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15 **UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE**
16 **CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA**

17 THOMAS LOPEZ, an individual;
18 FIREARMS POLICY COALITION, INC.,
19 a Delaware nonprofit corporation; and
20 CALIFORNIA GUN RIGHTS
FOUNDATION, a California nonprofit
corporation,

Plaintiffs,

v.

CITY OF LOS ANGELES, a California
municipal corporation; JAMES
McDONNELL, in his official capacity as
Chief of Police of the City of Los Angeles;
HYDEE FELDSTEIN SOTO, in her official
capacity as City Attorney for the City of
Los Angeles; CITY OF INGLEWOOD, a
California municipal corporation; MARK
FRONTEROTTA, in his official capacity as
Chief of Police of the City of Inglewood;

No. _____

**CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT FOR
VIOLATIONS OF 42 U.S.C. § 1983:
FIRST, SECOND AND
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS,
SUPREMACY CLAUSE**

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RICK R. OLIVAREZ, in his official
capacity as City Attorney for the City of
Inglewood.

Defendants.

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1 Plaintiffs Thomas Lopez, Firearms Policy Coalition, Inc., and California Gun
2 Rights Foundation file this complaint.

3 **I. Introduction**

4 1. The City of Los Angeles and the City of Inglewood each enforce a local
5 ordinance that prohibits any person from purchasing more than one handgun within
6 a thirty-day period. These “1-in-30 Bans” categorically bar ordinary, law-abiding
7 citizens from acquiring more than one handgun per month—regardless of the
8 citizen's background, qualifications, or purpose—and back that prohibition with
9 criminal penalties. No exemption or pathway exists for the law-abiding citizen who
10 wishes to purchase two handguns in the same month for self-defense or any other
11 lawful purpose.

12 2. The Ninth Circuit has already held that this exact restriction violates the
13 Second Amendment. In *Nguyen v. Bonta*, 140 F.4th 1237 (9th Cir. 2025), the Circuit
14 struck down California's statewide 1-in-30 Ban as facially unconstitutional, holding
15 that the Second Amendment protects the right to possess multiple firearms and to
16 acquire them without meaningful constraint, and that no historical tradition of
17 firearms regulation supports a categorical ban on the frequency of purchases by law-
18 abiding citizens. The local ordinances challenged here impose the same prohibition
19 on the same conduct for the same reasons. They fail under the same analysis.

1 3. The Defendant jurisdictions enacted their 1-in-30 Bans years before the
2 State adopted its own version of the restriction. The Ninth Circuit's invalidation of
3 the state law did not automatically repeal these local ordinances. These Bans remain
4 on the books and enforceable. Defendants have given no indication they intend to
5 stop enforcing them. Plaintiffs—one who wishes to purchase multiple handguns and
6 membership organizations whose members share that same desire—bring this action
7 to ensure that the Constitution's command reaches these local enactments as well.

8 4. Plaintiffs therefore bring this challenge because they unquestionably
9 face “a realistic danger of sustaining a direct injury as a result of the law’s operation
10 or enforcement,” *Skyline Wesleyan Church v. Cal. Dep't of Managed Health Care*,
11 968 F.3d 738, 747 (9th Cir. 2020), seek to vindicate their rights, and to enjoin
12 enforcement of the Cities’ Bans as required to conform the law to the Constitution’s
13 text, our Nation’s history, and the Supreme Court’s binding precedents.

14 5. Plaintiffs also bring this suit to challenge the constitutionality of
15 California Code of Civil Procedure Section 1021.11’s one-sided fee-shifting
16 provisions and seek an injunction against its application or enforcement. Before
17 pressing their challenges to the Cities’ Bans, Plaintiffs must first remove the cloud
18 hanging over those claims by virtue of the operation of Section 1021.11.

19 6. Section 1021.11 is an unconstitutional attempt by the State of
20 California to deter citizens and firearms advocacy groups—through a novel, one-

1 way fee-shifting penalty—from accessing the courts to litigate claims over firearms
2 regulations. The decision in *Miller v. Bonta*, 646 F. Supp. 3d 1218 (S.D. Cal. Dec.
3 19, 2022), enjoined the State from enforcing Section 1021.11 by holding that Section
4 1021.11 violated the First Amendment, *id.* at 1224–27, and the Supremacy Clause,
5 *id.* at 1227–31, and noting that it likewise ran afoul of the Due Process and Equal
6 Protection Clauses, *id.* at 1225–26. “A state law that threatens its citizens for
7 questioning the legitimacy of its firearm regulations may be familiar to autocratic
8 and tyrannical governments, but not American government. American law counsels
9 vigilance and suspiciousness of laws that thwart judicial scrutiny.” *Id.* at 1226.
10 Because “the purpose and effect of § 1021.11 is to trench on a citizen’s right of
11 access to the courts and to discourage the peaceful vindication of an enumerated
12 constitutional right,” the Court declared the statute invalid. *Id.* at 1227.

13 7. Because the Defendant local jurisdictions were not defendants in
14 *Miller*, they are not directly bound by the injunction. But Section 1021.11 is
15 unconstitutional regardless of whether the State or these local-government
16 Defendants seek to enforce it, so Plaintiffs now seek declaratory and injunctive relief
17 to enjoin its application by the Defendants here.

1 **II. Jurisdiction & Venue**

2 8. The Court’s original subject-matter jurisdiction comes from 28 U.S.C.
3 § 1331 and 28 U.S.C. § 1343.

4 9. This action, based on Defendants’ violation of Plaintiffs’ constitutional
5 rights, is brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and seeks declaratory and injunctive relief
6 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201 and 2202, as well as attorneys’ fees and costs pursuant
7 to 42 U.S.C. § 1988.

