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14	MAURO CAMPOS et al.,	Case No. 37-2020-00030178-CU-MC-CTL
15	Petitioner and Plaintiff,	
16	v.	MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND
17	VAVIED DECEDDA et al	AUTHORITIES IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDATE
18	XAVIER BECERRA et al.,	Date: July 22, 2022
19	Respondents and Defendants.	Time: 2:30 p.m. Dept: C-64
20		Judge: The Honorable John S. Meyer Action Filed: August 27, 2020
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1	INTRODUCTION
2	During the early days of the COVID-19 pandemic in California, when California also saw
3	an extraordinary surge in firearms purchases, the statutorily required background checks for some
4	purchasers temporarily extended beyond the 10-day waiting period to acquire a firearm. For most
5	purchasers the added delay in clearing a background check was no more than three to five days.
6	By July 2020, despite continued unprecedented levels of firearms sales, the California Bureau of
7	Firearms (the Bureau) had completely resolved the backlog, which has not recurred. Without
8	identifying any need for relief at the present time, Plaintiffs seek a writ of mandate and
9	declaratory judgment concerning this once-in-a-century event. Plaintiffs' claims are procedurally,
10	legally, and factually without merit and must be denied.
11	As a threshold matter, this Court should deny the writ of mandate because this case is moot.
12	Even if Petitioners could state a claim, which they cannot, the Department resolved all delays in
13	processing background check applications by July 2020. Petitioners may not obtain a writ
14	directing the Department to take actions that were resolved long ago, and may not obtain a
15	declaration concerning past events. This Court should decline Petitioners' invitation to issue an
16	advisory opinion where there is no ongoing controversy and no probability of any future
17	controversy.
18	Second, the Petition fails on the merits. The evidence in this case shows that the
19 20	Department of Justice and its Bureau of Firearms conducted background checks throughout the
20	pandemic in accordance with Penal Code section 28220.1 California's legislative scheme requires
21	the Department to perform background checks. Contrary to Petitioners' assertions, the statutory
22	scheme does not require the Department to approve background checks after ten days without
23	exception. Petitioners mistakenly conflate the 10-day waiting period, which begins at the time of
24 25	purchase, with the background check process, which by statute can extend for up to 30 days.
25 26	Where an adequate background check cannot be performed within ten days of receiving the
26 27	application, such as when there was a perfect storm of a global pandemic, office closures, and a
27	
28	¹ All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.

1	surge in gun sales, the statutory scheme still mandates that a background check should be
2	performed and does not require or allow the Department of Justice to approve unvetted
3	applications. Any other reading of the statute does not effectuate the clear intent of the statutory
4	scheme that background checks be conducted.
5	Finally, Plaintiffs offer no evidence to support their assertion that the Department
6	"exploited" the pandemic to delay background checks. Far from it. The undisputed evidence
7	shows that the Department diligently worked to complete the background check process as
8	quickly as possible under unprecedented and entirely unexpected conditions.
9	Accordingly, the Court should deny the petition for writ of mandate and the request for
10	declaratory relief.
11	BACKGROUND
12	I. FACTUAL AND LEGAL BACKGROUND
13	A. The Bureau of Firearms Conducts a Background Check for Every Person Who Purchases a Firearm.
14	California has a comprehensive statutory scheme for enforcing laws that prohibit felons and
15	other prohibited people from buying, possessing, and using firearms. Each time a person
16 17	purchases a firearm in California from a federally licensed firearms dealer, DOJ performs a
17	background check pursuant to the terms of section 28220. California is a "point-of-contact" state,
10 19	meaning that it conducts background checks that meet the minimum requirements of the federal
20	background check by accessing various electronic databases. (28 C.F.R. § 25.6(d).)
20 21	To initiate a background check for a firearms purchase, the dealer submits a "Dealer Record
21	of Sale" (DROS) to the Department through the DROS Entry System (DES) based on information
22	provided by the purchaser. (Thompson Decl. $\P6$.) Section 28220, subdivision (a), requires that the
24	Department perform a background check after receiving the DROS: "Upon submission of firearm
25	purchaser information, the Department shall examine its records, as well as those records that
26	it is authorized to request in order to determine if the purchaser is a person described in
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subdivision (a) of Section 27535,² or is prohibited by state or federal law from possessing, receiving, owning, or purchasing a firearm." (§ 28220, subd. (a).)

3 The Department's process for completing the background check under section 28220 starts 4 with an automated screening. (Thompson Decl. ¶7.) This automated screening is called the Basic 5 Firearms Eligibility Check (BFEC). (*Id.* at \P 8.) The BFEC checks the applicant information 6 against DMV records, and sends inquiries to various state and federal electronic databases based 7 on the purchaser's name and date of birth, compiling the responses when the date of birth and 8 name results in an exact or close match in those databases. (Id.; see also Silvester v. Harris (E.D. 9 Cal. 2016) 843 F.3d 816, 825 [describing the process].) If no disqualifying information turns up 10 in these checks, and there are no hits in any of the databases, the application will be approved. 11 (*Ibid.*) Currently, about 14% of all DROS applications are auto-approved through the BFEC 12 process and do not need further manual review by an analyst. (Thompson Decl. ¶13.) Once an 13 auto approval occurs, the dealer is notified of the approval after ten days. (Id. at $\P14$) Within the 14 DES, for an auto approved DROS, the dealer does not have the ability to mark the firearm as 15 "Delivered" until ten days from the submission date, unless the DROS applicant is exempt from 16 the 10-day waiting period. (*Ibid.*)

17 The applications that are not auto approved through the BFEC process—approximately 18 86% of total applications—need to be reviewed manually by an analyst. These applications are 19 placed into a queue and analysts in the Background Clearance Unit (BCU) process them in the 20 order that they are received, working on the oldest applications first. (Thompson Decl. ¶16.) An 21 analyst will review the DROS application and any database hits that may be connected to the 22 application. (*Ibid.*) If the records matched during the BFEC clearly indicate the DROS applicant 23 is not prohibited from purchasing or possessing a firearm, the analyst will approve the DROS, 24 enabling the purchaser to obtain the firearm at the conclusion of the 10-day waiting period. (Id. 25 ¶18.) Conversely, if the records matched during the BFEC clearly indicate the DROS applicant is

