

Final Risk Report

Regional War and World War III Under Climate, Resource, and Governance Stress

*Baseline senior estimate plus a Climageddon feedback loop additive scenario
Prepared March 16, 2026*

Method note. These percentages are structured judgment estimates, not actuarial forecasts. They combine current conflict conditions, resource stress, climate-risk escalation, countermeasures, and a final DMAP plus red-team pass. They should be read as decision-support ranges, not as precise predictions.

This report separates three layers: (1) mainstream-anchored baseline risk, (2) Job One Climageddon feedback-loop amplification, and (3) the hotter Universe Institute temperature-track stress test.

Abstract

This white paper evaluates the most probable active and emerging regional wars, then estimates the cumulative probability and likely timing of a future world war under two scenarios. The first is a senior baseline estimate that incorporates climate-resource stress and the Job One Climageddon Feedback Loop as a nonlinear multiplier. The second is a clearly labeled additive stress-test scenario that also applies the hotter temperature timetable on the Universe Institute 2026 forecast page. The report then checks the result through Otto Laske's 28 DTF / DMAP frame, runs a red-team review, and converts the findings into a readable decision document with tables, glossary, FAQ, and bibliography.

Executive summary

- The most dangerous direct pathways to World War III still run through Taiwan / U.S.-China and Russia-NATO. Climate does not replace those pathways; it makes them more brittle, more synchronized, and less governable.
- The regional-war hotspots most elevated by the climate-resource-governance stack are the Middle East, Sudan and adjacent spillover states, eastern DRC, Pakistan-Afghanistan, Ethiopia-Eritrea, India-Pakistan, and the Taiwan / South China Sea theater.
- The DMAP review did not reveal a missing single master cause. It revealed interacting causes: threshold effects, lag effects, cross-theater coupling, domestic fragility, shipping and mineral chokepoints, fiscal strain, and adaptation counterforces.
- The red-team pass reduced the temptation to overstate immediate near-term collapse. Near-term war probabilities rise, but the biggest climate-linked upward pressure still clusters in the late 2020s and early 2030s because transformation usually requires accumulation, not just one bad season.
- Under the final Level 1 senior estimate, the peak World War III risk window is 2028-2031, with 2030 the best single-year guesstimate. Under the additive hotter-track stress test, the peak window shifts earlier to 2028-2030, with 2029 the best single-year guesstimate.

At-a-glance final numbers

Item	Level 1 senior estimate	Climageddon additive	Interpretation
WWIII by March 2027	8-12%	9-13%	Still minority risk; deterrence and diplomacy remain strong.
WWIII by end of 2028	16-22%	18-25%	Risk rises as crises can synchronize.
WWIII by end of 2030	24-34%	27-39%	Highest load-bearing window.
WWIII by end of 2035	37-51%	42-58%	Danger rises materially, but not inevitability.

1. Scope, evidence standard, and caution

This report integrates five evidence layers: current conflict reporting; mainstream climate and security assessments; Job One's primary/secondary climate-consequence map; the Job One Climageddon Feedback Loop page; and the Universe Institute's hotter temperature-track scenario. The first four layers inform the baseline estimate. The fifth is treated as a high-end stress test rather than a consensus central forecast.

A critical caution follows from the evidence itself: climate's direct effect on conflict is weaker than governance, politics, and socioeconomic conditions in the near term, but climate increasingly intensifies displacement, food

insecurity, water stress, and compound risks as warming rises. In other words, climate is usually not the spark, but it does pile dry timber around the spark.[S1][S2][S3]

For that reason, every probability in this paper should be understood as a range produced by structured judgment. It is not the output of a closed-form predictive model. The ranges are meant to be transparent enough to challenge, update, and revise as conditions change.

2. DMAP / Laske 28 DTF review: what was missing and what changed

The DMAP pass was used as a completeness check rather than as a decorative theory sticker. It asked whether the draft had omitted key contextual, processual, relational, or transformational forces. The answer was yes, but mostly at the structural level rather than the headline level.