8 10. Venue is proper in this district pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), as a
9 substantial part of the events and omissions giving rise to Plaintiffs’ claims occurred
10 in the Central District of California.

11 **III. Parties**

12 **A. Individual Plaintiff**

13 11. Plaintiff Thomas Lopez is a natural person and a citizen of the United
14 States. Lopez is twenty-six years old. He resides in La Verne, California, in Los
15 Angeles County.

16 **B. Organizational Plaintiffs**

17 12. Plaintiff Firearms Policy Coalition, Inc. is a nonprofit membership
18 organization incorporated under the laws of Delaware with its principal place of
19 business in Clark County, Nevada, with members across the country. FPC works to
20 create a world of maximal human liberty and freedom and to promote and protect

1 individual liberty, private property, and economic freedoms. It seeks to protect,
2 defend, and advance the People's rights, especially but not limited to the inalienable,
3 fundamental, and individual right to keep and bear arms and protect the means by
4 which individuals may exercise the right to carry and use firearms. FPC serves its
5 members and the public through legislative advocacy, grassroots advocacy,
6 litigation and legal efforts, research, education, outreach, and other programs. FPC
7 brings this action on behalf of its members, including the named Plaintiffs, who are
8 adversely and directly harmed by Defendants' enforcement of the laws, regulations,
9 policies, practices, and customs challenged herein. The risk of fee liability imposed
10 by Section 1021.11 has caused FPC to refrain from filing suits or litigating
11 constitutional claims against Defendants that it is otherwise prepared to file and
12 litigate, including litigation against Defendants as set forth below.

13 13. Plaintiff California Gun Rights Foundation ("CGF") is a nonprofit
14 foundation incorporated under the laws of California with a place of business in
15 Clark County, Nevada. CGF serves its members, supporters, and the public through
16 educational, cultural, and judicial efforts to defend and advance Second Amendment
17 and related rights. CGF has members throughout California. CGF brings this action
18 on behalf of its members, including the named Plaintiffs, who are adversely and
19 directly harmed by Defendants' enforcement of the laws, regulations, policies,
20 practices, and customs challenged herein. The risk of fee liability imposed by

1 Section 1021.11 has caused CGF to refrain from filing suits or litigating
2 constitutional claims against Defendants that it is otherwise prepared to file and
3 litigate, including litigation against Defendants as set forth below.

4 14. FPC and CGF are referred to collectively as the “Organizational
5 Plaintiffs.”

6 **C. L.A. City Defendants**

7 15. Defendant City of Los Angeles is a municipal corporation and a
8 chartered city, organized and existing under the laws of the State of California.
9 Under its City Charter, the City of Los Angeles "shall have all powers possible for
10 a charter City to have under the constitution and laws of this state as fully and
11 completely as though they were specifically enumerated in the Charter." City of Los
12 Angeles, City Charter, art. I, § 101 (2025).

13 16. Defendant James McDonnell is the Chief of Police of the City of Los
14 Angeles and the chief administrative officer of the Los Angeles Police Department.
15 The Police Department has "the power and duty to enforce the penal provisions of
16 the Charter, City ordinances and state and federal law." City of Los Angeles, City
17 Charter, art. V, § 570 (2025). Subject to the Charter and the instruction of the Board
18 of Police Commissioners, the Chief of Police has the power and duty to, among other
19 things, "suppress all riots, disturbances and breaches of the peace" and to administer
20 the affairs of the Department. *Id.* § 574.

1 17. The City of Los Angeles's one-in-thirty ordinance, LAMC § 55.14,
2 assigns specific enforcement functions to the Board of Police Commissioners and,
3 through it, to the Chief of Police—including prescribing forms for purchaser
4 declarations, directing dealer signage, and inspecting dealer records. *See* LAMC
5 § 55.14(f)–(h).

6 18. Defendant Hydee Feldstein Soto is the City Attorney of the City of Los
7 Angeles. The City Attorney has the power and duty to "prosecute on behalf of the
8 people all criminal cases and related proceedings arising from violation of the
9 provisions of the Charter and City ordinances, and all misdemeanor offenses arising
10 from violation of the laws of the state occurring in the City." City of Los Angeles,
11 City Charter, art. IV, § 271(c) (2025). Violations of Section 55.14 are punishable as
12 infractions or misdemeanors. LAMC § 55.14(j).

13 19. Defendants McDonnell and Feldstein Soto are each sued in their
14 official capacities.

15 20. The City of Los Angeles, Jim McDonnell, and Hydee Feldstein Soto
16 are referred to collectively as the "L.A. City Defendants."

17 **D. Inglewood Defendants**

18 21. Defendant City of Inglewood is a municipal corporation and a chartered
19 city, organized and existing under the laws of the State of California. The City of
20

1 Inglewood exercises all powers granted to charter cities under the California
2 Constitution and state law.

3 22. Defendant Mark Fronterotta is the Chief of Police of the City of
4 Inglewood and the chief law enforcement official in and for the City. Fronterotta has
5 served as Chief of Police since January 2013. He is responsible for the enforcement
6 of the Inglewood Municipal Code, including its firearms provisions. The City's one-
7 in-thirty ordinance, Inglewood Municipal Code Section 5-19.6, assigns specific
8 enforcement functions directly to the Chief of Police—including prescribing
9 purchaser-declaration forms and directing dealer signage. *See* Inglewood Mun. Code
10 § 5-19.6(g)–(h).

11 23. Defendant Rick R. Olivarez is the City Attorney of the City of
12 Inglewood. The Inglewood City Attorney's Office is responsible for "[p]rosecuting
13 all alleged commission of state and local misdemeanors occurring within the City."
14 City of Inglewood, City Attorney's Office, <https://perma.cc/6VVL-2VS2>. Violations
15 of Inglewood Municipal Code Section 5-19.6 are punishable as infractions or
16 misdemeanors. Inglewood Mun. Code § 5-19.6(j).