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² Section 27535, subdivision (a), prohibits purchasing more than one firearm during a 30-day period.

prohibited from purchasing or possessing a firearm, and no further research is needed, the analyst will deny the DROS. (*Ibid.*)

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The Bureau's objective is to review DROSs within the statutory 10-day waiting period.
(Thompson Decl. ¶16.) The Bureau closely monitors all DROSs in the queue to ensure proper
personnel resources are available to process all transactions in a timely manner. (*Ibid.*)

6 The Department is sometimes unable to determine a person's eligibility before the 7 conclusion of California's mandatory 10-day waiting period, often because the person's record 8 reveals the existence of a mental health or criminal record suggesting that the buyer has a 9 potentially disqualifying mental health hold or criminal conviction. (See § 28220, subd. (f)(1)(A); 10 (Thompson Decl. ¶¶ 19-21.) For example, this can happen when an arrest or criminal charge has 11 been reported to a criminal records database, but the database shows no corresponding 12 disposition. (Thompson Decl. \P 24.) In such a case, the Department is unable to determine from 13 the record whether the person was convicted of the potentially prohibiting crime. (*Ibid.*) Upon 14 reviewing records, "[t]he department shall immediately notify the dealer to delay the transfer of 15 the firearm to the purchaser if the records of the department or the records available to the 16 department" indicate that the person may be disqualified from owning a firearm. (See § 28220, 17 subd. (f)(1)(A).) Section 28220, subdivision (f)(4), limits the Department to 30 days from 18 submission of the DROS to attempt to locate a disposition. (*Ibid.*) The analyst will also attempt to 19 determine missing information that is pertinent to making an eligibility determination. (*Ibid.*) For 20 example, the analyst may contact listed reporting agencies, such as courts, police departments, 21 and military tribunals, for disposition information regarding noted arrests. (*Ibid.*) 22 Throughout the review, the Department communicates with firearms dealers through DES. 23 (See Cal. Code Regs., tit. 11, § 4230, subd. (b).) After the dealer submits an application, DES will 24 show the transaction as "pending." (Thompson Decl. \P 9.) The regulations prohibit the firearms

- dealer from delivering the weapon while the status states "pending." (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 11,
- 26 § 4230, subd. (b)(1)(C).) After review, the Department will inform the dealer through its DES
- 27 system that the transaction is "denied" or "approved." (§ 28220, subd. (c); Cal. Code Regs., tit.
- 28 11, § 4230, subd. (b)(C)(2).) If the transaction is "approved," the dealer may deliver the firearm at

1	the conclusion of the 10-day waiting period, unless the purchaser is exempt. ³ (§ 4230, subd. (a).)
2	If the transaction is "denied," the dealer is prohibited from completing the sale. (Ibid.) The
3	regulations provide that DOJ will indicate a "delayed status" when it "is unable to determine the
4	purchaser's eligibility within the 10-day period." (Id., subd. (b)(2).) In practice, this occurs when
5	an analyst, manually reviewing an application in the unprocessed queue, finds an incomplete
6	record that needs additional review. (Thompson Decl. ¶¶ 19-21; see also § 28220, subd. (f).)
7	When the DROS is marked "delayed," the Bureau mails a copy of the notification to the
8	DROS applicant stating that the DROS is delayed and explaining the process by which the DROS
9	applicant may obtain a copy of the criminal or mental health record that the Department has on
10	file. (Thompson Decl. \P 24.) At the same time the analyst manually marks the DROS as
11	"delayed" within the DROS System, which then updates DES with the "delayed" status. (Ibid.)
12	To transfer the firearm, the dealer must use the "Deliver Gun" function within DES, which
13	allows the dealer to report delivery of the firearm. (§ 4230, subds. (a), (c)-(d).) When an
14	application is "denied," "pending," or "delayed," dealers do not have the option to deliver the
15	firearm.
16	B. The COVID-19 Pandemic's Effects Reached California in Early 2020.
17	On March 4, 2020, Governor Gavin Newsom proclaimed a State of Emergency in
18	California as a result of the threat of COVID-19. (https://www.gov.ca.gov/wp-
19	content/uploads/2020/03/3.4.20-Coronavirus-SOE-Proclamation.pdf> (as of June 17, 2022).) On
20	March 13, 2020, then-President Donald Trump likewise proclaimed the United States to be in a
21	state of national emergency due to the COVID-19 outbreak.
22	(https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/presidential-actions/proclamation-declaring-national-
23	emergency-concerning-novel-coronavirus-disease-covid-19-outbreak/> (as of June 13, 2022).)
24	On March 16, Governor Newsom issued Executive Order N-33-20, stating that COVID-19
25	had "rapidly spread throughout California" and directing Californians to stay home for the
26	preservation of public health and safety. (https://www.gov.ca.gov/wp-
27 28	³ If the approval occurs more than 10 days after the purchase, the dealer may immediately release the firearm to the purchaser; i.e., the purchaser does not wait 10 days from the date of approval, but 10 days from the date of purchase. (§ 28220, subd. (f)(3)A).)

content/uploads/2020/03/3.19.20-EO-N-33-20-COVID-19-HEALTH-ORDER-03.19.2020-

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signed.pdf> (as of June 17, 2022).) The order advised Californians to shelter at home unless they
needed to perform authorized necessary activities and, in which case, "they should at all times
practice social distancing." (*Id.*)

5 Many schools, childcare centers, government buildings, and businesses likewise reduced 6 operations or closed entirely. For example, courts throughout California temporarily reduced or 7 completely suspended operations. On March 16, 2020, the San Diego Superior Court asked that 8 summoned jurors not report to duty and suspended all non-emergency services starting March 17, 9 including: all criminal proceedings including arraignments, trials and sentencing, all civil 10 proceedings, and most family court proceedings. The court extended the emergency order several 11 times. Criminal jury trials did not resume in San Diego Superior Court until October 13, 2020. 12 Federal courts in California likewise suspended criminal jury trials beginning in March 2020. 13 (See United States v. Olsen (9th Cir. 2022) 21 F.4th 1036, 1041 [recounting general orders 14 suspending criminal trials in the Central District of California from March 2020 through 15 approximately May 2021].)