DTF class	What it forced us to re-check	What it added to the final report	Net effect on forecast
Context (C)	Larger whole, boundaries, enabling structures, hidden background conditions	Added fiscal strain, insurance retreat, strategic chokepoints, arms-control erosion, domestic political unrest, and adaptation capacity as background conditions shaping war risk.	Raised medium-term risk where buffering capacity is low; prevented single-cause thinking.
Process (P)	Directionality, rates of change, lag, accumulation, feedback timing	Clarified that climate and resource stress often alter war risk through accumulation and lag, so 24-month and 2030+ windows deserve more weight than immediate next-month panic.	Tempered some near-term jumps; increased confidence in late-2020s acceleration.
Relationship (R)	Interdependence, coupling, alliance chains, mutual constraint	Added cross-theater synchrony: Taiwan plus Hormuz plus food/fertilizer or migration stress can interact. Also strengthened counterforce analysis for trade dependence, diplomacy, and deterrence.	Raised system-level contagion risk while also preserving visible counterbalances.
Transformation (T)	Thresholds, reversals, breakdown and reorganization	Added regime-shift logic: crises are not just additive. They can flip into new states when multiple stresses converge. It also forced review of adaptation and peace-making as real transformation pathways.	Raised concern about nonlinear late-decade escalation; avoided fatalism by retaining off-ramps.

Bottom line from the DMAP pass: the forecast was directionally right, but it needed better treatment of lag, counterforces, and system coupling. That is why the final report keeps elevated late-decade risks without pretending every climate shock instantly becomes interstate war.

3. Final regional-war risk tables

Table 1 separates already active or near-active regional wars from the most likely next new regional wars. The Level 1 senior estimate includes the Climageddon Feedback Loop as a nonlinear multiplier. The Climageddon additive column then applies the hotter Universe Institute temperature-track scenario as a separate stress test.

3.1 Already active or near-active regional wars

Hotspot	Level 1 senior estimate	Climageddon additive	Primary accelerants	Primary counterforces
Middle East regional war	94-99% active over next 3 months	95-99% active over next 3 months	Iran-Israel-U.S. war dynamics; Hormuz disruption; fuel and fertilizer stress; heat and water stress.	Backchannel diplomacy; force exhaustion; maritime coalitions; fear of uncontrolled escalation.
Sudan plus spillover	74-87% over next 6 months	77-89% over next 6 months	Conflict-hunger-displacement loop; weak neighboring absorptive capacity; climate shocks.	Mediation, humanitarian access, border controls, aid if funding improves.
Eastern DRC regionalized war	79-88% over next 6 months	81-89% over next 6 months	Militias + state actors; mineral competition; displacement; ceasefire weakness.	Qatar/UN mediation, ceasefire monitors, external pressure.
Pakistan-Afghanistan	63-79% over next 6 months	65-81% over next 6 months	Border militancy, weak trust, refugee/economic stress, climate and food fragility.	Chinese mediation, battlefield fatigue, cost sensitivity, external diplomatic pressure.
Russia-NATO direct clash from Ukraine theater	8-12% over next 6 months	9-13% over next 6 months	Proximity, provocations, arms-control erosion, alliance entrapment.	Nuclear deterrence, command discipline, active talks, fear of regime-scale catastrophe.

3.2 Most likely next new regional wars

Hotspot	Level 1 senior estimate	Climageddon additive	Primary accelerants	Primary counterforces
Taiwan / wider East Asia crisis	14-20% in 12 months; 30-43% in 24 months	15-22% in 12 months; 33-46% in 24 months	Territory, power transition, alliance commitments, semiconductor and shipping vulnerability.	Mutual deterrence, economic costs, summit diplomacy, force-readiness caution.
India-Pakistan	13-19% in 12 months; 22-34% in 24 months	15-21% in 12 months; 25-37% in 24 months	Kashmir, terrorism risk, water and heat stress, agricultural vulnerability.	Nuclear deterrence, outside pressure, immediate technical limits on water coercion.
Ethiopia-Eritrea	34-46% in 12 months; 47-61% in 24 months	37-49% in 12 months; 51-66% in 24 months	Sea-access pressure, border grievance, food insecurity, drought, displacement.	Dialogue channels, war weariness, outside mediation, internal cost constraints.