17 24. Defendants Fronterotta and Olivarez are each sued in their official
18 capacities.

19 25. The City of Inglewood, Mark Fronterotta, and Rick Olivarez are
20 referred to collectively as the "Inglewood Defendants."

1 **IV. 1-in-30 Bans Violate the Constitution.**

2 **A. L.A. City’s 1-in-30 Ban.**

3 26. “L.A. City’s 1-in-30 Ban” comprises the following laws as enacted and
4 enforced by the City of Los Angeles and its individual Defendant officials.

5 27. The City of Los Angeles prohibits any person from purchasing more
6 than one handgun within a thirty-day period. Los Angeles Municipal Code § 55.14,
7 enacted by Ordinance No. 172,430 (eff. Mar. 4, 1999, oper. June 3, 1999).

8 28. Section 55.14 defines “dealer” as a retail firearms dealer licensed by
9 the City of Los Angeles. LAMC § 55.14(a).

10 29. Section 55.14(b) provides the primary prohibition: “No person shall
11 make application to a dealer, as provided in Section 12072 of the California Penal
12 Code, to purchase a pistol, revolver or other firearm capable of being concealed upon
13 the person, herein referred to as ‘handgun,’ within thirty (30) days of making a prior
14 application for the purchase of a handgun within the State of California.” LAMC
15 § 55.14(b). The thirty-day period runs from the date of the prior application,
16 counting that date as day one. *Id.*

17 30. Section 55.14 also restricts dealers. No dealer may transfer a handgun
18 to any person the dealer knows has applied to purchase more than one handgun
19 within the preceding thirty days. LAMC § 55.14(c). No dealer may transfer a
20 handgun if the dealer has received notice from the California Department of Justice

1 that the purchaser has submitted another handgun application within the preceding
2 thirty days. LAMC § 55.14(d).

3 31. The ordinance requires each dealer to maintain records of every
4 handgun sale—including the purchaser's name, the type of handgun, and the date of
5 sale—for at least two years, subject to inspection during normal business hours.
6 LAMC § 55.14(f). Each dealer must post a conspicuous sign stating the obligations
7 and restrictions imposed by the ordinance. LAMC § 55.14(g). Each purchaser must
8 sign a form, under penalty of perjury, declaring whether the purchaser has applied
9 to purchase a handgun within the preceding thirty days. LAMC § 55.14(h).

10 32. The ordinance lists seventeen categories of exempted persons and
11 transactions. LAMC § 55.14(i). These exemptions cover, among others, licensed
12 firearms dealers, law enforcement agencies, peace officers, correctional facilities,
13 licensed collectors, persons replacing a single lost or stolen handgun, and certain
14 other narrow categories. The exemptions do not cover ordinary, law-abiding citizens
15 who wish to purchase more than one handgun in a thirty-day period for self-defense
16 or other lawful purposes, including Plaintiffs.

17 33. The ordinance imposes escalating penalties. A first violation of the
18 purchaser prohibition is an infraction subject to a \$50 fine. A second violation is an
19 infraction subject to a \$100 fine. A third or subsequent violation is a misdemeanor.
20 Each handgun applied for constitutes a separate violation. LAMC § 55.14(j).

1 **B. Inglewood’s 1-in-30 Ban.**

2 34. “Inglewood’s 1-in-30 Ban” comprises the following laws as enacted
3 and enforced by the City of Inglewood and its individual Defendant officials.

4 35. The City of Inglewood prohibits any person from purchasing more than
5 one handgun within a thirty-day period. Inglewood Municipal Code § 5-19.6 (“Sale
6 or Purchase of More Than One Handgun Within a Thirty-Day Period Prohibited.”).

7 36. Section 5-19.6 defines “dealer” as a retail firearms dealer licensed by
8 the City of Inglewood. Inglewood Mun. Code § 5-19.6(a).

9 37. Section 5-19.6(b) provides the primary prohibition: “No person shall
10 make application to a dealer, as provided in Section 12072 of the California Penal
11 Code, to purchase a pistol, revolver or other firearm capable of being concealed upon
12 the person, herein referred to as ‘handgun,’ within thirty days of making a prior
13 application for the purchase of a handgun within the state of California.” Inglewood
14 Mun. Code § 5-19.6(b). The thirty-day period runs from the date of the prior
15 application, counting that date as day one. *Id.*

16 38. Section 5-19.6 also restricts dealers. No dealer may “transfer the title
17 of any handgun to any person whom the dealer knows has made application to
18 purchase more than one handgun within the state of California within a thirty-day
19 period prior thereto.” Inglewood Mun. Code § 5-19.6(c). No dealer may transfer a
20 handgun if the dealer has received notice from the California Department of Justice

1 that the purchaser has submitted another handgun application within the preceding
2 thirty days. Inglewood Mun. Code § 5-19.6(d).

3 39. The ordinance requires each dealer to maintain records of every
4 handgun sale for at least two years, subject to inspection during normal business
5 hours. Inglewood Mun. Code § 5-19.6(f). Each dealer must post a conspicuous sign,
6 pursuant to direction by the Chief of Police, stating the obligations and restrictions
7 imposed by the ordinance. Inglewood Mun. Code § 5-19.6(g). Each purchaser must
8 sign a form prescribed by the Chief of Police, under penalty of perjury, declaring
9 whether the purchaser has applied to purchase a handgun within the preceding thirty
10 days. Inglewood Mun. Code § 5-19.6(h).