16 During this time, firearms sales increased dramatically to unprecedented levels. (Thompson 17 Decl. ¶ 26.) The 2020 calendar year began unremarkably in terms of firearms sales. In January 18 and February 2020, the number of applications to purchase a firearm submitted to the Bureau of 19 Firearms had closely matched (or were actually slightly less than) what the Bureau had received 20 in the first two months of 2019, approximately 2,000 applications per day on average. (Martinez 21 Decl., Ex. B, "Daily Applications Incoming 2019 vs. 2020"; Thompson Decl., ¶ 29.) But in the 22 middle of March 2020, gun sales began to surge. On March 17, 18, and 19 the Bureau received 23 over 9,000 applications each day. (Thompson Decl. ¶ 30.) And on March 20, it received over 24 7,600—a slight drop from the days prior, but still nearly three times what would have been 25 expected. (*Ibid.*) For the full month of March, the Bureau received approximately 140,000 26 applications to be processed, as compared to the 85,000 that it received in the same month the 27 year before, with much of the increase coming in in the latter half of the month. (Martinez Decl., 28 Ex.B; see also Thompson Decl, Ex. A.) This surge continued for the rest of the 2020, with

October 2020 having nearly twice the number of applications as October 2019 and November and

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


C. The Bureau of Firearms Responded to a Surge in Firearms Applications.

The Bureau of Firearms routinely monitors incoming applications, and processes 14 applications within the 10-day waiting period, or where applicable, delays applications pursuant 15 to section 28220, subdivision (f), before expiration of the 10-day waiting period. (Thompson 16 Decl. ¶ 16.) The Bureau monitors DROSs and tries to project incoming numbers in order to 17 adjust staffing resources to meet changing demands. (Thompson Decl. ¶ 27.) For example, in the 18 past the Bureau has anticipated and staffed for seasonal increases in firearms sales (like at 19 Christmas) and temporary increases in DROSs due to changes in the law. (*Ibid.*) But the Bureau 20 had no way of anticipating the surge in firearms sales that it saw beginning in March 2020. (Ibid.) 21 Bureau staff responded to the surge in applications by continuing to report to work 22 throughout the pandemic to process applications. (Thompson Decl. ¶ 36.) Leadership at the 23 Bureau, including supervisors in the Background Check Unit, continued to monitor the number of 24 daily DROS applications received and processed and prioritized processing of the applications. 25 (Id. at ¶ 27, Exh. A [morning emails from March 4 through August 20, 2020]⁴.) They worked 26 27

⁴ This exhibit includes morning emails from March 4 through August 20, 2020. The Department has not located emails for the following days: April 15, 16 and 28, 2020.

1	under the constraints of the pandemic, which included some analysts needing to quarantine or
2	stay home due to increased medical risk, and other staff taking leave due to the need to care for
3	sick family members or children whose schools and daycares had closed. (<i>Id.</i> at $\P\P$ 32-33.)
4	To conduct background checks within the 10-day waiting period, the Bureau began
5	implementing all feasible measures to counteract these operational and staffing issues.
6	(Thompson Decl. \P 39.) These measures included redirecting staff from other units within the
7	Bureau. (<i>Id.</i> at \P 40.) The Bureau treated this as an "all hands on deck" situation. (<i>Ibid.</i>) The
8	Bureau also used flexible schedules and a mix of voluntary and mandatory overtime to increase
9	processing capacity, and moved cubicles to accommodate social distancing. (<i>Id.</i> at $\P\P41, 43.$)
10	Staff worked on weekends and early in the mornings. (Ibid.) The Bureau also expedited ongoing
11	hiring efforts. (Id. at ¶43.) However, hiring efforts were at best a long-term solution, as analysts
12	typically need six months of training to be able to adequately conduct background checks
13	independently. (See Tobia Decl., ¶¶ 4, 10).
14	During this time, the Bureau placed the following message on its website, notifying dealers
15	and firearms purchasers that the impact of COVID-19 could lead to background checks
16	completed after the expiration of the 10-day waiting period but that the Department would
17	continue to strive to complete checks in the shortest time possible:
18	Under Penal Code section 28220(f)(4), the Department of Justice (DOJ) has up to 30 days to complete headers and shocks on finances much sector.
19	days to complete background checks on firearms purchasers DOJ typically completed these checks within Penal Code Section 26815(a)'s 10-day waiting period.
20	COVID-19 protective measures have impacted the ability to increase personnel resources in the DROS unit to address the recent sustained increase in firearms as
21	DOJ employees <i>continue to perform the statutorily required background checks</i> throughout the COVID-19 pandemic, circumstances <i>may compel</i> that background checks are completed after the expiration of the 10 day waiting period for firearms
22	checks are completed after the expiration of the 10-day waiting period for firearms purchases. DOJ will continue to strive to provide the best service and <i>complete these checks in the shortest time possible</i> .
23	[italics added].
24	
25	In March 2020, staff processed approximately 103,000 applications, whereas in the prior
26	year in March they had processed 69,000. (Martinez Decl., Ex. C.) These numbers do not include
27	the percentage of applications that are auto-approved. (Ibid.) Staff continued this trend of
28	processing significantly more applications, year-over-year throughout 2020. (Ibid.) Some months,
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1 Petitioners seek a writ of mandate compelling the Attorney General, Director of Bureau of 2 Firearms, and Department of Justice to take three actions. First, where an application cannot be 3 processed within California's 10-day waiting period and such applications are not designated as 4 "delayed" under section 28220, subdivision (f) (used where a check has been performed and a 5 partial record has been found that needs more research), Petitioners demand that the Department 6 approve the applications, even if the Department has been unable to perform any background 7 check on the applicant. (Pet. ¶ 59 & p. 20; see also Pet.'s Br. at p. 10.) Second, Petitioners seek 8 authorization for "firearms dealers to deliver firearms to purchasers and transferees after 10 days, 9 except where Respondents comply with the statutes to extend the 10-day waiting period under 10 three specific and enumerated circumstances set forth in Penal Code section 28220(f)(1)(A)." 11 (Pet. p. 20.) Third, where a transfer is delayed under subdivision (f)(3), Respondents want the 12 Department to "immediately notify the dealer" of the reason(s) for any delay and inform the 13 purchaser about the delay pursuant to section 28220, subdivision (f). (*Ibid.*) 14 Petitioners also ask for related declaratory relief under Code of Civil Procedure section 15 1060: (1) "That DOJ may not use the DROS Entry System to leave an individual in 'Pending' 16 status after expiration of the 10-day waiting period under Penal Code section 28220 and 11 CCR 17 section 4230," and (2) "That DOJ may not delay firearm transfers beyond the initial 10-day 18 waiting period except in the three specific and enumerated circumstances set forth in Penal Code 19 section 28220(f)(1)(A)." (Pet. ¶ 63 & p. 20; see also Pet.'s Br. at p. 10.) 20 **STANDARD OF REVIEW** 21 "A writ of mandate may be issued by any court to an inferior tribunal, corporation, board, 22 or person, to compel the performance of an act which the law specially enjoins, as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station . . ." (Code Civ. Proc., § 1085, subd. (a).) For a writ to issue, the 23 24 Court must find a "clear, present, (and usually ministerial) duty" on the part of the respondent; 25 and a "clear, present, and beneficial right" in the petitioner, to performance of that duty. (Pacifica 26 Firefighters Assoc. v. City of Pacifica (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 758, 765.) "As a general matter, 27 courts 'will be deferential to government agency interpretations of their own regulations,

