

## UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

Thurgood Marshall U.S. Courthouse 40 Foley Square, New York, NY 10007 Telephone: 212-857-8500

## MOTION INFORMATION STATEMENT

Docket Number(s): 22-2987

Caption [use short title]

Motion for: emergency interim stay of preliminary

injunction, and stay of preliminary injunction

pending appeal

Set forth below precise, complete statement of relief sought:

Defendant-Appellant respectfully requests a stay

pending appeal, and an emergency interim stay, of a

preliminary injunction that indefinitely halts

enforcement statewide of a New York law prohibiting

carrying a firearm onto private property without obtaining

the owner or lessee's express consent.

Christian v. Nigrelli

MOVING PARTY: Steven A. Nigrelli

OPPOSING PARTY: Brett Christian et al.

☐ Plaintiff☒ Defendant☒ Appellant/Petitioner☐ Appellee/Respondent

MOVING ATTORNEY: Ester Murdukhayeva

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Court- Judge/ Agency appealed from: U.S. District Court for the Western District of New York - Hon. John L. Sinatra

## Please check appropriate boxes:

Has movant notified opposing counsel (required by Local Rule 27.1):

☒ Yes☐ No (explain):

Opposing counsel's position on motion:

☐ Unopposed☒ Opposed☐ Don't Know

Does opposing counsel intend to file a response:

☒ Yes☐ No☐ Don't Know

## FOR EMERGENCY MOTIONS, MOTIONS FOR STAYS AND INJUNCTIONS PENDING APPEAL:

Has this request for relief been made below?

☒ Yes☐ No

Has this relief been previously sought in this court?

☐ Yes☒ No

Requested return date and explanation of emergency:

Appellants respectfully request that an interim administrative stay be granted as soon

as possible as the district court denied appellants' request for a stay and the injunction is currently

in effect. Appellants request oral argument and a decision on the stay motion as soon as

practicable thereafter.

Is oral argument on motion requested?

☒ Yes☐ No (requests for oral argument will not necessarily be granted)

Has argument date of appeal been set?

☐ Yes☒ No If yes, enter date:

Signature of Moving Attorney:

/s/ Ester Murdukhayeva

Date: 11/28/2022

Service by: ☒ CM/ECF☐ Other [Attach proof of service]

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS  
SECOND CIRCUIT

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BRETT CHRISTIAN, et al.,

*Plaintiffs-Appellees,*

JOHN BROWN,

*Plaintiff,*

v.

STEVEN A. NIGRELLI, &c.,

*Defendant-Appellant,*

JOHN J. FLYNN, &c.,

*Defendant.*

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No. 22-2987

**MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF  
MOTION FOR A STAY PENDING APPEAL**

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Dated: November 28, 2022

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## PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

Appellant Steven A. Nigrelli, in his official capacity as Acting Superintendent of the New York State Police, seeks a stay pending appeal of a preliminary injunction issued by the U.S. District Court for the Western District of New York (Sinatra, J.), barring the State from enforcing the “restricted locations,” or “private property,” provision of New York State’s Concealed Carry Improvement Act (CCIA), enacted in response to *New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen*, 142 S. Ct. 2111 (2022). The restricted locations provision prohibits a person from carrying a firearm onto private property absent express consent from the owner or lessee. The district court’s injunction therefore requires that strangers be allowed to carry firearms onto others’ private property without obtaining consent to do so or even informing the owner or lessee of the presence of a deadly weapon on their property.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> The injunction is limited to “private property open to the public” because that was the relief requested by plaintiffs. However, the district court indicated that it would have granted a broader injunction as to all private property (including persons’ homes) if plaintiffs had requested such relief. See *infra* at 6.

A stay pending appeal is necessary given the likelihood that the State will prevail on the merits of its appeal and the balance of equities favoring the State. First, the State will likely demonstrate that the district court erred in enjoining enforcement of the restricted locations provision. Among other things, the court erred in finding that the sole individual plaintiff (Brett Christian) had standing to challenge the law, misapplied *Bruen* by finding that the challenged restriction implicated the Second Amendment, and erroneously disregarded a litany of historical statutes prohibiting the carrying of guns onto another's land without consent.

Second, the injunction threatens to sow confusion in both the public and law enforcement, resulting from the frequent changes in the applicable provisions of law during the pendency of various legal challenges across the State.<sup>2</sup> The injunction also undermines public safety and

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<sup>2</sup> This Court has twice granted interim stays of earlier district court orders enjoining the enforcement of the private property provision. *See* Order, *Antonyuk v. Nigrelli*, No. 22-2908 (2d Cir. Nov. 15, 2022), Dkt. No. 31 (three-judge panel granting interim stay of preliminary injunction); Order, *Antonyuk v. Hochul*, No. 22-2379 (2d Cir. Oct. 12, 2022), Dkt. No. 40 (interim stay of temporary restraining order). Both *Antonyuk* orders applied to all private property.



property rights by depriving property owners and the public of critical information about the presence of deadly weapons on the property.

Finally, and alternatively, any injunctive relief should be narrowed pending appeal to apply only to Christian, the sole plaintiff found by the district court to have standing. Statewide relief is grossly disproportionate to the individualized harms alleged by Christian.

## **FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND**

### **A. New York’s Concealed Carry Improvement Act**

#### **1. The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in *New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen***

Like the majority of States, New York requires a license to carry a concealed handgun in public. *See, e.g.*, Penal Law §§ 265.03 (criminalizing possession of loaded handgun), 265.20(a)(3) (exempting license holders). New York law has long set forth basic eligibility criteria for a license, including being at least twenty-one years old, not having a disqualifying conviction, and otherwise having “good moral character.” *Id.* § 400.00(1)(a)-(c). Until recently, New York also required demonstrating “proper cause” to obtain a concealed-carry license. *Id.* § 400.00(2)(f) (effective through June 23, 2022).

In *Bruen*, the Supreme Court invalidated New York’s “proper cause” requirement. The Court concluded that, insofar as “proper cause” demanded that applicants show “a special need for self-defense,” this requirement infringed the Second Amendment right of law-abiding, responsible citizens to carry arms in public for self-defense. 142 S. Ct. at 2138. *Bruen* recognized the necessity and constitutionality of modern firearms regulation. *Id.* at 2133. At the same time, the Court advised that a law that implicated the Second Amendment was constitutional only if the government proved that the law was “consistent with this Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation.” *Id.* at 2130. But the Court made clear that the burden on government was triggered only upon a threshold finding that the Second Amendment’s “plain text covers an individual’s conduct.” *Id.* at 2129-30.

## **2. New York’s update of its gun-safety laws after *Bruen***

On July 1, 2022, New York’s Legislature passed the CCIA, in an extraordinary session convened after *Bruen* was decided. *See* Ch. 371, 2022 N.Y. Laws (N.Y. Legis. Retrieval Sys.) (effective Sept. 1, 2022).

The CCIA made several changes to the licensing process to ensure that carry licenses would be provided only to law-abiding and responsible

persons. *See generally id.* §§ 1-3, 2022 N.Y. Laws at pp. 1-8. As pertinent to this appeal, the CCIA also prohibits possessing “a firearm, rifle, or shotgun” in a “restricted location,” which is defined as private property where the person possessing the weapon “knows or reasonably should know that the owner or lessee of such property has not permitted such possession by clear and conspicuous signage indicating that the carrying of firearms, rifles, or shotguns on their property is permitted or has otherwise given express consent.” Penal Law § 265.01-d(1). The provision does not apply to law enforcement officers, military personnel, armed security guards, and persons lawfully hunting. *Id.* § 265.01-d(2).

## **B. Procedural History**

On September 13, 2022, shortly after the CCIA took effect, Brett Christian and two gun-advocacy organizations filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the Western District of New York against the Superintendent of the New York State Police and the district attorney of Erie County, arguing that the Second and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit the private property provision as well as restrictions on possessing firearms in public parks and on public transit. (*See Compl.* (Sept. 13, 2022), Dist. Ct. Dkt.

No. 1.<sup>3</sup>) Two weeks later, plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction to enjoin defendants from continuing to enforce the challenged provisions. The state defendant opposed the motion.

On November 22, 2022, the district court (Sinatra, J.) issued a preliminary injunction barring defendants from enforcing the private property provision statewide, and reserved ruling on the portions of the motion seeking an injunction as to the public parks and public transit restrictions.<sup>4</sup> At plaintiffs' request, the district court enjoined the enforcement of the restricted location provision only as to "private property 'open to the public'" but suggested that it would have granted a broader injunction as to all private property (including people's homes) if plaintiff had asked for such relief. Ex. B, Decision & Order at 3 n.5.

First, the district court recognized that the organizational plaintiffs lacked standing under binding precedent and therefore analyzed only the claims raised by Christian. *Id.* at 3 n.4. The court concluded that

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<sup>3</sup> The docket sheet is attached as Exhibit A. John Boron, the original lead plaintiff, voluntarily dismissed his claims on September 28, 2022. (See Notice of Voluntary Dismissal (Sept. 28, 2022), Dist. Ct. Dkt. No. 17.)

<sup>4</sup> A copy of the district court's Decision & Order is attached as Exhibit B.

Christian sufficiently alleged an injury-in-fact because his “activities and behavior have been impacted” by the private property provision, as he would otherwise bring his firearm with him to establishments that “neither prohibit the carrying of firearms nor post signage consenting to the carry of firearms.” *Id.* at 8. The court did not analyze whether Christian adequately alleged that any such locations exist, nor did it address traceability or redressability despite acknowledging that private property owners have an unrestricted right to prohibit guns on their property. *See id.* at 2, 19-21.

Second, the district court declared without any historical analysis that the Second Amendment “presumptively guarantees Christian’s right to ‘bear’ arms for self-defense on private property outside of his home.” *Id.* at 15. The court dismissed the State’s numerous historical analogues dating from the colonial and Reconstruction eras because the statutes “are of unknown or limited duration” and therefore purportedly insufficient to establish a historical tradition of comparable regulation. *Id.* at 18-19.