11 40. The ordinance lists seventeen categories of exempted persons and
12 transactions. Inglewood Mun. Code § 5-19.6(i). These exemptions cover, among
13 others, licensed firearms dealers, law enforcement agencies, peace officers,
14 correctional facilities, licensed collectors, persons replacing a single lost or stolen
15 handgun, and certain other narrow categories. The exemptions do not cover ordinary,
16 law-abiding citizens who wish to purchase more than one handgun in a thirty-day
17 period for self-defense or other lawful purposes, including Plaintiffs.

18 41. The ordinance imposes escalating penalties. Violations of the purchaser
19 prohibition are punishable as infractions or misdemeanors under the penalty
20

1 structure set forth in Inglewood Municipal Code § 5-19.6(j). Each handgun applied
2 for constitutes a separate violation.

3 42. The Los Angeles and Inglewood City ordinances are referred to
4 collectively as the "1-in-30 Bans" or the "Bans."

5 **C. Defendants' 1-in-30 Bans violate the Right to Keep and Bear Arms.**

6 43. *Nguyen v. Bonta*, 140 F.4th 1237 (9th Cir. 2025), controls. *Nguyen* held
7 California Penal Code Section 27535(a)—the State's one-gun-a-month law—
8 facially unconstitutional under the Second Amendment. The local 1-in-30 Bans
9 challenged here impose the same restriction on the same conduct. They fail for the
10 same reasons.

11 44. The Second Amendment, incorporated against state and local
12 governments via the Fourteenth Amendment, protects “the right of the people to
13 keep and bear Arms.” U.S. CONST. amend. II; *McDonald v. City of Chicago*, 561
14 U.S. 742, 791 (2010); *id.* at 805–858 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring
15 in judgment) (“the right to keep and bear arms is a privilege of American citizenship
16 that applies to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment's Privileges or
17 Immunities Clause”). Under *Bruen*, the Court asks whether the Second
18 Amendment's plain text covers the regulated conduct and, if so, whether the
19 government can show the law is consistent with this Nation's historical tradition of
20

1 firearm regulation. *N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n v. Bruen*, 597 U.S. 1, 24 (2022);
2 *United States v. Rahimi*, 602 U.S. 680, 692 (2024).

3 45. The regulated conduct here is the acquisition of more than one handgun
4 within thirty days. *Nguyen*, 140 F.4th at 1241. The Second Amendment's plain text
5 covers that conduct because the right to keep and bear “Arms,” plural, protects
6 possession of multiple firearms, and the right to possess arms necessarily includes
7 the right to acquire them. *Id.* at 1242–43; *District of Columbia v. Heller*, 554 U.S.
8 570, 581, 635 (2008); *B&L Prods., Inc. v. Newsom*, 104 F.4th 108, 118 (9th Cir.
9 2024); *Teixeira v. County of Alameda*, 873 F.3d 670, 677 (9th Cir. 2017) (en banc).
10 The Amendment forbids infringement, and that term reaches burdens that hinder the
11 right, not just total bans. *See, e.g., Maryland Shall Issue, Inc. v. Moore*, 86 F.4th
12 1038, 1046 n.8 (4th Cir. 2023).

13 46. The 1-in-30 Bans meaningfully abridge Plaintiffs’ rights. A categorical
14 bar on purchasing more than one handgun in thirty days is not an incidental delay
15 tied to a valid regulatory function. California already imposes background checks, a
16 ten-day waiting period, a firearm safety certificate requirement, and a safe-handling
17 demonstration, while federal law separately prohibits straw purchases and requires
18 reporting of multiple handgun sales. The Bans add only a flat temporal cap on lawful
19 purchases by ordinary citizens. *Nguyen*, 140 F.4th at 1243. Nor are they analogous
20 to licensing regimes, because they provide no pathway by which an ordinary, law-

1 abiding citizen may purchase more than one handgun within the thirty-day period.
2 *Id.* at 1248. As *Nguyen* observed, no other constitutionally protected right is subject
3 to this kind of temporal rationing. *Id.* at 1243. The Bans therefore burden conduct
4 protected by the Second Amendment's plain text and are presumptively
5 unconstitutional. *See id.*; *Bruen*, 597 U.S. at 24.

6 47. Defendants cannot rebut that presumption. Under *Bruen*, they bear the
7 burden to show that the Bans are consistent with the Nation's historical tradition of
8 firearm regulation by identifying relevantly similar historical analogues. *Bruen*, 597
9 U.S. at 24, 29; *Rahimi*, 602 U.S. at 692. No such tradition exists.

10 48. During the Founding Era, Americans commonly owned, carried,
11 bought, and sold multiple firearms, and no colony or state restricted the frequency
12 or quantity of firearm purchases by law-abiding citizens. *Nguyen*, 140 F.4th at 1249.
13 In *Nguyen*, the Ninth Circuit rejected every analogue California offered to defend
14 the identical state restriction, including laws restricting sales to Native Americans,
15 dealer-registration and sales-tracking requirements, licensing regimes, and a
16 Virginia law limiting the carrying of multiple firearms near Native towns. *Id.* at
17 1248–49. Those laws targeted dangerous persons, particular places, or different
18 conduct; none resembled a categorical ban on how often ordinary citizens may
19 acquire handguns. *Id.* The same failed historical record cannot sustain these local
20

1 analogues, which apply to nearly all persons, all handguns, and offer no pathway for
2 lawful compliance.

3 The 1-in-30 Bans are therefore facially unconstitutional under the Second and
4 Fourteenth Amendments. Plaintiff Lopez is a law-abiding citizen not disqualified
5 from acquiring, possessing, or owning firearms. He has no criminal history or
6 disqualifying mental-health history and may lawfully purchase firearms in
7 California.