28 particularly when the interpretation involves matters within the agency's expertise and does not

1	plainly conflict with a statutory mandate. (See Yamaha Corp. of America v. State Bd. of
2	Equalization (1998) 19 Cal.4th 1, 12–13.) Courts "will not disturb the agency's determination
3	without a demonstration that it is clearly unreasonable." (Ibid.)
4	ARGUMENT
5	I. THE WRIT SHOULD BE DENIED BECAUSE THE MATTER IS MOOT.
6 7	A. There Is No Ongoing Delay in Processing Firearms Applications, Making Petitioners' Writ of Mandate Claim Moot.
8	The Court should deny the writ because this controversy is moot. "California courts will
9	decide only justiciable controversies." (Wilson & Wilson v. City Council of Redwood City (2011)
10	191 Cal.App.4th 1559, 1574 (Wilson), citations omitted.) "A case is moot when the decision of
11	the reviewing court 'can have no practical impact or provide the parties effectual relief."" (MHC
12	Operating Limited Partnership v. City of San Jose (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 204, 214 (MHC).)
12	"Stated differently, moot cases 'are "[t]hose in which an actual controversy did exist but, by the
13	passage of time or a change in circumstances, ceased to exist."" (Parkford Owners for a Better
15	Community v. County of Placer (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 714, 722, quoting Wilson, 191
16	Cal.App.4th at 1573.) "The pivotal question in determining if a case is moot is therefore whether
17	the court can grant the plaintiff any effectual relief." (Wilson, 191 Cal.App.4th at p. 1574.)
18	There is no effective relief for the court to grant through Petitioner's request for a writ of
19	mandate. Even if the evidence showed that any violation of a mandatory duty (it does not), all of
20	the transactions mentioned in the petition have received a final decision by the Department, and
21	since July 2020, DOJ has again been able to process applications within the 10-day waiting
22	period, which has always been its goal. (Thompson Decl.¶ 45-56.) As there is no ongoing delay,
23	the mandates Petitioner seeks would have "no practical impact" and could provide the parties "no
24	effectual relief." (MCH, 106 Cal.App.4th at p. 214.)
25	B. The Discretionary Exceptions to Mootness Do Not Apply.
26	Where a case is moot, a court may grant review if one of "three discretionary exceptions" to
27	mootness apply: "(1) when the case presents an issue of broad public interest that is likely to recur
28	[citation]; (2) when there may be a recurrence of the controversy between the parties [citation];

and (3) when a material question remains for the court's determination [citation.]." (*Epstein v. Superior Court* (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 1405, 1411.) None of these conditions are present here.

3 As to the first exception, while this case may involve an issue of broad public interest, it 4 plainly does not involve one that is likely to recur. The Department's policy and practice is and 5 always has been to complete firearms background checks within the 10-day waiting period, to 6 specifically delay firearms transactions under section 28220, subdivision (f), when that 7 subdivision applies, and to following each of section 28220's requirements. (Thompson Decl. 8 ¶ 24.) Only because of a confluence of unprecedented events did the Department depart from this 9 practice for a relatively short period of time at the start of the COVID pandemic. (Id. ¶ 46.) 10 Petitioners offer no evidence suggesting that there is likely to be a recurrence of the issue. 11 In a recent decision concerning another challenge to California's early response to the 12 COVID-19 crises, the Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, held that the case was moot. (Brach v. 13 *Newsom* (9th Cir. June 15, 2022) F.4th [p. 7].) The case involved a challenge to the 14 Governor's blueprint for reopening schools, which by the time the court was hearing the case, 15 was no longer in effect. (*Ibid.*) The court determined the controversy was moot and that the 16 plaintiff's speculation that the controversy could recur (by the Governor again suspending in-17 person instruction) was insufficient reason to hear the case. (Ibid.) The court determined: "It 18 could not be clearer that this case is moot." (*Id.* [p. 12].)

19 Likewise, the controversy here is moot and is unlikely to recur. As the evidence shows, 20 despite the continued surges in gun sales, the Bureau has been able to actively manage its 21 workload to keep up with demand. (Martinez Decl., Ex. D; Thompson Decl. ¶¶ 40-46.) And it has done this despite subsequent outbreaks. (See Brach, supra, F.4th at [p. 16-17] [discussing 22 23 the changed COVID landscape in California and that it was relevant that the challenged policy 24 had not been revived during latter outbreaks "while the State's case count soared well past 25 numbers reached early in the pandemic."].) For the same reasons, the second exception, which 26 applies if there may be a recurrence of the controversy between the parties, is likewise 27 inapplicable. As to the third exception, the same facts demonstrate that there is no material 28 question remaining for the Court's determination. There is no basis to issue a writ of mandate to

1 correct an alleged violation that the Department long ago addressed through application of 2 increased resources. Petitioners may argue that there is a material question that remains for this 3 Court's consideration because the Bureau continues to post the statement concerning the impact 4 of COVID-19 (quoted at p. 13, *supra*), which Petitioners believe to be an inaccurate statement of 5 the law. However, this is not sufficient reason to apply the mootness exception, because, as 6 explained in the next section, the statement accurate states applicable law and Petitioner's 7 interpretation of the statement lacks merit. And even if it did, the statement evidences no policy 8 of unduly delaying background checks, explaining that the Department strives to complete the 9 background checks within the 10-day waiting period. The evidence in this case shows no practice 10 of the Department to delay all background checks to 30 days, the upper statutory limit for 11 conducting a check. Instead it shows a concerted, sustained effort to conduct checks during the 12 10-day waiting period. (See Thompson Decl., ¶¶ 39-46).