Third, the district court found that the equities weighed in Christian’s favor because the public property provision purportedly

“leaves Christian no alternatives as he moves around outside his home.” *Id.* at 23. The court also concluded that it was in the public interest to “foster[] self-defense across the state.” *Id.* at 23. And the court reasoned that injunctive relief was not disruptive because “the Constitution and the Bill of Rights represent the status quo.” *Id.* at 12.

The district court denied the State’s request to briefly stay the order to permit an emergency application to this Court, so the injunction took effect immediately. *Id.* at 25-26.

## **ARGUMENT**

### **POINT I**

#### **THE PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION SHOULD BE STAYED PENDING APPEAL**

This Court should grant a stay of the preliminary injunction pending appeal and an interim stay pending resolution of this motion.

Relevant to this inquiry are the movant’s likelihood of success on the merits, irreparable injury to the movant without a stay, substantial injury to the opposing party if a stay is issued, and the public interest. *See Hassoun v. Searls*, 968 F.3d 190, 195 (2d Cir. 2020) (citing *Nken v. Holder*, 556 U.S. 418, 434 (2009)). These criteria operate “somewhat like

a sliding scale,” with the required chance of success on the merits inversely proportional to the strength of the equities for a stay. *Thapa v. Gonzales*, 460 F.3d 323, 334 (2d Cir. 2006). Interim injunctive relief may be granted where the legal questions presented “are grave” and the injury to the moving party without such relief “will be certain and irreparable.” *Citigroup Glob. Mkts., Inc. v. VCG Special Opportunities Master Fund Ltd.*, 598 F.3d 30, 36 (2d Cir. 2010) (quotation marks omitted).

**A. The District Court’s Merits Determinations Cannot Withstand Review.**

At the district court, Christian bore “the initial burden of establishing a likelihood of success on the merits.” *See We The Patriots USA, Inc. v. Hochul*, 17 F.4th 266, 281 (2d Cir.), *clarified*, 17 F.4th 368 (2d Cir. 2021), *cert. denied*, 142 S. Ct. 2569 (2022). The court below committed multiple errors in finding that Christian met this burden.

First, the district court erroneously found that Christian had standing to challenge the private property provision. *See* Ex. B, Decision & Order at 6-10. Christian stated that the provision precludes him from carrying a firearm onto private property otherwise open to the public (Pls.’ Mem. in Supp. of Mot. for Prelim. Inj., Ex. C, Decl. of Brett

Christian ¶ 10 (Sept. 28, 2022), Dist. Ct. Dkt. No. 19-4), but he conceded at his deposition that private property owners have the absolute right to bar (or to allow) carriage on their property (State’s Sur-Reply in Opp’n to Pls.’ Mot for Prelim. Inj., Ex. 1, Suppl. Decl. of Ryan L. Belka, Ex. 1, Dep. Tr. of Brett Christian (Christian Tr.) at 49:15-52:4, 70:23-71:17 (Nov. 21, 2022), Dist. Ct. Dkt. No. 47-1). The district court similarly acknowledged that property owners may always exclude guns from their property. Ex. B, Decision & Order at 19-21. And appellants conversely agree that property owners may choose to permit guns in their establishments, assuming that the establishments do not independently constitute “sensitive locations.”

Accordingly, to the extent Christian complains that he is unable to “go[] about his daily life in the state of New York while lawfully carrying his firearm” (Compl. ¶ 44), such injuries are attributable not to the challenged statute but to decisions made by property owners about whether to permit firearms on their property and how to communicate their consent (or lack thereof) to Christian’s desire to carry guns onto their property. Christian fails to plausibly allege that there is any estab-



lishment that he wishes to frequent that is owned by a person who wants to permit guns but is unwilling to provide Christian with express consent.

Second, the district court misapprehended the strength of the showing that Christian was required to make to obtain injunctive relief. Where a party seeks an injunction that would disrupt the status quo, they must “meet a heightened legal standard by showing ‘a clear or substantial likelihood of success on the merits.’” *North Am. Soccer League, LLC v. United States Soccer Fed’n, Inc.*, 883 F.3d 32, 37 (2d Cir. 2018). The status quo is “the last actual, peaceable uncontested status which preceded the pending controversy.” *Id.* (quotation marks omitted). In contravention of this established standard, the district court found that Christian was relieved of the need to make a heightened showing because the “Constitution and the Bill of Rights represent the status quo.” Ex. B, Decision & Order at 12. But that observation cannot resolve the issue in a case where the dispute concerns the meaning of the relevant provisions of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights. The district court’s flawed reasoning would destabilize settled expectations by making it easy to stay enforcement of a statute based on a mere allegation that the statute was unconstitutional. *See Libertarian Party of Conn. v.*

*Lamont*, 977 F.3d 173, 176-77 (2d Cir. 2020) (applying heightened scrutiny to constitutional challenge).

Third, the district court erroneously presumed that New York’s prohibition on carrying weapons onto private property without affirmative consent implicates the Second Amendment’s text. *See* Ex. B, Decision & Order at 13-15. But the Supreme Court has never found that carrying firearms onto others’ “*private* property,” Penal Law § 265.01-d(1) (emphasis added), equates with “carrying handguns *publicly*,” *Bruen*, 142 S. Ct. at 2134 (emphasis added), or keeping arms in one’s own home, *District of Columbia v. Heller*, 554 U.S. 570, 628 (2008). The district court’s apparent belief that the Second Amendment protects a right to carry anywhere outside the home (*see* Ex. B, Decision & Order at 15) cannot be squared with its acknowledgment that “[p]roperty owners indeed have the right to exclude” persons with guns from their property (*id.* at 2; *see also id.* at 19-21).

The district court was therefore wrong to suggest that the Second Amendment is absolute even “at the property line of others.” *See* Ex. B, Decision & Order at 14 n.12. To the contrary, a private property owner has the categorical right to decide “whether to allow firearms on its

premises and, if so, under what circumstances.” *GeorgiaCarry.Org, Inc. v. Georgia*, 687 F.3d 1244, 1266 (11th Cir. 2012), *abrogated on other grounds by Bruen*, 142 S. Ct. 2111. New York’s statute merely protects that right by selecting a default rule that enables proprietors to make an informed determination about whether to allow guns on the premises; namely, by requiring someone carrying concealed to seek express consent, which may, in certain circumstances, require disclosing that the person is carrying a weapon.<sup>5</sup>

The district court was also wrong to characterize the private property provision as the State’s “unilateral[]” exercise of a property owner’s right to exclude. *See* Ex. B, Decision & Order at 2; *see also id.* at 21. The law does not limit the manner in which a property owner can give express consent. A property owner may post a sign or give consent to requests in advance or on site. A property owner may choose to allow all permit holders to carry weapons on their land or to give express consent only to particular individuals. And a property owner may choose to allow or disallow carriage on its own timeline, without any involvement by the

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<sup>5</sup> In New York, it has long been a crime to remain in a building with an operable firearm after a direction to leave. *See* Penal Law § 140.17(2).

State. The restriction is therefore a default property rule that does not implicate the Second Amendment and does not require a historical justification.

Finally, and in any event, the district court separately erred in concluding that the private property restriction is unsupported by the history and tradition of firearms regulation. The State described a significant, unambiguous tradition of laws forbidding carrying guns onto others' property without their permission. (*See* State's Mem. of Law in Opp'n to Pls.' Mot. for Prelim Inj. (State's Mem.) at 16-18 (Nov. 4, 2022), Dist. Ct. Dkt. No. 33.) Specifically, the State identified a Maryland law from 1715, a Pennsylvania law from 1721, New Jersey laws from 1722 and 1771, a New York law from 1763, a Louisiana law from 1865, a Texas law from 1866, and an Oregon law from 1893. Many of these statutes were more restrictive than the challenged CCIA provision, in that they required the owner's consent to be issued ahead of time and had no exceptions for law enforcement. And none of the statutes made a distinction between private property open to the public and private property closed to the public; instead, the statutes broadly prohibited the carriage of firearms without express consent on "any Lands not his own, and for

which the Owner pays Taxes,” 1771 N.J. Laws 344, or to “the premises or plantations of any citizen,” 1865 La. Acts 14.

The district court found these statutes insufficient, chiefly adopting the reasoning of an opinion recently issued by a different district court judge. Ex. B, Decision & Order at 15-16 (citing *Antonyuk v. Hochul*, No. 22-cv-986, 2022 WL 16744700, at \*79-81 (N.D.N.Y. Nov. 7, 2022)).<sup>6</sup> The court in *Antonyuk* misinterpreted the provisions cited by the State to be “anti-poaching laws” and dismissed them as irrelevant to the CCIA’s private property provision. *Antonyuk*, 2022 WL 16744700, at \*79. However, the plain text of the statutes cited by the State make clear that they do not merely prohibit hunting but the carrying of firearms onto private property absent consent. *See, e.g.*, 1715 Md. Laws 90 (“shoot, kill or hunt, or be seen to carry a gun”); 3 Pa. Stat. at Large 255 (1896) (“to carry any gun or hunt”); 1741 N.J. Laws 101 (“to carry any Gun, or hunt”); 1771 N.J. Laws 344 (“to carry any Gun on any Lands not his own”); Tex. Penal Code art. 6510, 2 Paschal’s Dig.1321 (4th ed. 1874) (“to carry firearms on the inclosed premises or plantation of any citizen”);

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<sup>6</sup> As noted above at 2 n.2, a three-judge panel of this Court entered an interim stay as to the preliminary injunction issued in *Antonyuk*.

1893 Or. Laws 79 (“to go or trespass upon any enclosed premises or lands”). And even if these historical laws had been motivated in whole or in part by concerns about poaching, the district courts here and in *Antonyuk* failed to explain why the State could not rely on these provisions to support a private property restriction motivated by different and modern concerns. *See Bruen*, 142 S. Ct. at 2132.