8 **D. The 1-in-30 Bans irreparably harm Plaintiff Lopez.**

9 49. Plaintiff Lopez is not disqualified from exercising his Second
10 Amendment right to acquire, possess, and own firearms and ammunition. He has no
11 criminal history. He has no history of mental health adjudication or commitment. He
12 could pass a government background check and lawfully purchase a firearm in the
13 State of California.

14 50. Plaintiff Lopez serves in the California National Guard. Before joining
15 the Guard, he served five years on active duty in the United States Army as an
16 infantryman. He holds an active secret security clearance issued by the United States
17 government. He holds a concealed carry permit issued by the State of North
18 Carolina, valid through 2028. He is a current firearm owner.

19 51. Plaintiff Lopez is a member of Plaintiffs FPC and CGF.
20

1 52. Plaintiff Lopez desires and intends to purchase more than one handgun
2 within a thirty-day period from a federally licensed firearms dealer located in the
3 City of Los Angeles and the City of Inglewood. He is ready, willing, and financially
4 able to make those purchases now. Among the handguns Plaintiff Lopez desires to
5 purchase are models manufactured by Canik and Walther—handguns in common
6 use for lawful purposes throughout California and the United States and eligible for
7 purchase in California.

8 53. Plaintiff Lopez intends to acquire these handguns for self-defense,
9 defense of others, proficiency training, and other lawful purposes in the exercise of
10 his rights secured under the Second and Fourteenth Amendments.

11 54. But for the 1-in-30 Bans and Defendants' enforcement of them, Plaintiff
12 Lopez would purchase more than one handgun within a thirty-day period from a
13 federally licensed dealer in the City of Los Angeles and the City of Inglewood.

14 55. The 1-in-30 Bans prohibit Plaintiff Lopez from doing so. If Plaintiff
15 Lopez were to apply to purchase more than one handgun within a thirty-day period
16 from a dealer in the City of Los Angeles, he would face criminal prosecution under
17 LAMC § 55.14(j). If he were to do so from a dealer in the City of Inglewood, he
18 would face prosecution under Inglewood Municipal Code § 5-19.6(j). Each handgun
19 applied for would constitute a separate violation. Repeat violations escalate from
20 infractions to misdemeanors.

1 56. No exemption in either of the Bans applies to Plaintiff Lopez. He is not
2 a licensed firearms dealer, a law enforcement officer, a correctional facility, a
3 licensed collector, or any other category of exempt person or entity. He is an
4 ordinary, law-abiding citizen who wishes to exercise his constitutionally protected
5 right to purchase handguns for lawful purposes. The Bans categorically prohibit him
6 from purchasing more than one handgun within a thirty-day period and offer no
7 pathway—no application, no permit, no qualification process—by which he may do
8 so.

9 57. Plaintiff Lopez faces a credible threat of prosecution. The 1-in-30 Bans
10 are actively enforced by the Defendant officials in each jurisdiction. Defendants
11 have given no indication that they will refrain from enforcing the 1-in-30 Bans.
12 Plaintiff Lopez's intended conduct—applying to purchase more than one handgun
13 within a thirty-day period—is the conduct each ordinance prohibits and penalizes.

14 58. The 1-in-30 Bans thus force Lopez to choose between refraining from
15 exercising his Second Amendment right to purchase the handguns he desires within
16 the timeframe he desires, or facing criminal sanction. Lopez refrains. His injury is
17 directly traceable to the 1-in-30 Bans and would be redressed by the declaratory and
18 injunctive relief sought in this action.

19 **E. The 1-in-30 Bans irreparably harm the Organizational Plaintiffs.**

20 59. The foregoing paragraphs are incorporated herein as if set forth in full.

1 60. The Organizational Plaintiffs operate in California with missions that
2 include defending and promoting the rights of the People under the Second
3 Amendment, advancing individual liberty, and restoring freedom through litigation,
4 legislative advocacy, grassroots advocacy, research, education, and outreach.

5 61. The Organizational Plaintiffs have members who reside in California
6 and purchase firearms in the City of Los Angeles and the City of Inglewood,
7 including the named Individual Plaintiff. The Organizational Plaintiffs sue on behalf
8 of the named Individual Plaintiff and their members.

9 62. The Organizational Plaintiffs' members in the City of Los Angeles and
10 the City of Inglewood include individuals who, such as Plaintiff Lopez, are law-
11 abiding adults who are not disqualified from exercising their Second Amendment
12 protected rights. They could pass a government background check and lawfully
13 purchase firearms in the State of California. They are current firearm owners or
14 desire to become firearm owners. They are members of "the people" protected by
15 the Second Amendment.

16 63. The Organizational Plaintiffs' members in each of these jurisdictions
17 desire and intend to purchase more than one handgun within a thirty-day period from
18 federally licensed firearms dealers located in the City of Los Angeles and/or the City
19 of Inglewood for self-defense, defense of others, proficiency training, and other
20

1 lawful purposes in the exercise of their rights secured under the Second and
2 Fourteenth Amendments.

3 64. But for the 1-in-30 Bans and Defendants' enforcement of them, the
4 Organizational Plaintiffs' members would purchase more than one handgun within
5 a thirty-day period from federally licensed dealers in these jurisdictions.

6 65. The 1-in-30 Bans prohibit the Organizational Plaintiffs' members from
7 doing so. If a member of the Organizational Plaintiffs were to apply to purchase
8 more than one handgun within a thirty-day period from a dealer in the City of Los
9 Angeles, that member would face criminal prosecution under LAMC § 55.14(j). If
10 a member of the Organizational Plaintiffs were to do so from a dealer in the City of
11 Inglewood, that member would face prosecution under Inglewood Municipal Code
12 § 5-19.6(j).