13 Finally, courts decline to exercise discretion over moot cases where "any resolution would 14 be unlikely to provide guidance for future . . . disputes. (See MHC, supra, 106 Cal.App.4th at p. 15 215 [declining to exercise discretion to resolve moot questions where "resolution would be 16 unlikely to provide guidance for future rent control disputes, because the two issues presented in 17 the City's appeal are essentially factual in nature and therefore require resolution on a case-by-18 case basis.") Here, none of the three directions Petitioners ask for in a writ order would provide 19 any meaningful guidance when it comes to processing firearms applications. The Department's 20 policy is to process applications within the 10-day period—approving, denying, or delaying for 21 further review based on "hits" in the databases. Petitioners do not suggest otherwise.

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- 23

C. The Court Should Also Decline to Issue Declaratory Relief on Account of the Case's Mootness.

As with a claim for writ of mandate, a declaratory relief claim requires an actual controversy. Declaratory relief is restricted to "cases of actual controversy relating to the legal rights and duties of the respective parties." (Code Civ. Proc. § 1060; *Wilson, supra*, 191 Cal.App.4th at p. 1582.) While the "actual controversy' language encompasses a *probable* future controversy relating to the legal rights and duties of the parties," "it does not embrace

1	controversies that are 'conjectural, anticipated to occur in the future, or an attempt to obtain an
2	advisory opinion from the court." (<i>Wilson</i> , at p. 1582 [citations omitted].) Declaratory relief
3	"operates prospectively, rather than merely to redress past wrongs. (5 Witkin, California
4	Procedure (6th ed. 2022) Pleading, § 846.) To determine whether a controversy is an "actual
5	controversy, courts consider the same questions it considers when determining whether a matter
6	is ripe for adjudication." (Ibid., citing Farm Sanctuary Inc. v. Department of Food & Agriculture
7	(1998) 159 Cal.App.4th 402, 418.) Courts assess (1) "the fitness of the issue for judicial decision
8	and (2) the hardship that may result from withholding court consideration." (<i>Ibid.</i> ; <i>Security</i>
9	National Guaranty, Inc. v. California Coastal Com. (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 402, 418, fn. 5.) "A
10	difference of opinion does not give rise to a justiciable case until an actual controversy arises."
11	(Wilson v. Transit Authority (1962) 199 Cal.App.2d 716, 722.) Courts "may refuse to exercise"
12	their power to grant declaratory relief "in any case where its declaration or determination is not
13	necessary or proper at the time under all the circumstances." (Code Civ. Proc. § 1061.)
14	Here, the alleged controversy lacks fitness for judicial determination. A controversy lacks
15	fitness for judicial determination when its "posture lacks urgency" and "definiteness
16	necessary to render declaratory relief appropriate." (BKHN, Inc. v. Dep. of Health Servs. (1992)
17	3 Cal.App.4th 301, 309.) Here, Petitioners seek declaratory relief regarding DOJ's use of the
18	"pending" status after expiration of the 10-day waiting period, and a statement that DOJ may not
19	delay firearm transfers beyond the initial 10-day waiting period, except as provided by
20	subdivision (f)(1)(A) of section 28220. But Petitioners have shown no policy by DOJ to do either
21	of those things in its typical administrative practice and has shown only a temporary practice
22	utilized under severe operational difficulties that are unlikely to recur. (Cf. <i>Californians for</i>
23	Native Salmon etc. Assn. v. Department of Forestry (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 1419 [declaratory
24	relief claim could be maintained where petitioner alleged agency had an ongoing policy of
25	ignoring laws and regulations].) Petitioner's declaratory relief, therefore, lacks any urgency.
26	Further, as argued explained above, this controversy also lacks definiteness. To the extent it
27	has any application at all, it would be in a different circumstance with unpredictable facts. By
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avoiding ruling on this moot controversy, the Court avoids issuing a ruling that would be
 deployed during uncertain times with unpredictable consequences.

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3 And while there is risk in ruling on this indefinite and moot controversy, declining to 4 consider the issues on the merits would cause little hardship for the Petitioners. The Department 5 resolved the delays at issue in this case before this lawsuit was even filed. And even before that 6 resolution, the length of delay beyond the 10-day waiting period for most purchasers, by 7 Petitioner's count, was under 3 days (See Duvernay Decl., \P 6). As indicated by the Bureau's 8 daily emails, the longest delay for any purchaser was 8 days—twelve days shorter than the time 9 that section 28220, subdivision (f), affords in various circumstances. (See Thompson Decl, Ex. 10 A.) If the same scenario were to recur, which is unlikely, Plaintiff could bring a similar lawsuit 11 and seek temporary injunctive relief, and the Court could address the merits at that time with 12 knowledge of the circumstances present in whatever case has been brought.

13 Petitioners want this Court to rule that when it becomes impossible for DOJ to conduct its 14 background review of applicants within ten days—whether due to a pandemic, an Earthquake, 15 hacking, or some other unforeseeable event (or confluence of events) —that firearms dealers 16 should be able to sell firearms to people who have undergone no background check and that DOJ 17 should approve the applications. This would be an extraordinary result that would result in 18 unvetted firearms flooding into California. These firearms would continue to circulate after any 19 delay is resolved. The Court should decline to answer this question until it is faced with a 20 particular, live controversy so that the Court may undertake what could likely be an important 21 balancing of interests, including the public's interest in having background checks be performed, 22 with the benefit of concrete facts during a material controversy. Accordingly, the Court should 23 decline to issue declaratory relief.