The district court further erred in concluding that the historical analogues provided by the State failed to “demonstrate a *tradition* in support of [New York’s] private property exclusion.” *See* Ex. B, Decision & Order at 18. To the contrary, the cited laws span 180 years and are from jurisdictions across the geographic breadth of this nation. The court nevertheless concluded that these “enactments are of unknown or limited duration” and dismissed them as “outliers.” *Id.* at 19. In arbitrarily dismissing the State’s showing of historical analogues, the court in effect eliminated the possibility of supporting a law through historical analogues—the exact result against which *Bruen* expressly cautioned. *See* 142 S. Ct. at 2133.

## **B. Equitable Factors Strongly Support a Stay.**

The three equitable criteria strongly favor a stay. The purpose of a preliminary injunction is not to award final relief, but rather to preserve the status quo during a lawsuit. *Kane v. De Blasio*, 19 F.4th 152, 163 (2d Cir. 2021) (per curiam). Here, the preliminary injunction bars the enforcement of a statutory provision that was in effect for weeks by the time plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction.

Meanwhile, public agencies have devoted significant effort to implementing the law and informing the public about it.<sup>7</sup> If the injunction remains operative, these agencies must communicate to the public and to private property owners that the default property rules have shifted. *See Romer v. Green Point Sav. Bank*, 27 F.3d 12, 16 (2d Cir. 1994) (confusion and expense of relaying shifting information constituted irreparable harm). Public confusion will be exacerbated by the fact that this Court has previously granted interim stays of injunctions against enforcement

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<sup>7</sup> See, e.g., [N.Y. Div. of Crim. Just. Servs., Frequently Asked Questions Regarding Recent Changes to New York State Firearm Laws](#) (Aug. 27, 2022); [City of New York, Concealed Carry Firearm Laws in New York City](#) (Aug. 31, 2022).

of the private property provision entered by another district court. See *supra* at 2 n.2.

In addition, the preliminary injunction risks harm to public safety and undermines the rights of property owners to make informed decisions about who enters their property. If the injunction stands, a property owner or patron of an establishment may not know that an armed person was on the property until a tragic shooting incident occurs. Whether a shooting injury or death is intentional or inadvertent, it cannot “be undone, thus rendering the consequences irreparable.” *See Uniformed Fire Officers Ass’n v. De Blasio*, 973 F.3d 41, 48 (2d Cir. 2020); *see also Maryland v. King*, 567 U.S. 1301, 1303 (2012) (Roberts, C.J., in chambers) (granting stay).

The district court cavalierly rejected the notion that the private property restriction would protect public safety, reasoning that mass shooters would not follow the law anyway. Ex. B, Decision & Order at 22. But a court cannot enjoin a duly enacted law based on guesswork that criminals will not follow it. In any event, the court’s reasoning does not address potential harm from spontaneous, unplanned violence or accidental shootings, including from individuals who are not adequately



trained in using a weapon for self-defense. (*See* State’s Mem. at 42-43.) *See* Br. of Giffords L. Ctr. to Prevent Gun Violence as *Amicus Curiae* at 6-13, *Antonyuk v. Bruen*, No. 22-cv-734 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 17, 2022), Dkt. No. 30.

A stay would not prejudice Christian, who remains able to seek and obtain express consent from the owner or lessee of any private establishment that he wishes to frequent, subject to independent sensitive locations restrictions not challenged in this case. The district court’s assertion that “[t]he private property exclusion is all-encompassing and leaves Christian no alternatives as he moves around outside his home” is simply inaccurate. *See* Ex. B, Decision & Order at 23. And the court’s concern that Christian may have to “‘constantly disarm’ in order to comply with the private property restriction” (*id.* at 4-5) is allayed by Christian’s acknowledgment that the process of disarming and storing his firearm takes approximately 30 seconds (Christian Tr. at 101:18-105:11).

Finally, a stay is warranted because the district court entered a preliminary injunction without giving the State a meaningful opportunity to defend a duly enacted law. Specifically, the court gave the State

approximately five weeks to oppose the preliminary injunction motion, which included challenges to three distinct provisions. (See Minute Entry (Oct. 3, 2022), Dist. Ct. Dkt. No. 26.) Under *Bruen*'s revised standard for Second Amendment challenges, defending firearm regulations requires assembling materially analogous laws and policies from a wide range of sources, and obtaining expert testimony from legal historians and other scholars, a process that requires meaningfully more time. See, e.g., *GeorgiaCarry.Org, Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs*, 788 F.3d 1318, 1327 (11th Cir. 2015) (noting the difficulty of “undertak[ing] this historical inquiry on an accelerated preliminary injunction timeline”).<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>8</sup> See also *Defense Distributed v. Bonta*, No. 22-cv-6200, 2022 WL 15524977, at \*5 n.9 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 21) (tentative ruling) (denying preliminary injunction where “there is no possibility” that the State could “present the type of historical analysis conducted in *Bruen* on 31 days’ notice (or even 54 days’ notice).”), *adopted*, No. 22-cv-6200, 2022 WL 15524983 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 24, 2022); Minute Order, *Angelo v. District of Columbia*, No. 22-cv-1878 (D.D.C. July 15, 2022) (granting extension on opposition to preliminary injunction in post-*Bruen* challenge to prohibition on firearms on public transit given “the need to ensure that the record in th[e] case is properly developed.”)

## POINT II

### IN THE ALTERNATIVE, ANY INJUNCTIVE RELIEF SHOULD BE NARROWED PENDING APPEAL

Although the preliminary injunction should be stayed entirely, at a minimum it should be narrowed to apply only to Christian, which would suffice to prevent any alleged harms for which he has standing.

This Court has the discretion to “narrow the scope” of a preliminary injunction pending an appeal, based on “the relative harms to [the parties], as well as the interests of the public at large.” *See Trump v. International Refugee Assistance Project*, 137 S. Ct. 2080, 2087-88 (2017) (quotations omitted). Here, the district court had no cause to restrain defendants’ enforcement of key provisions of the CCIA as to everyone, everywhere in New York, given the individualized harms alleged by Christian.

A district court’s ordering relief benefiting “strangers to the suit” potentially rewards forum shopping and blunts development of competing perspectives on the law. *Department of Homeland Sec. v. New York*, 140 S. Ct. 599, 600-01 (2020) (Gorsuch, J., joined by Thomas, J., concurring in grant of stay). Narrowing the injunction would also honor the rule that “injunctive relief should be no more burdensome to the defendant

than necessary to provide complete relief to the plaintiffs.” *See Kane*, 19 F.4th at 173 (quotation marks omitted).

## CONCLUSION

This Court should grant a stay pending appeal, and an interim administrative stay, of the preliminary injunction.

Dated: New York, New York  
November 28, 2022

Respectfully submitted,

LETITIA JAMES  
*Attorney General*  
*State of New York*  
Attorney for Appellants

By: /s/ Ester Murdukhayeva  
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### **CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE**

Pursuant to Rules 27 and 32 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, Oren L. Zeve, an employee in the Office of the Attorney General of the State of New York, hereby certifies that according to the word count feature of the word processing program used to prepare this document, the document contains 4,226 words and complies with the typeface requirements and length limits of Rules 27(d) and 32(a)(5)-(6).

/s/ Oren L. Zeve

# EXHIBIT A

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APPEAL, [MEDIATION](#)

**U.S. DISTRICT COURT**  
**U.S. District Court, Western District of New York (Buffalo)**  
**CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 1:22-cv-00695-JLS**

Christian et al v. Nigrelli et al  
Assigned to: Hon. John L. Sinatra, Jr.  
Related Case: [1:22-cv-00771-JLS](#)  
Cause: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

Date Filed: 09/13/2022  
Jury Demand: Defendant  
Nature of Suit: 950 Constitutional - State Statute  
Jurisdiction: Federal Question

**Plaintiff****John Boron**

TERMINATED: 09/29/2022

represented by **David H. Thompson**  
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*LEAD ATTORNEY**PRO HAC VICE**ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED*

V.

**Defendant****Steven A. Nigrelli***in his official capacity as Superintendent of the New York State Police*represented by **James M. Thompson**

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### **Defendant**

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### **Amicus**

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**LEAD ATTORNEY**  
**ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED**

Date Filed	#	Docket Text
09/13/2022	<u>1</u>	COMPLAINT against All Defendants \$ 402 receipt number ANYWDC-4673461, filed by SECOND AMENDMENT FOUNDATION, John Boron, FIREARMS POLICY COALITION, INC., Brett Christian. (Attachments: # <u>1</u> Exhibit Exhibit A, # <u>2</u> Civil Cover Sheet)(Rotsko, Nicolas) (Entered: 09/13/2022)
09/13/2022	<u>2</u>	Original Summons Filed. (Rotsko, Nicolas) (Entered: 09/13/2022)
09/13/2022	<u>3</u>	Original Summons Filed. (Rotsko, Nicolas) (Entered: 09/13/2022)
09/13/2022		Case Assigned to Hon. William M. Skretny. Notification to Chambers of on-line civil case opening. (TMK) (Entered: 09/13/2022)
09/13/2022		AUTOMATIC REFERRAL to Mediation The ADR Plan is available for download at <a href="http://www.nywd.uscourts.gov/alternative-dispute-resolution">http://www.nywd.uscourts.gov/alternative-dispute-resolution</a> . (TMK) (Entered: 09/13/2022)
09/13/2022		Notice of Availability of Magistrate Judge: A United States Magistrate of this Court is available to conduct all proceedings in this civil action in accordance with 28 U.S.C. 636c and FRCP 73. The Notice, Consent, and Reference of a Civil Action to a Magistrate Judge form (AO-85) is available for download at <a href="http://www.uscourts.gov/services-forms/forms">http://www.uscourts.gov/services-forms/forms</a> . (TMK) (Entered: 09/13/2022)
09/13/2022	<u>4</u>	Summons Issued as to Kevin P. Bruen, John J. Flynn. (TMK) (Entered: 09/13/2022)
09/15/2022	5	TEXT ORDER -- IT HEREBY IS ORDERED, that the Clerk of Court TRANSFER this case to the Honorable John L. Sinatra, Jr., United States District Judge, as a related case to 22-CV-541-JLS, over which he presides. SO ORDERED. Issued by William M. Skretny, United States District Judge on 9/15/2022. (JCM)  <b>Clerk to Follow up</b> (Entered: 09/15/2022)
09/15/2022		Case Reassigned to Hon. John L. Sinatra, Jr. Hon. William M. Skretny no longer assigned to the case. (TMK) (Entered: 09/15/2022)
09/15/2022	6	NOTICE: All parties are expected to comply with Judge Sinatra's individual requirements set forth in the "Judges' Info" section of the Court's website. Business organization parties should pay particular attention to the tab relating to such parties. (KLH) (Entered: 09/15/2022)
09/16/2022	<u>7</u>	MOTION to appear pro hac vice <i>Peter A. Patterson</i> ( Filing fee \$ 200 receipt number ANYWDC-4676445.) by John Boron, Brett Christian, Firearms Policy Coalition, Inc., Second Amendment Foundation. (Attachments: # <u>1</u> Sponsoring Affidavit, # <u>2</u>