13 66. No exemption in any of the three ordinances applies to the
14 Organizational Plaintiffs' affected members. They are ordinary, law-abiding citizens
15 who wish to exercise their constitutional right to purchase handguns for lawful
16 purposes. The Bans categorically prohibit them from purchasing more than one
17 handgun within a thirty-day period and offer no pathway by which they may do so.

18 67. The Organizational Plaintiffs' members face a credible threat of
19 prosecution. The 1-in-30 Bans are actively enforced by the Defendant officials in
20 each jurisdiction. Defendants have given no indication that they will refrain from

1 enforcing the Bans. The intended conduct of the Organizational Plaintiffs' members
2 — applying to purchase more than one handgun within a thirty-day period — is the
3 precise conduct each ordinance prohibits and penalizes.

4 68. The injuries to the Organizational Plaintiffs' members are of the kind
5 that the Organizational Plaintiffs were organized to redress. The Organizational
6 Plaintiffs exist to defend the Second Amendment protected rights of their members,
7 and the deprivation of those rights by the 1-in-30 Bans falls squarely within the
8 Organizational Plaintiffs' organizational mission and purpose.

9 69. Neither the claims asserted nor the relief requested in this action
10 requires the participation of the Organizational Plaintiffs' individual members. The
11 constitutional validity of the 1-in-30 Bans and the appropriateness of declaratory and
12 injunctive relief can be resolved without the individual participation of each affected
13 member. *See Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President & Fellows of Harvard*
14 *College*, 600 U.S. 181, 199-200 (2023); *Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising*
15 *Comm'n*, 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977).

16 70. The Organizational Plaintiffs accordingly have associational standing
17 to assert the rights of their members who purchase firearms within the City of Los
18 Angeles and the City of Inglewood. Their members would have standing to sue in
19 their own right; the interests the Organizational Plaintiffs seeks to protect are
20

1 germane to the Organizational Plaintiffs' purposes; and neither the claims asserted
2 nor the relief requested requires the individual members' participation. *Id.*

3 **V. The Section 1021.11 Fee-Shifting Regime Violates the Constitution.**

4 71. California Code of Civil Procedure Section 1021.11 imposes a one-way
5 fee-shifting penalty on any person, attorney, or law firm that seeks declaratory or
6 injunctive relief against a state or local firearms law. The statute allows government
7 defendants to recover attorney's fees and costs if they prevail on any claim, even if
8 plaintiffs prevail on others, while denying plaintiffs prevailing-party status
9 altogether. It also authorizes a separate state-court collection action within three
10 years and purports to permit enforcement even if a court has already held the statute
11 invalid or preempted. In substance, Section 1021.11 is designed to deter firearms-
12 related civil-rights litigation by threatening asymmetric and potentially ruinous fee
13 liability.

14 72. Section 1021.11 violates the First Amendment. The right to petition
15 includes the right of access to the courts, and government may not burden that right
16 by imposing punitive conditions on those who seek judicial review of allegedly
17 unconstitutional laws. *See Cal. Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited*, 404 U.S.
18 508, 510 (1972); *NAACP v. Button*, 371 U.S. 415, 429-30 (1963); *In re Primus*, 436
19 U.S. 412 (1978). Section 1021.11 targets only one class of litigants—those
20 challenging firearms laws—and thus burdens protected petitioning activity based on

1 subject matter and viewpoint. It exists to insulate firearms regulations from judicial
2 scrutiny and cannot survive constitutional review. *Miller v. Bonta*, 646 F. Supp. 3d
3 1218, 1224-27 (S.D. Cal. 2022), correctly held the statute invalid on that ground.

4 73. Section 1021.11 is also preempted by 42 U.S.C. § 1988. Federal law
5 governs fee awards in § 1983 actions and permits prevailing plaintiffs ordinarily to
6 recover fees, while prevailing defendants may recover only when the suit is
7 frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless. *Hensley v. Eckerhart*, 461 U.S. 424, 429 &
8 n.2 (1983); *Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC*, 434 U.S. 412, 422 (1978).
9 Section 1021.11 flips that regime by granting government defendants fees for partial
10 success, denying fees to plaintiffs entirely, and authorizing later state-court fee
11 actions notwithstanding the federal court's judgment. It therefore conflicts with both
12 the text and purpose of § 1988 and is preempted under the Supremacy Clause. *Miller*,
13 646 F. Supp. 3d at 1227–30.

14 74. Section 1021.11 also violates the Equal Protection and Due Process
15 Clauses. It singles out firearms-rights plaintiffs and their counsel for uniquely
16 adverse treatment imposed on no other class of civil-rights litigants. That
17 classification burdens the exercise of First and Second Amendment protected rights,
18 cannot survive strict scrutiny, and fails even rational-basis review. The statute
19 likewise denies meaningful access to the courts by conditioning judicial review on
20 willingness to risk crushing fee liability for partial loss. As *Miller* explained, laws

1 that exact an unaffordable price for access to court are intolerable. 646 F. Supp. 3d
2 at 1225.

3 75. Section 1021.11 irreparably harms Plaintiffs. This action falls within
4 the statute's terms because Plaintiffs seek declaratory and injunctive relief under
5 § 1983 against local firearms ordinances and the officials who enforce them. The
6 statute therefore exposes Plaintiff Lopez, the Organizational Plaintiffs, and their
7 counsel to joint and several liability for Defendants' fees if Defendants prevail on
8 any claim. Defendants have not disclaimed reliance on the statute. That threat is
9 concrete and present. It materially deters Lopez from participating in this litigation,
10 chills the Organizational Plaintiffs' decision to bring and support firearms cases on
11 behalf of its members, burdens counsel's willingness to represent such plaintiffs, and
12 prevents Plaintiffs from litigating their constitutional claims on equal terms.
13 Declaratory and injunctive relief against Defendants' invocation or enforcement of
14 Section 1021.11 would remove that deterrent and redress Plaintiffs' injuries.