24

II. THE DEFENDANTS COMPLIED WITH CALIFORNIA'S STATUTORY SCHEME.

If the Court does proceed to consider the merits of this case, it should determine that the
Petitioner has failed to show that the Respondents have violated any statutory duty and deny the
petitioner for writ of mandate.

1

A.

The Department Has No Policy of Delaying Background Checks.

With no evidence to support their claims, Petitioners argue that the Department "exploited 2 the COVID-19 pandemic as an opportunity to unlawfully suspend—and thereby violate—the 3 4 statutes and regulations requiring DOJ to conduct background checks within the first 10 days of a firearm transaction." (See Pet.'s Br. 1.) Petitioners ignore the simultaneous challenges of the 5 COVID-19 pandemic and surge in firearms transactions needing processing, characterizing them 6 as mere "administrative challenges" or short-staffing, and conclude, again with no evidence, "[I]n 7 short, DOJ conducted background checks when it got around to it, despite what the requirements 8 9 of Penal Code § 28220 and 11 C.C.R. § 4230 say." (*Id.* at 2.)

The evidence shows otherwise. As declarant Shanon Thompson describes, Petitioners went 10 to great lengths to process background checks during early days of the pandemic. Statistics 11 provided by the Department in discovery, which show that the Department took longer than ten 12 days to conduct background checks during the height of the pandemic, show no conspiracy or 13 policy to delay background checks. The numbers, instead, show a concerted effort to timely and 14 efficiently process firearms applications in response to a surge in applications. The Bureau's 15 processing climbed significantly in 2020 even as the Bureau navigated severe challenges. 16 (Martinez Decl., Ex. B.) These challenges included not only the pandemic and an extraordinary 17 increase in workload, but also two days where their offices were closed due to protests (resulting 18 19 in an inability to process background checks) and where firearms purchases increased even further. (See Thompson Decl. ¶¶31-38, Ex. A at pp. 89-95, Ex. B; Martinez Decl., Ex. C.) 20

The Petitioners misinterpret the Department's statement on its website to invent a policy 21 that the Department does not have and a dilatory attitude towards processing firearms that has no 22 foundation in the record. Petitioners ignore the Department's statement that it strives to complete 23 background checks in the shortest amount of time possible. Petitioners also take issue with DOJ's 24 statement on its website that "Under Penal Code section 28220(f)(4), the Department of Justice 25 (DOJ) has up to 30 days to complete background checks on firearms purchasers." However, this 26 is an accurate statement of the law. (See § 28220, subd. (f)(4) [providing 30 days from the 27 dealer's original submission of purchaser information to notify dealer where Department is 28

1 unable to ascertain the disposition of an arrest or criminal charge, mental health outcome, or 2 eligibility to purchase a firearm].) The Department's statement on its website also specifically 3 notifies firearms dealers and the public that "DOJ employees *continue to perform the statutorily*" 4 required background checks throughout the COVID-19 pandemic." This also accurately states 5 DOJ's statutory requirement under section 28220, subdivision (a), and correctly assured that 6 processing had continued. Petitioner can point to no directive from the Legislature that a 7 background check should cease 10 days after the Department receives the application, even where 8 the Department has not been able to perform the required database checks. Far from it. As noted, 9 the Legislature gave the Department up to 30 days to complete background checks where it was 10 unable to determine eligibility in a shorter period. And here, due to a confluence of factors— 11 COVID and a surge in firearms sales among them—the Department was unable to make that 12 determination for some, but not all, purchasers during a brief period at the outset of the pandemic. 13 The statement goes on to inform dealers and purchasers about delays that it has experienced 14 due to the pandemic, saying that "circumstances may compel" DOJ to take longer than the 10-day 15 waiting period to perform a background check. It concludes by affirming DOJ's commitment to 16 processing applications timely: "DOJ will continue to strive to provide the best service and 17 complete these checks in the shortest time possible." (Emphasis added.) None of this 18 demonstrates a policy by DOJ to "impose delays that prevent law-abiding, responsible 19 Californians from taking possession of their firearms." (See Pet.'s Br. at 11.) Rather, the 20 statement affirms the Department's responsibility to check each application to purchase a firearm, 21 and its continuing efforts to do so as quickly as possible the early months of the pandemic. 22 Petitioners' analysis of the discovery data (see Duvernay Decl., at ¶ 6; Pet.'s Br. at p. 8, 23 FN 4) likewise does not illustrate any conspiracy to delay background checks. The Department 24 does not dispute that during the time in question it reviewed records for many background checks 25 more than 10 days after it had received a DROS. But these delays do not indicate any conspiracy 26 to "impos[e] delays." (See Pet.'s Br. at p. 11.) Even the numbers cited by Petitioners show that 27 the average time to decision was under 13 days---three days beyond the statutory background 28 check of 10-days. (See Duvernay Decl. p. 8, FN 4.) Petitioners read the Department's statement

on its website as a policy to delay every transaction to 30 days, which neither the facts nor the
 wording support. The numbers reinforce that Petitioners' reading of Department's statement is
 inaccurate.

4

B. DOJ Complied with its Obligations Under California Law.

Petitioners' writ of mandate requires this Court to cross-reference California's firearms
statutes to imply a mandatory statutory deadline for the Department to conduct its initial review
of records during background checks, and to nullify DOJ's clear requirement to perform a
background check in section 28220, subdivision (a). This reading of the statutes lacks merit, and
for that reason, the Court should deny the writ of mandate.

10 In determining the meaning of a statute, the court's "fundamental task is 'to ascertain the 11 intent of the lawmakers so as to effectuate the purpose of the statute." (Allen v. Sully Miller 12 Contracting Co. (2002) 28 Cal.4th 222, 227.) The court first must examine the statutory language 13 and if possible, give the language its usual and ordinary meaning. (*Ibid.*) "If, however, the 14 statutory language is ambiguous, a court "may resort to extrinsic sources, including the ostensible 15 objects to be achieved and the legislative history." (*Ibid.*) The court ultimately should "choose the 16 construction that comports most closely with the apparent intent of the lawmakers, with a view to 17 promoting rather than defeating the general purpose of the statute." (Ibid.) In undertaking this 18 task, courts "do not consider the statutory language in isolation," rather they "look to the entire 19 substance of the statute... in order to determine the scope and the purpose of the provision." (Flannery v. Prentice (2001) 26 Cal.4th 572, 578, citations and internal quotations omitted.) 20

21 California law recognizes that "the law never requires impossibilities." Civ. Code, § 3531. 22 This interpretive maxim aids courts in effecting "just application" of the law. (*National Shooting* 23 Sports Foundation (2018) 5 Cal.5th 428, 433.) The application applies when strict interpretation 24 of a law would result in consequences contrary to the overriding intent of the statute. (*Ibid.*) As 25 the Court explained in *Shooting Sports*, the maxim does not invalidate a statute but rather seeks to 26 effectuate its underlying intent. (*Ibid.*) In accordance with the maxim, "the case law recognizes 27 that a statute may contain an implied exception for noncompliance based on impossibility where 28 such an exception reflects a proper understanding of the legislative intent behind the statute."(Id.

at p. 434.) Courts "avoid any construction that would produce absurd consequences." (*Flannery*,
 supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 578.)