		Petition for Pro Hac of Peter A. Patterson, # <a href="#">3</a> Attorney's Oath, # <a href="#">4</a> WDNV Civility Principles Oath, # <a href="#">5</a> Registration Form) (Rotsko, Nicolas) (Entered: 09/16/2022)
09/16/2022	<a href="#">8</a>	MOTION to appear pro hac vice <i>David H. Thompson</i> ( Filing fee \$ 200 receipt number ANYWDC-4676465.) by John Boron, Brett Christian, Firearms Policy Coalition, Inc., Second Amendment Foundation. (Attachments: # <a href="#">1</a> Sponsoring Affidavit, # <a href="#">2</a> Petition for Pro Hac of David H. Thompson, # <a href="#">3</a> Attorney's Oath, # <a href="#">4</a> WDNV Civility Principles Oath, # <a href="#">5</a> Registration Form) (Rotsko, Nicolas) (Entered: 09/16/2022)
09/16/2022	<a href="#">9</a>	MOTION to appear pro hac vice <i>John W. Tienken</i> ( Filing fee \$ 200 receipt number ANYWDC-4676475.) by John Boron, Brett Christian, Firearms Policy Coalition, Inc., Second Amendment Foundation. (Attachments: # <a href="#">1</a> Sponsoring Affidavit, # <a href="#">2</a> Petition for Pro Hac of John W. Tienken, # <a href="#">3</a> Attorney's Oath, # <a href="#">4</a> WDNV Civility Principles Oath, # <a href="#">5</a> Registration Form)(Rotsko, Nicolas) (Entered: 09/16/2022)
09/16/2022	<a href="#">10</a>	AFFIDAVIT of Service for Summons & Complaint served on John J. Flynn on 09/16/2022, filed by John Boron, Brett Christian, Firearms Policy Coalition, Inc., Second Amendment Foundation. (Rotsko, Nicolas) (Entered: 09/16/2022)
09/19/2022		ATTENTION CORPORATION PLAINTIFFS/DEFENDANTS: Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.7.1(b) and/or General Order No. 157 In the Matter of Disclosure of Members, Shareholders, Partners, and Leaders of Business Organization Parties, all Corporate Disclosure Statements are to be filed within seven (7) days of this notice. (KM) (Entered: 09/19/2022)
09/19/2022	11	TEXT ORDER granting <a href="#">7</a> MOTION to appear pro hac vice. SO ORDERED. Issued by Hon. John L. Sinatra, Jr. on 9/19/22. (MEM)  Clerk to Follow up (Entered: 09/19/2022)
09/19/2022	12	TEXT ORDER granting <a href="#">8</a> Motion to appear pro hac vice. SO ORDERED. Issued by Hon. John L. Sinatra, Jr. on 9/19/22. (MEM)  Clerk to Follow up (Entered: 09/19/2022)
09/19/2022	13	TEXT ORDER granting <a href="#">9</a> Motion to appear pro hac vice. SO ORDERED. Issued by Hon. John L. Sinatra, Jr. on 9/19/22. (MEM)  Clerk to Follow up (Entered: 09/19/2022)
09/19/2022	<a href="#">14</a>	AFFIDAVIT of Service for Summons and Complaint served on Kevin P. Bruen on 9/16/2022, filed by John Boron, Brett Christian, Firearms Policy Coalition, Inc., Second Amendment Foundation. (Rotsko, Nicolas) (Entered: 09/19/2022)
09/20/2022	<a href="#">15</a>	Corporate Disclosure Statement by Firearms Policy Coalition, Inc.. (Rotsko, Nicolas) (Entered: 09/20/2022)
09/20/2022	<a href="#">16</a>	Corporate Disclosure Statement by Second Amendment Foundation. (Rotsko, Nicolas) (Entered: 09/20/2022)
09/28/2022	<a href="#">17</a>	NOTICE of Voluntary Dismissal by John Boron (Thompson, David) (Entered: 09/28/2022)
09/28/2022	<a href="#">18</a>	MOTION to Amend/Correct <i>Case Caption and Short Title</i> by Brett Christian, Firearms Policy Coalition, Inc., Second Amendment Foundation. (Attachments: # <a href="#">1</a> Text of Proposed Order)(Thompson, David) (Entered: 09/28/2022)
09/28/2022	<a href="#">19</a>	MOTION for Preliminary Injunction by Brett Christian, Firearms Policy Coalition, Inc., Second Amendment Foundation. (Attachments: # <a href="#">1</a> Memorandum in Support, # <a href="#">2</a> Exhibit A - Local Rule 65 Witness List, # <a href="#">3</a> Exhibit B - Complaint, # <a href="#">4</a> Exhibit C - Declaration of Brett Christian, # <a href="#">5</a> Exhibit D - Declaration of Brandon Combs, # <a href="#">6</a> Exhibit E - Declaration of Alan Gottlieb, # <a href="#">7</a> Exhibit F - Stickley v. City of Winchester, CL21-206 (Va Cir. Ct. Sept. 27, 2022), # <a href="#">8</a> Text of Proposed Order)(Thompson, David) (Entered: 09/28/2022)
09/29/2022	20	TEXT ORDER re <a href="#">19</a> Motion for Preliminary Injunction. The parties are ordered to appear for a status conference on October 3, 2022, at 3:30 PM for scheduling purposes. Plaintiffs are ordered to serve their motion papers and this Text Order upon Defendants in accordance with the applicable rule(s) of service such that Defendants are on notice by September 30, 2022. Plaintiffs are to file proof of service by October 3, 2022, at 12:00 PM. SO ORDERED. Issued by Hon. John L. Sinatra, Jr. on 9/29/2022. (KLH) (Entered: 09/29/2022)
09/29/2022	21	TEXT ORDER granting <a href="#">18</a> Motion Amend/Correct Case Caption and Short Title. The Clerk is directed to amend the caption in this action to be as follows: BRETT CHRISTIAN, FIREARMS POLICY COALITION, INC., and SECOND AMENDMENT FOUNDATION, Plaintiffs, v. KEVIN P. BRUEN, in his official capacity as Superintendent of the New York State Police, JOHN J. FLYNN, in his official capacity as District Attorney for the County of Erie, New York, Defendants. The Clerk is further directed to amend the short title in this action to be as follows: Christian, et al., v. Bruen, et al. SO ORDERED. Issued by Hon. John L. Sinatra, Jr. on 9/29/2022. (KLH) (Entered: 09/29/2022)
09/29/2022	<a href="#">22</a>	NOTICE of Appearance by Kenneth R. Kirby on behalf of John J. Flynn (Kirby, Kenneth) (Entered: 09/29/2022)
09/29/2022	<a href="#">23</a>	ANSWER to <a href="#">1</a> Complaint, with <i>Jury Demand</i> by John J. Flynn.(Kirby, Kenneth) (Entered: 09/29/2022)
09/30/2022	<a href="#">24</a>	CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE by John Boron, Brett Christian, Firearms Policy Coalition, Inc., Second Amendment Foundation re: <i>Status Conference Text Order and motion papers</i> (Rotsko, Nicolas) (Entered: 09/30/2022)
10/03/2022	<a href="#">25</a>	NOTICE of Appearance by Ryan Lane Belka on behalf of Kevin P. Bruen (Belka, Ryan) (Entered: 10/03/2022)
10/03/2022	26	Minute Entry for proceedings held before Hon. John L. Sinatra, Jr.: Status Conference held on 10/3/2022 re <a href="#">19</a> Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction. Court sets briefing schedule. Defendants' opposition papers due 11/4/2022. Plaintiffs' reply due 11/18/2022. Parties to appear for argument on 11/22/2022 at 2:00 PM. Defendant Bruen's deadline to file an answer or motion to dismiss is extended to 11/4/2022.

