9%), and as severe in 4 (4%). However, these findings are not representative of everyone injured, because our sample was limited to persons who chose to seek medical evaluation. New England Journal of Medicine, <https://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJMc2032052>

It was only because a police accountability activist shared the *New England Journal of Medicine* article with HH that it ends up in a small sidebar in this after-action review. Otherwise, we wouldn't have learned that 89 people were injured seriously enough by police violence to go to the hospital.

The harm the MPD did to the community during the George Floyd uprising cannot be overstated. The MPD literally hunted protesters. According to BWC footage described in court documents, an officer gave Sgt Andrew Bittell the orders "Drive Down Lake Street. You see a group, call it out. OK great!

F*** 'em up, gas 'em up, f*** 'em up." Following orders, Bittell told his SWAT unit, "the first f***ers we see, we're just hammering 'em with 40s."¹⁹

The MPD's violent responses to those protesting MPD violence continue a vicious cycle of police brutality, however much police in this report claim that the MPD wants to change (key finding #2, page 9).

Further harms committed by the MPD that are ignored in this after-action report include officers' disparate treatment of white supremacists (such as "umbrella man") versus those actually protesting George Floyd's murder.

Finally, the report normalizes spying on activists as standard operating procedure. A section on page 45 casually mentions the way that the Strategic Information Center "supports the MPD by providing intelligence and information gained through camera surveillance, social media monitoring and collaboration with other intelligence gathering centers in the state," lamenting that rank-and-file officers did not receive daily SIC briefings (page 45). The problem, as the report sees it, is *not* that the MPD is spying on community members exercising their first amendment rights. It's that MPD officers aren't getting *more* of that surveillance footage.

Calls for Service Ignored

During the uprising and continuing afterwards, the MPD all but abandoned the duty to respond to calls for service. There was basically a police "sick out" – large numbers of officers simply failed to come to work and did no work while they were there. Since then, large numbers of officers had filed phony PTSD claims, costing over \$25 million at the time of this writing.

- Andy Browne and others detained a white supremacist who had hurled a brick through the glass door of Cup Foods and was harassing mourners at George Floyd Square. After waiting 30 minutes for police to arrive, a dispatcher advised them to move the man a few blocks away. After another hour passed, MPD officers finally arrived. When asked what took so long, officers knocked Browne to the ground and left without taking the man with them. Browne and the others were forced to release him.²⁰
- In the Powderhorn neighborhood, eyewitnesses reported that police prevented the fire department from intervening as neighbors attempted to control fires, even though there were no protests in the area. They then proceeded to pepper-spray and shoot rubber bullets at the people who were trying to put out the fires and protect the neighborhood from spreading fires.
- Neighbors were protecting a gas station, a family business, at 44th and Lake Street. Minneapolis police arrived and started beating and pepper-spraying people.
- Attacks by white supremacists on Northside businesses and residents were ignored.
- Multiple episodes of community violence have been ignored including the murder of Dameon Chambers (who performed under the name Murphy Ranks) two days after the murder of George Floyd, a half block south of George Floyd Square. His murder was never investigated.²¹
- Over \$500 million in property damage was never investigated.²²

No Mention of Lawsuits

The HH report ignores the numerous lawsuits the city faces as a result of the police violence community members were compelled to protest. These suits are an important part of the aftermath of the uprising and contrast with the HH report's emphasis on damage to businesses.

- The city faces \$111 million in potential suits for police misconduct toward protesters and other community members during the uprising.²³
- The ACLU mounted a successful lawsuit over police treatment of the media.²⁴
- An ACLU lawsuit over police treatment of protesters during the uprising continues in the courts.²⁵

No Mention of Racism or the Role of White Supremacists

Even with their emphasis on damage to businesses, the HH report does not specifically address damages to businesses owned by BIPOC (Black, Indigenous, and People of Color) residents. In fact, there is only one reference to people of color (by any term) in the entire 86-page report (p. 28) and that reference tries to justify police conduct by falsely claiming people of color supported it. The complete erasure of racism in this report is the textbook definition of whitewashing.

At the same time, this report also fails to mention the role of white supremacists in the destruction of businesses and other community institutions like libraries and schools for purposes of “igniting a race war”^{26 27 28} or the many community members who worked frantically to stop this destruction.²⁹

During the uprising, white supremacists roamed the city's Northside attacking businesses and terrorizing residents. But you would never know that if you rely on the HH report for your information on the uprising.

Finally, there is no mention of the ongoing and insidious racism within the MPD that allowed for the killing of George Floyd and police attacks on the community in its aftermath. The findings in the MDHR report make this issue abundantly clear, yet it never merited a mention in the HH report.³⁰

Harms of this Report

This report is not neutral and is not without harmful impacts to the city government and community. It directs the media and public conversation away from what's really needed.

These harms include:

- Creating a sense of urgency for improving coordination to suppress future dissent while making no recommendations for changes to address the need for dissent in the first place.
- A lack of urgency for the kind of reforms that would prevent future police deadly force incidents.
- Framing community members who demonstrated powerfully against police violence as “violent protesters” who were not our neighbors and family members.
- Deflecting attention from harm to protesters and other community members to the claimed harms to police officers as individuals and to the institution of policing.

- Depriving the community of a truthful, detailed analysis of the conditions that led to the uprising, the uprising itself, the aftermath, and what should be done to change these conditions. The city chose to contract for a report they knew would be a whitewash.
- Emphasizing the feigned “trauma” to the police officers that has led to over \$25 million in phony PTSD claims at the time of this writing.

The HH report claims to analyze “what went wrong with aspects of the City’s response to the protests and unrest” (page 5). If the City follows HH’s recommendations, the report claims, it will “be better prepared for and able to respond more effectively to future protests and civil unrest” (page 2). Yet if HH cannot identify and name major atrocities widely covered in the media, such as harassing and wounding journalists and “hunting” protesters, then their recommendations have no credibility. We cannot possibly do better if we can’t document what went wrong.

Community Recommendations

The city should not accept the recommendations of this flawed HH report. Instead, the city should listen to community recommendations for ending police violence and the lack of accountability that reinforces it.

The Minnesota Department of Human Rights has completed an investigation of the the City of Minneapolis and the Minneapolis police. Members of the community contributed heavily to this investigation and are now contributing ideas for a consent decree. In addition, the US Department of Justice is investigating the Minneapolis police department. Both of these investigations will lead to enforceable reform, offering far better solutions for preventing future civil unrest than simply learning how to suppress that unrest more effectively.

Rather than contracting the work of police reform to a biased corporate entity, the city should fully cooperate with these investigations and adopt their community-informed recommendations.

Conclusion

Although this report has received praise in some media outlets, the HH report is a failure as an after-action review. Despite costing \$229,490.55, this report suffers from poor methodology, lacks historical context and fails to meaningfully address harmful conduct by the MPD. A bad process leads to a bad result. For this reason, the solutions proposed cannot and will not address the underlying issues that led to the murder of George Floyd and the uprising that followed. Worse yet, these solutions have the potential to further harm our traumatized community and curtail our civil liberties.

A true and unbiased after-action report is still badly needed as a guide for effective reforms, not just in this instance but in all police critical incidents including the killings of Terrance Franklin, Jamar Clark, Justine Damond Ruszczyk, Thurman Blevins, Travis Jordan, Dolal Idd, and many others.

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