Hotspot	Level 1 senior estimate	Climageddon additive	Primary accelerants	Primary counterforces
South China Sea	8-12% in 12 months; 14-20% in 24 months	9-13% in 12 months; 16-23% in 24 months	Coercion at sea, treaty risk, fishery and shipping stress, Taiwan linkage.	Gray-zone preference, alliance caution, diplomatic signaling, commercial incentives.
Korean Peninsula	6-10% in 12 months; 12-20% in 24 months	7-12% in 12 months; 13-22% in 24 months	Missile/testing cycle, military exercises, regime signaling.	Very strong deterrence, high predictability of ruin, periodic diplomacy.

3.3 World War III cumulative probability path

WWIII cumulative horizon	Level 1 senior estimate	Climageddon additive	Interpretive note
By March 2027	8-12%	9-13%	Still a minority outcome; deterrence and diplomacy remain powerful.
By end of 2028	16-22%	18-25%	System coupling and concurrent crises matter more.
By end of 2030	24-34%	27-39%	Highest-load-bearing horizon in this study.
By end of 2035	37-51%	42-58%	Severe but not inevitable; off-ramps still matter.
Peak-risk window	2028-2031	2028-2030	Additive scenario shifts the peak earlier.
Best single-year guesstimate	2030	2029	The hotter stress test brings the peak forward by about a year.

4. Why the final numbers changed after the red-team pass

The red-team pass did not merely ask how the report could be wrong. It asked how it could be wrong in opposite directions at the same time, which is more realistic and more useful.

4.1 What could make the report too alarmist?

- Nuclear deterrence remains extraordinarily powerful in the highest-consequence theaters.
- Many climate impacts are severe but still mediated by adaptation, aid, trade substitution, strategic reserves, and emergency governance.
- Some high-end tipping and temperature estimates on the Job One and Universe Institute pages go beyond mainstream central estimates and therefore should be treated as stress tests, not baselines.
- War forecasting often overweights vivid crises and underweights elite caution, command discipline, and the dull but real power of war fatigue.

4.2 What could make the report too conservative?

- Official models still struggle with compounding and cascading risk across food, energy, migration, finance, and governance.[S1]
- Resource chokepoints can tighten much faster than annual planning cycles allow, especially in Hormuz and in critical-mineral supply chains.
- Domestic political polarization inside major powers can reduce crisis-management quality even when leaders understand the stakes.
- The expiration of New START removes formal binding limits on U.S. and Russian strategic arsenals and reduces transparency at a bad time.[S4]

4.3 Evidence standards, claim hygiene, and credibility ladder

The report distinguishes five claim types. First, current conflict facts supported by Reuters, AP, CFR, SIPRI, UN, WMO, UNEP, FAO/WFP, and IPCC. Second, mainstream climate-risk interpretations drawn from those sources. Third, Job One and Universe Institute systemic scenario claims treated as internally coherent but not automatically mainstream. Fourth, judgmental probability estimates developed from the evidence stack. Fifth, explicit tail-risk discussion kept separate from baseline probabilities.

This credibility split matters. It lets the report use the more aggressive feedback-loop and temperature materials as a strategic stress test without pretending every number on those pages is already the consensus center of gravity.

4.4 Commons failure and stewardship check

Commons logic reinforces the forecast. Climate, atmosphere, oceans, fisheries, shipping lanes, and nuclear stability are all shared systems where each actor has incentives to free-ride, delay, externalize costs, and rely on others to absorb the damage. That pushes risk upward unless credible monitoring, burden-sharing, and enforcement improve. At the same time, stewardship requires not fusing identity with prophecy. The purpose of this report is not to dramatize collapse; it is to improve risk recognition, timing judgment, and preventive action.