		Appearances. For plaintiffs: Nicolas Rotsko. For defendant Flynn: Kenneth Kirby. For defendant Bruen: Ryan Belka. (Court Reporter Bonnie Weber) (KLH) (Entered: 10/03/2022)
10/07/2022	<a href="#">27</a>	PLAINTIFFS' STATUS REPORT re the TRO issued in <i>Antonyuk v. Hochul</i> (NDNY). (Attachments: # <a href="#">1</a> Exhibit) (KLH) (Entered: 10/07/2022)
10/18/2022	<a href="#">28</a>	RESPONSE to Motion re <a href="#">19</a> MOTION for Preliminary Injunction <i>Affidavit in Response to Plaintiffs' Motion for a Preliminary Injunction/Temporary Restraining Order</i> filed by John J. Flynn. (Kirby, Kenneth) (Entered: 10/18/2022)
10/29/2022	29	TEXT ORDER granting <a href="#">43</a> motion for leave to file amicus brief. Everytown for Gun Safety may file its proposed brief (Dkt. 45-1) by 10:00 am on Monday, October 31, 2022, but may not present evidence or participate in oral arguments or any hearing. SO ORDERED. Issued by Hon. John L. Sinatra, Jr. on 10/29/2022. (Entered: 10/29/2022)
10/29/2022	30	TEXT ORDER vacating the Text Order issued at Dkt. 29. SO ORDERED. Issued by Hon. John L. Sinatra, Jr. on 10/29/22. (MEM) (Entered: 10/29/2022)
11/01/2022	<a href="#">31</a>	MOTION for Leave to File Excess Pages by Steven A. Nigrelli. (Attachments: # <a href="#">1</a> Declaration of Ryan L. Belka, Esq.)(Belka, Ryan) (Entered: 11/01/2022)
11/02/2022	32	TEXT ORDER granting <a href="#">31</a> Motion for Leave to File Excess Pages. SO ORDERED. Issued by Hon. John L. Sinatra, Jr. on 11/2/22. (MEM) (Entered: 11/02/2022)
11/04/2022	<a href="#">33</a>	MEMORANDUM in Opposition re <a href="#">19</a> MOTION for Preliminary Injunction filed by Steven A. Nigrelli. (Attachments: # <a href="#">1</a> Declaration of Ryan L. Belka, Esq., # <a href="#">2</a> Exhibit (s) 1-11 re Private Property, # <a href="#">3</a> Exhibit (s) 12-45 re Parks, # <a href="#">4</a> Exhibit (s) 46-64 re Parks)(Belka, Ryan) (Entered: 11/04/2022)
11/04/2022	<a href="#">34</a>	CONTINUATION OF EXHIBITS to <a href="#">33</a> Memorandum in Opposition to Motion, <i>Exhibit 65 re Parks</i> . (Belka, Ryan) (Entered: 11/04/2022)
11/04/2022	<a href="#">35</a>	CONTINUATION OF EXHIBITS to <a href="#">33</a> Memorandum in Opposition to Motion, <i>Exhibits 66-78 re Parks</i> . (Attachments: # <a href="#">1</a> Exhibit (s) re Public Transportation, # <a href="#">2</a> Declaration of Dr. Brennan Rivas, PhD with Exhibits A-B, # <a href="#">3</a> Declaration of David J. State, Esq.)(Belka, Ryan) (Entered: 11/04/2022)
11/04/2022	<a href="#">36</a>	NOTICE of Appearance by James M. Thompson on behalf of Steven A. Nigrelli (Thompson, James) (Entered: 11/04/2022)
11/07/2022	37	TEXT ORDER: The parties shall appear for a status conference on 11/10/2022 at 1:30 PM regarding the preliminary injunction hearing. Parties may appear in person or by telephone for the status conference. SO ORDERED. Issued by Hon. John L. Sinatra, Jr. on 11/7/2022. (KLH) (Entered: 11/07/2022)
11/09/2022	<a href="#">38</a>	MOTION for Leave to File Excess Pages by Brett Christian, Firearms Policy Coalition, Inc., Second Amendment Foundation. (Attachments: # <a href="#">1</a> Declaration in Support of Motion for Leave to File Excess Pages)(Rotsko, Nicolas) (Entered: 11/09/2022)
11/10/2022	39	TEXT ORDER granting <a href="#">38</a> Motion for Leave to File Excess Pages. SO ORDERED. Issued by Hon. John L. Sinatra, Jr. on 11/10/22. (MEM) (Entered: 11/10/2022)
11/10/2022	40	Minute Entry for proceedings held before Hon. John L. Sinatra, Jr.: Status Conference held on 11/10/2022 re the preliminary injunction hearing. Parties advise the Court that a deposition of Mr. Christian is scheduled and, as such, live testimony at the preliminary injunction hearing is not needed. Plaintiffs' reply memorandum is forthcoming. Mr. Belka to notify the court if sur-reply is needed.  Appearances. For plaintiffs: Nicolas Rotsko and John Tienken (by teleconference). For defendant Nigrelli: Ryan Belka and James Thompson (by teleconference). For defendant Flynn: Kenneth Kirby (by teleconference). (Court Reporter Bonnie Weber) (KLH) (Entered: 11/10/2022)
11/11/2022	<a href="#">41</a>	MOTION for Leave to File <i>Amicus Brief</i> by Everytown for Gun Safety.(Taylor, William) (Entered: 11/11/2022)
11/11/2022	<a href="#">42</a>	MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT re <a href="#">41</a> MOTION for Leave to File <i>Amicus Brief</i> by Everytown for Gun Safety. (Taylor, William) (Entered: 11/11/2022)
11/11/2022	<a href="#">43</a>	DECLARATION signed by William J. Taylor, Jr. re <a href="#">41</a> MOTION for Leave to File <i>Amicus Brief</i> filed by Everytown for Gun Safety . (Attachments: # <a href="#">1</a> Exhibit A -- Proposed Amicus Brief)(Taylor, William) (Entered: 11/11/2022)
11/12/2022	44	TEXT ORDER granting <a href="#">41</a> MOTION for Leave to File Amicus Brief. Everytown for Gun Safety may file its proposed brief (Dkt. 43-1) by Monday, November 14, 2022, but may not present evidence or participate in oral arguments or any hearing. SO ORDERED. Issued by Hon. John L. Sinatra, Jr. on 11/12/22. (Entered: 11/12/2022)
11/12/2022	<a href="#">45</a>	MEMORANDUM/BRIEF of <i>Amicus Curiae</i> by Everytown for Gun Safety. (Taylor, William) (Entered: 11/12/2022)
11/18/2022	<a href="#">46</a>	REPLY to Response to Motion re <a href="#">19</a> MOTION for Preliminary Injunction filed by Brett Christian, Firearms Policy Coalition, Inc., Second Amendment Foundation. (Attachments: # <a href="#">1</a> Declaration of Exhibits in Support of Reply, # <a href="#">2</a> Exhibit 1 - 5, # <a href="#">3</a> Exhibit 6 - 10, # <a href="#">4</a> Exhibit 11 - 15, # <a href="#">5</a> Exhibit 16 - 20, # <a href="#">6</a> Exhibit 21 - 25, # <a href="#">7</a> Exhibit 26 - 30)(Thompson, David) (Entered: 11/18/2022)
11/21/2022	<a href="#">47</a>	REPLY/RESPONSE to re <a href="#">46</a> Reply to Response to Motion, <a href="#">19</a> MOTION for Preliminary Injunction filed by Steven A. Nigrelli. (Attachments: # <a href="#">1</a> Declaration of Ryan L. Belka, Esq. with Exhibit 1 (Transcript of the Deposition of Brett Christian dated November 16, 2022))(Belka, Ryan) (Entered: 11/21/2022)
11/22/2022	48	Minute Entry for proceedings held before Hon. John L. Sinatra, Jr.: Oral Argument held on 11/22/2022 re Plaintiffs' <a href="#">19</a> motion for preliminary injunction. Court requests supplemental briefing from the parties specific to irreparable harm as to public parks and transportation. Submissions due 12/2/2022. Court reserves decision on that part of the motion. Written decision on the remaining parts of motion to follow.

		Appearances. For plaintiffs: John Tienken, Pete Patterson, and Nicolas Rotsko. For defendant Nigrelli: Ryan Belka. For defendant Flynn: Kenneth Kirby. (Court Reporter Bonnie Weber)(KLH) (Entered: 11/22/2022)
11/22/2022	<a href="#">49</a>	DECISION AND ORDER granting Plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction: Defendants and their officers, agents, servants, employees, and all persons in concert or participation with them who receive notice of this preliminary injunction, are enjoined, effective immediately, from enforcing all of N.Y. Pen. L. § 265.01-d with respect to private property open to the public, and their regulations, policies, and practices implementing it; this preliminary injunction shall remain in effect pending disposition of the case on the merits; and no bond shall be required. The portions of Plaintiffs' motion addressing public parks and public transportation will be addressed in a subsequent decision. Signed by Hon. John L. Sinatra, Jr. on 11/22/2022.  <b>Please note: This docket entry does not contain every detail of this order. It is your responsibility to read and download the pdf of this document for reference.</b> (KLH) (Entered: 11/22/2022)
11/23/2022	<a href="#">50</a>	NOTICE OF APPEAL as to <a href="#">49</a> Order,,, by Steven A. Nigrelli. Filing fee \$ 505, receipt number ANYWDC-4731684. (Belka, Ryan) (Entered: 11/23/2022)
11/23/2022	<a href="#">51</a>	DESIGNATION of Record on Appeal by Steven A. Nigrelli re <a href="#">50</a> Notice of Appeal CLERK TO FOLLOW UP (Belka, Ryan) (Entered: 11/23/2022)
11/23/2022	<a href="#">52</a>	CLERKS CERTIFICATE filed and electronically sent to Court of Appeals re <a href="#">51</a> DESIGNATION of Record on Appeal. (CGJ) (Entered: 11/23/2022)

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# EXHIBIT B

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

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BRETT CHRISTIAN,  
FIREARMS POLICY COALITION,  
INC., and  
SECOND AMENDMENT  
FOUNDATION,

22-CV-695 (JLS)

Plaintiffs,

v.

STEVEN A. NIGRELLI, and  
JOHN J. FLYNN,

Defendants.

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**DECISION AND ORDER**  
**(PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION)**

Another one of New York's new restrictions imposed in the immediate aftermath of the Supreme Court's *Bruen* decision is the private property exclusion. That new provision makes it a felony for a license holder to possess a firearm on *all private property*, unless the relevant property holders actually permit such possession with a sign or by express consent.

The Supreme Court's cases addressing the individual's right to keep and bear arms—from *Heller* and *McDonald* to its June 2022 decision in *Bruen*—dictate that New York's private property exclusion is equally unconstitutional. Regulation in this area is permissible *only if* the government demonstrates that the current enactment is consistent with the Nation's historical tradition of sufficiently analogous regulations. As set forth below, New York fails that test.