3 For example, courts construe the explicitly mandatory language in section 312 of the Code 4 of Civil Procedure to allow for limited, implied exceptions. The statute provides that "Civil 5 actions, without exception, can only be commenced within the periods described in this title, after 6 the cause of action shall have accrued, unless where, in special cases, a different limitation is 7 prescribed by statute." (Lewis v. Superior Court (1985) 175 Cal.App.3d 366, 372.) 8 Notwithstanding the "without exception" language of the statute, in Lewis v. Superior Court, the 9 Court of Appeal construed the statute to allow for a late filing when the attorney for the plaintiff 10 had missed the filing due to a severe injury he incurred days before the deadline. The statutory 11 scheme set forth various exceptions, none of which applied to the specific circumstances of the 12 case. (*Ibid.*) Nevertheless, the Court held that the statute allowed for judicial construction of 13 implicit tolling exceptions: "The Legislature in 1872 formulated its exceptions by specification of 14 circumstances, rather than by direct statement of general principle. Of course it could not then 15 predict all of the circumstances that come within the purpose of the tolling scheme and implicit 16 tolling exceptions to effect the ostensible purpose." (Id. at p. 372.) The Court held that "Language 17 of statutes of limitation must admit to implicit exceptions where compliance is impossible and 18 manifest injustice would otherwise result" and "the facts here presented give rise to an 19 impossibility of compliance with the statute of limitation." (*Id.* at p. 376.)

20 And in Sutro Heights Land Co. v. Merced Irr. Dist. (1931) 211 Cal. 670, the Supreme Court 21 considered a public water agency's statutory duty to solve drainage issue created by its canals and 22 found that although it had not "not succeeded in discharging this duty to its fullest extent, it had 23 done all that could reasonably be required of it with the money available for that purpose and 24 which the resources of the district permit." (Id. at pp. 704-705.) The Court held that under 25 "[u]nder such a state of facts, the writ of mandate will not lie." (Ibid.) In reaching this 26 determination, the Court considered the purpose of the Legislative purpose of the statute: "We do 27 not believe that, under this state of facts, it was ever intended by those responsible for the 28 enactment of the Drainage Act of 1907 that an irrigation district, situated as is the defendant in

this action, should be compelled to work its own destruction by undertaking to provide drainage
 facilities for the district, the expense of which is beyond its financial ability to meet or pay for."
 (*Id.* at p. 703.)

4 Here, in passing Section 28220, the Legislature clearly intended that the Department 5 perform adequate background checks of firearms applicants, through a search of authorized 6 criminal, mental health, and other databases. Under section 28220, subdivision (a), the 7 Department is directed to perform these searches: "Upon submission of firearm purchaser 8 information, the Department of Justice shall examine its records . . . in order to determine if the 9 purchaser is a person . . . by state and or federal law from possessing, receiving, owning, or 10 purchasing a gun." Courts have also held that the Department of Justice has a duty to complete its 11 background checks. (See Braman v. State of California (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 344; Gray v. State 12 of California (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 151.)

13 Section 28220 places no explicit deadline for the Department to conduct the review that it 14 describes in subdivision (a). California law provides for a mandatory 10-day waiting period in 15 section 26815, but that is a minimum waiting period, not a deadline for background checks. In 16 Silvester v. Harris, supra, the Ninth Circuit recognized that the purpose of this mandatory waiting 17 period is both to accommodate the length of time when a background check would normally be 18 performed and also serve as a cooling off period. (843 F.3d 816, 823.) Although the waiting 19 period provides time for the State to conduct background checks, there is no regulation, statute, or 20 case authority that states that every background check must take place within the mandatory 21 waiting period.

Petitioners urge the Court to find that that section 28220, subdivision (f), provides a time limit on all background checks by specifying three circumstances where a background check may take up to 30 days. (Pet.'s Br. at p. 11-12.) But Petitioner's construction of the statute would lead to absurd results. The Legislature added subdivision (f) to California's background check law to require the Department to delay firearms transactions up to thirty days where it comes across incomplete mental health, criminal, or firearms records. (2013 Cal. Legis. Serv. Ch. 737 (A.B. 500).) The provision states that the "department *shall* immediately notify the dealer to delay the

1 transfer of a firearm to a purchaser if the records of the department, or the records available to the 2 department" indicate any one of three different circumstances relevant to determining eligibility. 3 (\S 28220, subd. (f)(4).) The provision describes three foreseeable and routine contexts where 4 background checks are not able to be completed in ten days and specifically authorizes DOJ to 5 extend the background check up to 30 days in those instances. (Ibid.) It demonstrates a legislative 6 determination that when a background check requires more than ten days to be completed, DOJ 7 should take additional time to complete the check. Petitioner's construction of subdivision (f)(1)8 to negate the Department's duties to perform a background check where the Department needs 9 more than ten days to search records for reasons the Legislature could not have predicted, 10 undermines the central purpose of section 28220, which is to require the Department to perform 11 background checks and not approve sales until that can be accomplished.

12 Even if the Court agrees with Petitioner that statutory construction of California's laws 13 implies that background checks should normally be performed in ten days, it should find an 14 implied exception for the situation that occurred in this case. Even in cases where statutes and 15 regulations impose explicit time limits on agencies, courts have deemed the "time limits to be 16 directory unless the Legislature expresses a contrary intent." (California Correctional Peace 17 Officers Assn. v. State Personnel Bd. (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1133, 1145.) No contrary intent appears 18 here. Furthermore, statutes should be construed to allow implied exceptions to timing where the 19 exceptions would "effect the ostensible purpose" of the statute. (See Lewis v. Superior Court, 20 *supra*, 175 Cal.App.3d at p. 372.)