1 **VI. Causes of Action**

2 **A. Count One**

3 **COUNT ONE**
4 **1-in-30 Bans**
5 **42 U.S.C. § 1983**
6 **Action for Deprivation of Plaintiffs' Rights under the**
7 **Second and Fourteenth Amendments**
8 **Facial and As-Applied**
9 **(All Plaintiffs v. All Defendants)**

7 76. The foregoing paragraphs are hereby incorporated herein as if set forth
8 in full.

9 77. All Plaintiffs assert Count One against all Defendants.

10 78. Count One proceeds both facially and as-applied.

11 79. The Second Amendment provides: “A well regulated Militia, being
12 necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear
13 Arms, shall not be infringed.” U.S. CONST. amend. II. The Second Amendment is
14 applicable against state and local governments via the Fourteenth Amendment.
15 *McDonald v. City of Chicago*, 561 U.S. 742, 791 (2010); *id.* at 805–858 (Thomas,
16 J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (“the right to keep and bear arms
17 is a privilege of American citizenship that applies to the States through the
18 Fourteenth Amendment's Privileges or Immunities Clause”).

19 80. For the reasons set forth above, the 1-in-30 Bans violate the Second and
20 Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. The Bans meaningfully

1 constrain conduct protected by the Second Amendment's plain text—the purchase
2 of more than one handgun within a thirty-day period—and Defendants cannot
3 demonstrate that the Bans are consistent with this Nation's historical tradition of
4 firearm regulation. *Nguyen v. Bonta*, 140 F.4th 1237 (9th Cir. 2025); *N.Y. State Rifle*
5 *& Pistol Ass'n v. Bruen*, 597 U.S. 1 (2022).

6 81. For the reasons set forth above, the 1-in-30 Bans irreparably harm
7 Plaintiff Lopez and the members of the Organizational Plaintiffs. Plaintiff Lopez
8 desires and intends to purchase more than one handgun within a thirty-day period
9 and is deterred from doing so solely by the threat of criminal prosecution under the
10 Bans. The Organizational Plaintiffs' members, including the named Individual
11 Plaintiff, are injured in the same manner. But for the Bans, Plaintiffs would exercise
12 their constitutionally protected right to acquire multiple handguns within a thirty-
13 day period for self-defense, defense of others, proficiency training, and other lawful
14 purposes.

15 82. Defendants enacted, enforce, and threaten to enforce the 1-in-30 Bans
16 under color of state law within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Their enforcement
17 of the Bans deprives Plaintiffs of rights secured by the Second and Fourteenth
18 Amendments.

1 **B. Count Two**

2 **COUNT TWO**
3 **Section 1021.11**
4 **42 U.S.C. § 1983**
5 **Action for Deprivation of Plaintiffs’ Rights under the**
6 **First and Fourteenth Amendments**
7 **Facial and As-Applied**
8 **(All Plaintiffs v. All Defendants)**

9 83. The foregoing paragraphs are hereby incorporated herein as if set forth
10 in full.

11 84. All Plaintiffs assert Count Two against all Defendants.

12 85. Count Two proceeds both facially and as-applied.

13 86. The First Amendment provides in relevant part that “Congress shall
14 make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech . . . or the right of the people . . . to
15 petition the government for a redress of grievances.” U.S. CONST. amend. I. The First
16 Amendment is applicable against the States. *See Gitlow v. New York*, 268 U.S. 652,
17 666 (1925).

18 87. For the reasons set forth above, Section 1021.11's fee-shifting penalty
19 violates the First Amendment to the Constitution. The statute chills Plaintiffs' right
20 to petition the courts for redress of their Second Amendment grievances, is content-
based and viewpoint-discriminatory, and cannot survive strict scrutiny.

 88. For the reasons set forth above, Section 1021.11 irreparably harms both
Plaintiff Lopez and the Organizational Plaintiffs. The statute subjects Plaintiffs and

1 their counsel to joint and several liability for Defendants' attorney's fees for bringing
2 this action. It deters Plaintiff Lopez from participating in this litigation and chills the
3 Organizational Plaintiffs from filing this and other lawsuits they are otherwise
4 prepared to bring on behalf of their members. But for Section 1021.11, Plaintiffs
5 would press their constitutional challenges to the 1-in-30 Bans without the threat of
6 asymmetric and potentially ruinous fee liability.

7 **C. Count Three**

8 **COUNT THREE**
9 **Section 1021.11**
10 **42 U.S.C. § 1983**
11 **Action for Deprivation of Plaintiffs' Rights under the**
12 **Supremacy Clause**
13 **Facial and As-Applied**
14 **(All Plaintiffs v. All Defendants)**

15 89. The foregoing paragraphs are hereby incorporated herein as if set forth
16 in full.

17 90. All Plaintiffs assert Count Three against all Defendants.

18 91. Count Three proceeds both facially and as-applied.

19 92. The Supremacy Clause provides in relevant part that “[t]his
20 Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance
thereof . . . shall be the supreme law of the land . . . any thing in the constitution or
laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding.” U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.

1 93. Section 1988(b) provides in relevant part that, “[i]n any action or
2 proceeding to enforce a provision of [42 U.S.C. § 1983], the court, in its discretion,
3 may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney’s
4 fee as part of the costs.” 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b).

5 94. For the reasons set forth above, Section 1021.11's fee-shifting penalty
6 directly conflicts with 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b), undermines its purposes, and is
7 preempted. Its application is unconstitutional under the Supremacy Clause.