Property owners indeed have the right to exclude. But *the state* may not unilaterally exercise that right and, thereby, interfere with the Second Amendment rights of law-abiding citizens who seek to carry for self-defense outside of their own homes. Thus, the motion for a preliminary injunction enjoining Defendants' enforcement of this private property exclusion is granted.<sup>1</sup>

### **BACKGROUND**

Brett Christian filed this lawsuit on September 13, 2022, joined by institutional plaintiffs, Firearms Policy Coalition, Inc. ("FPC"), and Second Amendment Foundation ("SAF"). Dkt. 1. Plaintiffs allege claims against two Defendants in their official capacities, namely, the superintendent of the New York State Police, and the Erie County District Attorney. *See id.*

Christian, who is licensed under New York law to carry a concealed firearm, "desires to carry his firearm for self-defense purposes when going about his day-to-day life." *Id.* at 26.<sup>2</sup> He alleges that he "will be unable to carry his firearm on his person throughout the State because of the State's designation of private property." *Id.* The private property exclusion "effectively prevents" him "from going about his daily life in the state of New York while lawfully carrying his firearm for purposes

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<sup>1</sup> Plaintiffs' motion and the parties' briefs also separately address two additional restrictions on carry, namely, in public parks and on public transportation. The Court has requested further briefing on the irreparable harm issue as to those locations. These parts of Plaintiffs' motion will be addressed in a subsequent decision.

<sup>2</sup> Unless noted otherwise, page references refer to the number in the footer of each page of the document.

of self-defense.” *Id.* at 27. He seeks declaratory judgment and injunctive relief. *Id.* at 30-31.

The relevant portion of the new statute adds to the Penal Law, as relevant here:

§ 265.01-d Criminal possession of a weapon in a restricted location.  
1. A person is guilty of criminal possession of a weapon in a restricted location when such person possesses a firearm, rifle, or shotgun and enters into or remains on or in private property where such person knows or reasonably should know that the owner or lessee of such property has not permitted such possession by clear and conspicuous signage indicating that the carrying of firearms, rifles, or shotguns on their property is permitted or has otherwise given express consent. . . .<sup>3</sup>

Plaintiffs<sup>4</sup> moved for a preliminary injunction seeking to enjoin Defendants from enforcing this private property exclusion.<sup>5</sup> *See* Dkt. 19.

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<sup>3</sup> Section § 265.01-d(2) provides that this restriction does not apply to, among others, persons who are “lawfully engaged in hunting activity,” persons who are “police officers” as defined in the criminal procedure law, persons who are “designated peace officers,” as well as “security guards” and “active-duty military personnel.”

<sup>4</sup> FPC and SAF recognize that it is “the law of this Circuit that an organization does not have standing to assert the rights of its members in a case brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.” Dkt. 1, ¶ 14 (quoting *Nnebe v. Daus*, 644 F.3d 147, 156 (2d Cir. 2011)). SPC and SAF “contend that this circuit precedent is erroneous and should be overruled by a court competent to do so.” Dkt. 1, ¶ 14. As such, this Decision and Order does not address those Plaintiffs and will only focus on Plaintiff Christian.

<sup>5</sup> Christian challenges this provision with respect to private property “open to the public.” Dkt. 19-1, at 8. Judge Suddaby’s Preliminary Injunction was not so limited. *See Antonyuk v. Hochul*, No. 22-CV-986, 2022 WL 16744700, at \*85-86 (N.D.N.Y. Nov. 7, 2022). The State’s argument is not so limited and, indeed, cites enactments addressing private property not open to the public. And the analysis below, driven by the Constitution and caselaw, is not so limited. The relief here



Christian, who resides in Cheektowaga, New York, states that he is “currently licensed to carry a handgun pursuant to New York law with a license issued by Erie County.” Dkt. 19-4, ¶¶ 1, 4. Prior to the enactment of the private property exclusion, Christian “would typically bring [his] firearm with [him] on private property open to the public, including weekly visits to gas stations and monthly visits to hardware stores.” *Id.* ¶ 10. He “intended to continue to do so, but for the enactment and enforcement” of the private property exclusion. *Id.* Throughout Christian’s community, “establishments that are open to the public and in which [he] previously carried a firearm” have “failed to post conspicuous signage consenting to the carrying of firearms.” *Id.* But for the enactment of the private property exclusion, Christian “would continue to carry a firearm in establishments such as these that neither prohibit the carrying of firearms nor post signage consenting to the carrying of firearms.” *Id.*

The private property exclusion has “particularly burdened” Christian “when driving or running errands.” *Id.* ¶ 11. When he is driving, he is “unable to take any bathroom breaks,” pick up food, or purchase gas while carrying his firearm. *Id.* He must “disable and store” his firearm before driving or walking into the parking lot, which means that, sometimes, he must “stop carrying for self-defense before” he “can get physically close enough to see if any ‘clear and conspicuous signage’ exists.” *Id.* By having to “constantly disarm” in order to comply with the private property

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must, however, be limited to what Christian has requested in his motion.

restriction, Christian is “left without the ability to defend” himself and is “suffering diminished personal safety on a frequent and ongoing basis.” *Id.* ¶ 12. He testified at his deposition consistently with these points. See Dkt. 47-1.

The Court received submissions from the parties.<sup>6</sup> The Court then held a hearing.<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>6</sup> On October 18, 2022, Defendant Flynn submitted an affidavit in response where he stated that he “leave[s] to the State-related co-defendant the defense of the said legislation from the plaintiffs’ said challenge.” Dkt. 28. On November 4, 2022, Defendant Steven A. Nigrelli submitted a Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for a Preliminary Injunction (Dkt. 33), which attached a Declaration of Ryan L. Belka, Esq. (Dkt. 33-1), a Declaration of Dr. Brennan Rivas, PhD (Dkt. 35-2), and a Declaration of David J. State, Esq. (Dkt. 35-3). With the Court’s permission, Everytown for Gun Safety filed an *amicus curiae* brief in opposition to Plaintiffs’ request for a preliminary injunction. Dkt. 45. Plaintiff filed a reply on November 18, 2022, Dkt. 46, and the State filed a sur-reply on November 21, 2022. Dkt. 47. As stated by the Court in *Bruen*, “[t]he job of judges is not to resolve historical questions in the abstract; it is to resolve *legal* questions presented in particular cases or controversies. That ‘legal inquiry is a refined subset’ of a broader ‘historical inquiry,’ and it relies on ‘various evidentiary principles and default rules’ to resolve uncertainties. For example, ‘[i]n our adversarial system of adjudication, we follow the principle of party presentation.’ Courts are thus entitled to decide a case based on the historical record compiled by the parties.” *New York State Rifle & Pistol Assoc., Inc. v. Bruen*, \_\_ U.S. \_\_, 142 S.Ct. 2111, 2130n.6 (2022) (emphasis in original) (citations omitted). The historical record itself, and not expert arguments or opinions, informs the analysis.

<sup>7</sup> The State requested “pre-hearing discovery and a preliminary injunction evidentiary hearing that allowed for cross-examination on the issue of standing.” See Dkt. 33, at 9n.4. The State deposed Christian and the parties submitted the transcript. See Dkt. 47-1. In anticipation of the deposition, the parties advised the Court that live testimony would be unnecessary. See Dkt. 40.

## ANALYSIS

### I. STANDING

The State<sup>8</sup> maintains that Christian lacks standing. Dkt. 33, at 8-10.<sup>9</sup> It argues that he has identified “unspecified” gas stations, hardware stores, and locations to take bathroom breaks, pick up food, or purchase gas—which, without more, “cannot demonstrate any activity or location that is clearly encompassed” by the statute. *Id.* at 10. The State further argues that Christian “presents no evidence” that these locations “have not already determined to prevent (or allow) concealed carry on their property.” *Id.* Christian has standing here.

Standing relates to a court’s constitutional power to hear and decide a case and, therefore, implicates subject-matter jurisdiction. *See Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins*, 578 U.S. 330, 338 (2016). To establish standing, “a plaintiff must show (1) an ‘injury in fact,’ (2) a sufficient ‘causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of,’ and (3) a ‘likel[i]hood’ that the injury ‘will be redressed by a favorable decision.’” *Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus*, 573 U.S. 149, 157 (2014) (quoting *Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife*, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)).

Only the first element of the test, *i.e.*, whether the Christian has suffered an injury-in-fact, bears discussion here (though all elements are met). An injury-in-fact exists where a plaintiff “suffered ‘an invasion of a legally protected interest’

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<sup>8</sup> “The State” and the State Defendant Nigrelli are used here interchangeably, as the Attorney General’s submissions functionally has as well. *See* Dkt. 33, 47.

<sup>9</sup> Regarding the institutional Plaintiffs, *see* footnote 4 above.

that is ‘concrete and particularized’ and ‘actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.’” *Spokeo*, 578 U.S. at 336 (quoting *Lujan*, 504 U.S. at 555). A particularized injury “affect[s] the plaintiff in a personal and individual way.” *Id.* (internal quotations and citation omitted). To be sure, the plaintiff’s injury must be direct, and a plaintiff “may not raise the rights of a third-party. . . .” See *N.Y. State Nat’l Org. for Women v. Terry*, 886 F.2d 1339, 1347 (2d Cir. 1989).

Pre-enforcement challenges to criminal statutes are “cognizable under Article III.” *Cayuga Nation v. Tanner*, 824 F.3d 321, 331 (2d Cir. 2016). The Supreme Court has made it clear that a plaintiff suffers an injury-in-fact sufficient to establish standing when he or she faces “threatened enforcement of a law” that is “sufficiently imminent.” *Susan B. Anthony List*, 573 U.S. at 158-59. When challenging a law prior to its enforcement, “a plaintiff satisfies the injury-in-fact requirement where he alleges ‘an intention to engage in a course of conduct arguably affected with a constitutional interest, but proscribed by a statute, and there exists a credible threat of prosecution thereunder.’” *Id.* (quoting *Babbitt v. United Farm Workers Nat. Union*, 442 U.S. 289, 297 (1979)).