Release judgment: publishable with caveats. The report is strong enough to release as a white paper if it clearly labels the hotter Universe Institute track as a stress-test scenario, not a settled mainstream forecast.

5. Final narrative judgment

The final judgment is blunt. The world is not moving toward war because one variable changed. It is moving toward a more war-prone condition because multiple stress systems are rising together: interstate rivalry, alliance entrapment, arms racing, resource concentration, migration pressure, food insecurity, climate damage, fiscal strain, and declining institutional slack.

The reason the late 2020s matter so much is not magic. It is accumulation. WMO already shows a very high probability that at least one year in 2025-2029 exceeds 1.5°C and a 70% chance the five-year average does so; UNEP still puts current policies near 2.8°C by 2100, far above Paris goals, while IPCC says compound and cascading risks rise with warming.[S1][S2][S3] That means the background operating environment for conflict management is deteriorating during the same years in which Taiwan, Russia-NATO, the Middle East, the Horn, and South Asia all remain plausible crisis nodes.

The report therefore lands on a mixed conclusion. World War III is not the most likely single outcome in the next few years. Continued proxy war, coercion, gray-zone conflict, economic warfare, and recurrent regional war are still more likely. But the probability of a larger, direct great-power war is no longer comfortably negligible once climate, resource, and governance stress are layered into the forecast.

6. Frequently asked questions

Does this report say climate change causes war by itself?

No. The report says climate increasingly multiplies conflict risk by worsening food, water, displacement, health, infrastructure, and fiscal stress. Politics and military decisions still do the final triggering.

Why are Taiwan and Russia-NATO still the top WWII pathways if the climate story is so severe?

Because direct world-war pathways depend on great-power militaries, alliances, and nuclear arsenals. Climate changes the background risk environment, but it does not replace the main military tripwires.

Why keep a separate additive scenario?

Because the Universe Institute temperature timetable is materially hotter and faster than mainstream central estimates. It is analytically useful as a stress test, but it should not be smuggled into the baseline without disclosure.

Why do some 12-month probabilities rise only modestly while 24-month probabilities rise more?

Because DMAP process analysis highlights accumulation and lag. Climate and resource stress usually change the political operating environment over time rather than forcing immediate interstate war on a fixed calendar.

What would lower the risks the fastest?

Three baskets matter most: de-escalation and arms-control restoration among major powers; food-water-energy buffering and adaptation in fragile regions; and stronger migration, aid, and early-warning systems to prevent local shocks from becoming regime or interstate crises.

7. Glossary

Additive scenario: A deliberately higher-stress scenario layered on top of the baseline to test what happens if feedbacks and warming run faster than mainstream central estimates.

AMOC: Atlantic Meridional Overturning Circulation, a major Atlantic ocean-circulation system relevant to abrupt regional climate shifts.

CFLoop / Climageddon Feedback Loop: Job One shorthand for interacting climate feedbacks, tipping points, and nonlinear consequences that amplify warming and damage.

Compound risk: Two or more hazards or stresses striking together or in sequence so that total damage is larger than a simple sum.

DTF / DMAP: Laske's Dialectical Thought Forms and the associated dialectical metasystemic analysis method, used here as a completeness and contradiction check.

Great-power war: Direct war between major military powers, especially nuclear-armed states or alliance systems led by them.

Hormuz chokepoint: The Strait of Hormuz, a narrow maritime passage critical to global oil and LNG trade.

Level 1 senior estimate: The baseline final estimate in this white paper, already incorporating climate-resource stress and the Job One feedback-loop multiplier, but not the hotter Universe Institute timetable.

Regional war: A war involving at least one state and one neighboring or aligned state, or a civil war with direct cross-border state involvement.

Stress test: An intentionally severe scenario used to examine what could happen if multiple adverse assumptions prove true together.

8. Selected bibliography

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