21 The Bureau navigated the same social distancing and personnel issues in the early days of 22 the pandemic as other government and private entities, and did so while seeing its work nearly 23 double as firearms transactions surged. (Marlon Decl., Ex. B; Thompson Decl., ¶ 26-38.) 24 Despite this, the Bureau continued processing applications and did so efficiently. (Ibid.) In light 25 of these unique challenges, the Court should apply the plain language of section 28220 to effect 26 its central purposes that a background check be conducted. The alternative, which is an order that 27 would require Department to approve applications without a background check, would defeat the 28 clear purpose of section 28220.

1 The Ninth Circuit's review of a district court's handling of speedy trial issues during the 2 pandemic is instructive. In United States v. Olsen (9th Cir. 2022) 21 F.4th 1036, 1047, the court 3 held that there was no speedy trial violation where a trial had been continued while the Court had 4 closed due to the pandemic. The court held that the speedy trial act did not require that trial must 5 be *impossible*: "[S]urely a global pandemic that has claimed more than half a million lives in this 6 country, and nearly 60,000 in California alone, falls within such unique circumstances to permit a 7 court to temporarily suspend jury trials in the interest of public health." In coming to the 8 conclusion, the Court did not invalidate or ignore the important right to a speedy and public jury 9 trial: "We are, however, mindful that the right to a speedy and public jury trial provided by the 10 Sixth Amendment is among the most important protections guaranteed by our Constitution, and it 11 is not one that may be cast aside in times of uncertainty." (Id. at p. 1049.) But the Court 12 interpreted the government's obligation to provide such a trial while considering operational 13 context: "The Central District of California did not cast aside the Sixth Amendment The 14 orders acknowledge the importance of the right to a speedy and public trial both to criminal 15 defendants and the broader public, and conclude that, considering the continued public health and 16 safety issues posed by COVID-19, proceeding with such trials would risk the health and safety of 17 those involved, including prospective jurors, defendants, attorneys, and court personnel. The 18 pandemic is an extraordinary circumstance and reasonable minds may differ in how best to 19 respond to it." (*Id.* at p. 1049.

Here, the Department complied with section 28220's instruction that it perform background checks by timely processing applications in the order they were received, as quickly as it could while maintaining accuracy under the constraints of the pandemic, office closures due to protesting, and an unprecedented surge in gun sales.

The relief Petitioners request shows the weakness of their position. Petitioners ask this
Court to "direct[] Respondents to approve applications after the expiration of the 10-day waiting
period, absent a statutory basis to deny or delay the application . . ." (Pet., at p. 20, Prayer 1.) If
Respondents had done just that—approved tens of thousands of firearms applications that failed
to auto-approve, rather than taking, on average, 3 more days to perform a background check—

DOJ would not have been following section 28220, subdivision (a)'s instruction that the Department perform a background check. The Department had no authority to approve sales without conducting a background check in this way. Certainly the Department has no duty, ministerial or otherwise, to act outside its authority to conduct background checks, and this cannot be the basis for this court to issue a writ under section 1085.

The Department's regulations defining DES statuses do not further Petitioner's argument.
Under section 4230 of the California Code of Regulations, the "approved" record status is to be
used "*for a Department-approved application*." (Cal. Code Regs. tit. 11, § 4230, subd. (b)(1)(A).)
There is no basis to conclude that "Department-approved applications" should include
applications that were not properly subjected to a full background check due to an unprecedented
mixture of global pandemic, unrelenting gun buying surge, and office closures.

12 To the extent that Petitioners attempt to assert the Department violated its regulations by 13 keeping applications in "pending" status in DES beyond 10 days, despite the pending status being 14 defined as applicable "during the 10-day waiting period," the dispute is de minimus and therefore 15 cannot support issuance of a writ of mandate. "A writ is not available to enforce abstract rights or 16 command futile acts with no practical benefits." (California High Speed Rail Auth. v. Superior 17 Court (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 676, 707, citations omitted.) Each application is placed in 18 "pending" status when it is received by the Department. (Thompson Decl. 9.) For applicants that 19 are not automatically approved during DOJ's initial automated review of records, an analyst must 20 first review records before changing the status of the application in DES. (Ibid.) It would have 21 been a futile to manually change statuses at the conclusion of the 10-day wait period when 22 "pending"—notwithstanding its definition in the regulation—best represented the status of the 23 applications: their review was ongoing and the applications could not be approved. Choosing to 24 change the status from "pending" to "delayed" would have increased confusion as well, as it 25 would have resulted in communications going to purchasers that suggested a need for additional 26 records to be reviewed. (Thompson Decl. \P 24). As dealers are not allowed to transfer firearms in 27 pending or in delayed status, keeping applications in "pending" rather than marking them 28 "delayed" did not prejudice Petitioners or other buyers and provided dealers sufficient notice not

1	to transfer the firearm. (See § 26815 ["No firearm shall be delivered, "or after notice by the
2	department pursuant to Section 28220"].)
3	Finally, because the Department complied with its obligations under the statute, the rest of
4	Petitioner's arguments are without merit. The ability of the Governor to suspend laws and impose
5	emergency orders under the Emergency Services Act is irrelevant here. The Department's actions
6	did not result in any de facto suspension of the statutes. The Department complied with its
7	obligations under the statute and effectuated the intent of the Legislature that it performs a
8	background check before approving a gun sale. Likewise, the Department did not
9	"administratively rewrite" a statute or "substitute its judgment for the Legislature." Here, the
10	Legislature has made it clear that the Department should conduct background checks and the
11	Department complied with its obligation to conduct background checks to the best of its ability,
12	as required by the section 28220.
13	CONCLUSION
14	For the above reasons, the petition for writ of mandate and request for declaratory relief
15	should be denied.
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19	Dated: June 17, 2022 Respectfully submitted,
20	ROB BONTA
21	Attorney General of California MARK R. BECKINGTON
22	Supervising Deputy Attorney General
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