A plaintiff need not first “expose himself to liability before bringing suit to challenge the basis for the threat—for example, the constitutionality of a law threatened to be enforced.” *Knife Rts., Inc. v. Vance*, 802 F.3d 377, 384 (2d Cir. 2015) (quoting *MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc.*, 549 U.S. 118, 128–29 (2007)). See also *Steffel v. Thompson*, 415 U.S. 452, 459 (1974) (“[I]t is not necessary that [the plaintiff] first expose himself to actual arrest or prosecution to be entitled to

challenge [the] statute that he claims deters the exercise of his constitutional rights.”).

The identification of a credible threat sufficient to satisfy the imminence requirement of injury in fact “necessarily depends on the particular circumstances at issue.” *Picard v. Magliano*, 42 F.4th 89, 98 (2d Cir. 2022) (quoting *Cayuga Nation*, 824 F.3d at 331)). Indeed, the standard articulated by the Supreme Court “sets a low threshold and is quite forgiving to plaintiffs seeking such pre[-]enforcement review,’ as courts are generally ‘willing to presume that the government will enforce the law as long as the relevant statute is recent and not moribund.’” *Picard*, 42 F.4th 89 (quoting *Cayuga Nation*, 824 F.3d at 331).

Christian has established that he suffered an injury-in-fact. He states that he would “typically bring [his] firearm with [him] on private property open to the public.” Dkt. 19-4, ¶ 10. He “intended to continue to do so, but for the enactment and enforcement” of the restriction. *Id.* Christian also would have also continued “to carry a firearm in establishments” that “neither prohibit the carrying of firearms nor post signage consenting to the carry of firearms” but for the restriction. *Id.* His activities and behavior have been impacted.

Moreover, New York Governor Kathy Hochul explained, in a July 1, 2022, press statement, that individuals “who carry concealed weapons in sensitive locations . . . will face criminal penalties.” See NEW YORK GOV.’S PRESS OFFICE, *Governor Hochul Signs Landmark Legislation to Strengthen Gun Laws and Bolster Restrictions on Concealed Carry Weapons in Response to Reckless Supreme Court*

*Decision*, July 1, 2022, available at <https://on.ny.gov/3nXWrvA> (last visited Nov. 22, 2022). On the eve of the law's enactment, Hochul criticized the Supreme Court's decision in *Bruen* as an attempt to "strip away the rights of a governor to protect her citizens from gun violence." BUFFALO NEWS, *Hochul: Last-Minute Pistol Permit Seekers May be too Late to Avoid NY's New Gun Requirements*, Aug 31, 2022 updated Oct 9, 2022, available at [https://buffalonews.com/news/local/crime-and-courts/hochul-last-minute-pistol-permit-seekers-may-be-too-late-to-avoid-nys-new-gun/article\\_ad5100a0-2943-11ed-af06-cbe41e631955.html](https://buffalonews.com/news/local/crime-and-courts/hochul-last-minute-pistol-permit-seekers-may-be-too-late-to-avoid-nys-new-gun/article_ad5100a0-2943-11ed-af06-cbe41e631955.html) (last visited Nov. 22, 2022).

In addition, First Deputy State Police Superintendent Steven Nigrelli (now Acting Superintendent and the substituted Defendant) warned that, if "you violate this law, you will be arrested. Simple as that." *See Antonyuk v. Hochul*, No. 22-CV-0986, 2022 WL 4367410, at ¶ 9 n.1 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 2022) (quoting statement by First Deputy Superintendent of the State Police Steven Nigrelli, "Governor Hochul Delivers a Press Conference on Gun Violence Prevention," <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gC1L2rrztQs> at 37:40)). Nigrelli explained that, in New York State, troopers "are standing ready" to ensure that "all laws are enforced." *Id.* He emphasized that the troopers will have "zero tolerance," and it is an "easy message" that he does not need to "spell it out more than this." *Id.*

These public statements show that New York residents—including Christian—face "threatened enforcement of a law" that is "sufficiently imminent." *Susan B. Anthony List*, 573 U.S. at 158-59. *See also Cayuga Nation*, 824 F.3d at

331 (credible threat of prosecution exists when Defendant has “announced its intention to enforce the [law] against the [plaintiff]”). Further, given the recency of the law—and lack of any indication that it will be repealed—the Court is and should be “willing to presume that the government will enforce” it. *See Picard*, 42 F.4th 89 (quoting *Cayuga Nation*, 824 F.3d at 331). Nothing in the State’s sur-reply is to the contrary. On these facts, Christian has standing.<sup>10</sup>

## II. PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

### A. Preliminary Injunction Standard

Generally, a party seeking preliminary injunctive relief “must show (1) irreparable harm; (2) either a likelihood of success on the merits or both serious questions on the merits and a balance of hardships decidedly favoring the moving party; and (3) that a preliminary injunction is in the public interest.” *N. Am. Soccer League, LLC v. U.S. Soccer Fed’n, Inc.*, 883 F.3d 32, 37 (2d Cir. 2018). Where, like here, the preliminary injunction “would stay government action taken in the public interest pursuant to a statutory or regulatory scheme,” the moving party “must satisfy the more rigorous prong of ‘likelihood of success’” at step two. *Bronx Household of Faith v. Bd. of Educ. of City of N.Y.*, 331 F.3d 342, 349 (2d Cir. 2003).

The standard may be further heightened if “(i) an injunction would alter, rather than maintain, the status quo, or (ii) an injunction will provide the movant with substantially all the relief sought and that relief cannot be undone even if the

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<sup>10</sup> Judge Suddaby reached a similar conclusion in *Antonyuk*, 2022 WL 16744700, at \*38-39.



defendant prevails at a trial on the merits.” *Tom Doherty Assocs., Inc. v. Saban Ent., Inc.*, 60 F.3d 27, 33-34 (2d Cir. 1995). If either scenario applies, a plaintiff must show “a clear or substantial likelihood of success on the merits” at step two. *See N. Am. Soccer League*, 883 F.3d at 37 (internal quotations and citation omitted); *Tom Doherty Assocs.*, 60 F.3d at 35.

When deciding whether an injunction is mandatory and would alter the status quo, the status quo is “the last actual, peaceable uncontested status which preceded the pending controversy.” *N. Am. Soccer League*, 883 F.3d at 37 (quoting *Mastrio v. Sebelius*, 768 F.3d 116, 120 (2d Cir. 2014) (per curiam)) (internal quotations omitted). The court also considers whether the injunction would “command[] some positive act”—rather than prohibit some act—by the defendant. *Mastrovincenzo v. City of New York*, 435 F.3d 78, 89 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting *Tom Doherty Assocs.*, 60 F.3d at 34). An injunction that enjoins a defendant from enforcing a regulation “clearly prohibits, rather than compels, government action by enjoining the future enforcement.” *Id.* at 90.

Moreover, the heightened standard does not apply to “any [request for an] injunction where the final relief for the plaintiff would simply be a continuation of the preliminary relief.” *Tom Doherty Assocs.*, 60 F.3d at 34. Instead, the heightened standard applies when the injunction “will render a trial on the merits largely or partly meaningless, either because of temporal concerns”—like a case involving a live, televised event scheduled for the day the court granted preliminary relief—“or because of the nature of the subject of the litigation”—like a case



involving disclosure of confidential information. *Id.* at 35. If a preliminary injunction “will make it difficult or impossible to render a meaningful remedy to a defendant who prevails on the merits at trial,” then the heightened standard applies; “[o]therwise, there is no reason to impose a higher standard.” *Id.*

In this case, Christian requests that this Court “vindicate that the Second Amendment is not a ‘second-class right’ by preliminarily enjoining enforcement” of the private property exclusion. Dkt. 19-1, at 24. This request seeks to prohibit Defendants from enforcing the new private property exclusion; it does not seek an order requiring Defendants to act. In other words, Christian seeks to restore the status that existed before implementation of the private property exclusion. He therefore seeks a prohibitory—not a mandatory—injunction. As stated in *Hardaway*, the Constitution and the Bill of Rights represent the status quo—not 2022 legislation on the books for a few months.<sup>11</sup> See *Hardaway v. Nigrelli*, No. 22-CV-771, 2022 WL 16646220, at \*6 (W.D.N.Y. Nov. 3, 2022).

And relief remains available to Defendants if they prevail at trial on the merits. If Defendants prevail, the Court could vacate any injunctive relief and allow them again to enforce the private property exclusion.

Thus, the standard remains that Christian must demonstrate: (1) irreparable harm; (2) a likelihood of success on the merits; and (3) that a preliminary injunction

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<sup>11</sup> The Court recognizes that courts should not lightly enjoin enforcement of laws. The law at issue here, however, is at odds with higher law, namely—the Constitution. The Court notes here too that Christian would meet the heightened standard in any event—even if it applied.

is in the public interest. *See N. Am. Soccer League*, 883 F.3d at 37; *Bronx Household of Faith*, 331 F.3d at 349.

## **B. Likelihood of Success on the Merits**

Christian is likely to succeed on the merits of his Second and Fourteenth Amendment claims. As set forth below, on this historical record, New York’s new private property exclusion violates the right of individuals to keep and bear arms for self-defense outside of their homes.

That right was enshrined in the Second Amendment to the Constitution, ratified in 1791: “A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.” U.S. Const. amend. II. And on three recent occasions, the Supreme Court explored this right and supplied the framework that resolves this issue on this motion. A thorough understanding of the Supreme Court’s *Heller*, *McDonald*, and *Bruen* opinions is essential. This Court discussed them at length in *Hardaway*, 2022 WL 16646220, at \*7-14.

Most relevant here, *Bruen* held that the Second and Fourteenth Amendments “protect an individual’s right to carry a handgun for self-defense *outside the home*.” *Bruen*, 142 S.Ct. at 2122 (emphasis added). Most gun owners “do not wear a holstered pistol at their hip in their bedroom or while sitting at the dinner table. Although individuals often ‘keep’ firearms in their home, at the ready for self-defense, most do not ‘bear’ (*i.e.*, carry) them in the home beyond moments of actual

confrontation. To confine the right to ‘bear’ arms to the home would nullify half of the Second Amendment’s operative protections.” *Bruen*, 142 S.Ct. at 2134-35.