8 95. For the reasons set forth above, Section 1021.11 irreparably harms both
9 Plaintiff Lopez and the Organizational Plaintiffs. The statute creates an asymmetric
10 fee regime that deters Plaintiffs from prosecuting their federal civil rights claims
11 under Section 1983 and threatens to nullify the fee protections Congress provided
12 through Section 1988. But for Section 1021.11, Plaintiffs would litigate their
13 constitutional challenges to the 1-in-30 Bans without the risk that a state-law
14 collection action could be brought against them and their counsel for exercising
15 federal rights in federal court.

1 challenge government action under every other provision of the Bill of Rights—
2 solely because Plaintiffs seek to vindicate Second Amendment protected rights. But
3 for this discriminatory treatment, Plaintiffs would litigate on equal footing with
4 every other civil rights plaintiff in the State.

5 **E. Count Five**

6 **COUNT FIVE**
7 **Section 1021.11**
8 **42 U.S.C. § 1983**
9 **Action for Deprivation of Plaintiffs’ Rights under the**
10 **Due Process Clause**
11 **Facial and As-Applied**
12 **(All Plaintiffs v. All Defendants)**

13 102. The foregoing paragraphs are hereby incorporated herein as if set forth
14 in full.

15 103. All Plaintiffs assert Count Five against all Defendants.

16 104. Count Five proceeds both facially and as-applied.

17 105. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that
18 no state shall “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process
19 of law.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.

20 106. For the reasons set forth above, Section 1021.11 violates the Due
Process Clause. The statute exacts a punitive financial penalty on citizens who
exercise their fundamental right to seek judicial review of firearms regulations,
thereby depriving them of meaningful access to the courts without due process of

1 law. Section 1021.11 conditions access to the judicial process on the willingness to
2 bear a risk of asymmetric fee liability that no other category of civil rights litigant
3 must bear—a burden that “requires that a citizen be able to be heard in court.” *Miller*
4 *v. Bonta*, 646 F. Supp. 3d 1218, 1225 (S.D. Cal. 2022).

5 107. For the reasons set forth above, Section 1021.11 irreparably harms both
6 Plaintiff Lopez and the Organizational Plaintiffs. The statute threatens Plaintiffs with
7 financial ruin for exercising their right to be heard in court. It deprives Plaintiff
8 Lopez of the ability to challenge the 1-in-30 Bans on equal terms. It deprives the
9 Organizational Plaintiffs and their counsel of the ability to litigate on behalf of the
10 Organizational Plaintiffs’ members without the threat of joint and several fee
11 liability that attaches to no other form of civil rights litigation. But for Section
12 1021.11, Plaintiffs would access the courts to vindicate their constitutional rights
13 without the punitive conditions the statute imposes.

14 **VII. Prayer for Relief**

15 108. Plaintiffs respectfully request that this Honorable Court enter judgment
16 in their favor and against Defendants, as follows:

17 109. The Court should address and resolve Counts Two, Three, Four, and
18 Five before addressing and resolving Count One.

19 110. As to Counts Two, Three, Four, and Five, the Court should enter
20 judgment in Plaintiffs’ favor and against the Defendants, as follows:

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- a. Declare that the SB 1327 fee-shifting penalty set forth in California Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.11 violates the First Amendment to the United States Constitution;
- b. Declare that the SB 1327 fee-shifting penalty set forth in California Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.11 is preempted and its application is unconstitutional under the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution;
- c. Declare that the SB 1327 fee-shifting penalty set forth in California Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.11 violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution;
- d. Declare that the SB 1327 fee-shifting penalty set forth in California Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.11 violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution;
- e. Enjoin the Defendants’ enforcement or application of the SB 1327 fee-shifting penalty set forth in California Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.11 against Plaintiffs, Plaintiffs’ members, and any attorney or law firm representing any Plaintiff in any litigation involving the Defendants potentially subject thereto;

1 f. Award Plaintiffs costs of suit, including reasonable attorneys' fees
2 under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 and any other applicable law, and all further
3 relief to which Plaintiffs may be justly entitled; and

4 g. Grant any and all other equitable and/or legal remedies this Court may
5 see fit.

6 111. As to Count One, the Court should enter judgment in Plaintiffs' favor
7 and against all Defendants, as follows:

8 a. Declare that Plaintiffs' rights guaranteed by the Second and Fourteenth
9 Amendments to the United States Constitution are violated by the
10 enforcement of L.A. City's 1-in-30 Ban, Los Angeles Municipal Code
11 § 55.14, enacted by Ordinance No. 172,430 (eff. Mar. 4, 1999, oper.
12 June 3, 1999), et seq.;

13 b. Permanently enjoin the L.A. Defendants, their officers, agents,
14 servants, employees, and all persons in active concert or participation
15 with them, and all persons who have notice of the injunction, from
16 enforcing L.A. City's 1-in-30 Ban, Los Angeles Municipal Code
17 § 55.14, enacted by Ordinance No. 172,430 (eff. Mar. 4, 1999, oper.
18 June 3, 1999), et seq.;

19 c. Declare that Plaintiffs' rights guaranteed by the Second and Fourteenth
20 Amendments to the United States Constitution are violated by the

1 enforcement of Inglewood’s “1-in-30 Ban,” Inglewood Municipal
2 Code § 5-19.6 et seq.;

3 d. Permanently enjoin the Inglewood Defendants, their officers, agents,
4 servants, employees, and all persons in active concert or participation
5 with them, and all persons who have notice of the injunction, from
6 enforcing Inglewood’s 1-in-30 Ban, Inglewood Municipal Code § 5-
7 19.6 et seq.;

8 e. Award Plaintiffs nominal damages;

9 f. Award Plaintiffs’ costs, attorney fees, and all other allowable expenses
10 pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988 and all applicable laws; and

11 g. Grant any and all other equitable and/or legal remedies this Court may
12 see fit.

Respectfully submitted,

Dated: June 3, 2026

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