The Court continued, “[m]oreover, confining the right to ‘bear’ arms to the home would make little sense given that self-defense is ‘the *central component* of the [Second Amendment] right itself.” *Id.* (quoting *District of Columbia v. Heller*, 554 U.S. 570, 599 (2008)). *See also McDonald*, 561 U.S. at 767, 130 S.Ct. 3020. After all, “the Second Amendment guarantees an ‘individual right to possess and carry weapons in case of confrontation,’ *Heller*, 554 U.S. at 592, 128 S.Ct. 2783, and confrontation can surely take place outside the home.” *Id.* at 2135. “*Many Americans hazard greater danger outside the home than in it. The text of the Second Amendment reflects that reality.* The Second Amendment’s plain text thus presumptively guarantees petitioners Koch and Nash a right to bear arms in public for self-defense.” *Id.* (citation omitted) (emphasis added).<sup>12</sup>

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<sup>12</sup> *Bruen*’s articulation of “in public” is not a limitation. While *Heller* and *McDonald* were limited to the home, *Bruen* then addressed the right *outside of the home*. The Court did not indicate that the right ceased at the property line of others. *See, e.g., Bruen*, at 2135, 2157 (“outside the home”); *see also Heller*, 554 U.S. at 594 (“the right . . . was by the time of the founding understood to be an individual right protecting against both public and private violence.”). As stated in Justice Alito’s concurrence in *Bruen*, “because many people face a serious risk of lethal violence when they venture outside their homes, the Second Amendment was understood at the time of adoption to apply under those circumstances . . . . [As such,] a State may not enforce a law . . . that effectively prevents its law-abiding residents from carrying a gun for this purpose.” *Bruen*, 142 S.Ct. at 2157 (Alito, J., concurring). The same is true in this case.

In this case, tracking *Bruen*, Christian is an ordinary, law-abiding citizen to whom the Second Amendment applies. *Id.* at 2134. As it did for the petitioners in *Bruen*, the Second Amendment’s plain text thus presumptively guarantees Christian’s right to “bear” arms for self-defense on private property outside of his own home.

*Bruen* also set forth the relevant test: “when the Second Amendment’s plain text covers an individual’s conduct, the Constitution presumptively protects that conduct. To justify its regulation, the government may not simply posit that the regulation promotes an important interest. Rather, *the government must demonstrate that the regulation is consistent with this Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation.* Only if a firearm regulation is consistent with this Nation’s historical tradition may a court conclude that the individual’s conduct falls outside the Second Amendment’s unqualified command.” *Id.* at 2126 (citation and internal quotation omitted) (emphasis added). In other words, “the government must affirmatively prove that its firearms regulation is part of the historical tradition that delimits the outer bounds of the right to keep and bear arms.” *Id.* at 2127.

The State argues that its private property exclusion complies with *Bruen*. It cites to a few colonial and reconstruction-era enactments (Maryland in 1715, Pennsylvania in 1721, New Jersey in 1722, New York in 1763, New Jersey in 1771, Louisiana in 1865, Texas in 1866, and Oregon in 1893). Dkt. 33, at 16-18. They do not carry the State’s burden, as explained at length in *Antonyuk*, 2022 WL

16744700, at \*79-81.<sup>13</sup> To Judge Suddaby's discussion of this issue in *Antonyuk*, this Court adds a few additional points.

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<sup>13</sup> The three additional late-nineteenth century enactments cited in paragraphs 18, 20, and 22 of the Belka declaration (Dkt. 33-1) were not expressly addressed in *Antonyuk*. They are not generalized private property enactments, but are enactments focused on large gatherings like fairs, assemblies, and social gatherings. They are adequately addressed by the thrust of Judge Suddaby's analysis of the State's cited enactments. And they vastly post-date the Second Amendment.

It bears consideration of what a court might do if it were addressing an 1880s-era enactment in real time—in the 1880s. The court would be expected to ascertain the meaning of the right codified in the Second Amendment. It would not be impressed by 1880s-era laws in effect in neighboring jurisdictions that *contravened* the earlier public understanding of the right.

In fact, *Bruen* noted that, “when it comes to interpreting the Constitution, not all history is created equal. ‘Constitutional rights are enshrined with the scope they were understood to have *when the people adopted them*.’” *Bruen*, 142 S.Ct. at 2136 (citing *Heller*, emphasis in original). Courts “must also guard against giving postenactment history more weight than it can rightly bear.” *Id.* at 2136. In other words, *Bruen* recognized that, “where a governmental practice has been open, widespread, and unchallenged since the early days of the Republic, the practice should guide our interpretation of an ambiguous constitutional provision.” *Id.* at 2137 (internal citation omitted). And “to the extent later history contradicts what the text says, the text controls.” *Id.*

Indeed, “post-ratification adoption or acceptance of laws that are *inconsistent* with the original meaning of the constitutional text obviously cannot overcome or alter that text.” *Id.* (internal citation omitted). Because “post-Civil War discussions of the right to keep and bear arms ‘took place 75 years after the ratification of the Second Amendment, they do not provide as much insight into its original meaning as earlier sources.’” *Id.* And although it is the Fourteenth Amendment that requires New York to respect the right addressed by the Second Amendment, the Court has “made clear that “individual rights enumerated in the Bill of Rights and made applicable against the States through the Fourteenth Amendment have the same scope as against the Federal Government.” *Id.* The Court has “generally assumed that the scope of the protection applicable to the Federal Government and States is pegged to the public understanding of the right when the Bill of Rights was adopted in 1791.” *Id.* If this were not the case, the Second Amendment could mean one thing *vis a vis* federal laws, and entirely something else *vis a vis* state and local laws.

Moreover, as the Court surveyed a few additional restrictions appearing randomly in the late 19<sup>th</sup>-Century, the Court noted that, similarly, “we will not stake our interpretation on a handful of temporary territorial laws that were

As the Supreme Court has made clear, individuals have the right to carry handguns outside their homes for self-defense. New York’s exclusion is valid only if the State “affirmatively prove[s]” that the restriction is part of the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation. *Bruen*, 142 S.Ct. at 2127. The test is rigorous because the Second Amendment is the very product of an interest balancing, already conducted by “the People,” which “elevates above all other interests the right of law-abiding, responsible citizens to use arms for self-defense.” *Id.* at 2131 (citing *Heller*, 554 U.S. at 635). That balance, struck by the traditions of the American people, “demands” unqualified deference. *Id.*<sup>14</sup>

Significant, too, is the Court’s recognition that, when, a “challenged regulation addresses a general societal problem that has persisted since the 18th century, the lack of a distinctly similar historical regulation addressing that problem is relevant evidence that the challenged regulation is inconsistent with the Second Amendment.” *Id.* at 2131. New York’s law here concerns the same alleged societal problem addressed in *Heller*: “handgun violence,” primarily in “urban

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enacted nearly a century after the Second Amendment’s adoption, governed less than 1% of the American population, and also ‘contradic[t] the overwhelming weight’ of other, more contemporaneous historical evidence.” *Id.* at 2154-55 (internal citations omitted). As to certain territorial restrictions, “they appear more as passing regulatory efforts by not-yet-mature jurisdictions on the way to statehood, rather than part of *an enduring American tradition of state regulation.*” *Id.* at 2155 (emphasis added).

<sup>14</sup> As *Heller* recognized, citizens must be permitted to use handguns “for the core lawful purpose of self-defense.” *Heller*, 554 U.S. at 630.



area[s].” And, as in *Bruen*, there is no such tradition in the historical materials that the State has “brought to bear on that question.” *Id.* at 2132.<sup>15</sup>

Also noteworthy is *Bruen*’s conclusion of its search for an enduring tradition: “At the end of this long journey through the Anglo-American history of public carry, we conclude that respondents have not met their burden to identify an American tradition justifying the State’s proper-cause requirement. The Second Amendment guaranteed to ‘all Americans’ the right to bear commonly used arms in public subject to certain reasonable, well-defined restrictions. Those restrictions, for example, limited the intent for which one could carry arms, the manner by which one carried arms, or the exceptional circumstances under which one could not carry arms, such as before justices of the peace and other government officials. Apart from a few late-19<sup>th</sup>-century outlier jurisdictions, American governments simply have not broadly prohibited the public carry of commonly used firearms for personal defense. Nor, subject to a few late-in-time outliers, have American governments required law-abiding, responsible citizens to ‘demonstrate a special need for self-protection distinguishable from that of the general community’ in order to carry arms in public.” *Id.* at 2156 (internal citations omitted).

In other words, the State’s cited enactments do not demonstrate a *tradition* in support of its private property exclusion. *Bruen*, 142 S.Ct. at 2135, 2138, 2150,

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<sup>15</sup> *Bruen* itself invalidated a century-old New York proper-cause requirement similarly in effect in five other states as well as the District of Columbia. That seven jurisdictions enacted similar restrictions was *insufficient* in the face of a much broader and much older public-carry tradition. If such was a failure of analogs or tradition in *Bruen*, the State’s argument must also fail here.

2156.<sup>16</sup> *Antonyuk* made that clear. And the notion of a “tradition” is the opposite of one-offs, outliers, or novel enactments. “Tradition” requires “continuity.” See generally *Bruen*, 142 S.Ct. at 2135-56; *Washington v. Glucksberg*, 521 U.S. 702, 723 (1997); *Tradition*, The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language (5<sup>th</sup> ed. 2011). The cited enactments are of unknown or limited duration,<sup>17</sup> and the State has not met its burden to show *endurance* (of any sort) *over time*.<sup>18</sup> For this reason, too, the State’s argument fails.

The State also argues that private property owners have always had the right to exclude others from their property and, as such, may exclude those carrying concealed handguns. See Dkt. 33, at 13-15. But that right has always been one *belonging to the private property owner*—not to the State.<sup>19</sup> It is the property owner who must exercise that right—not the State. If a property owner wants to exclude,

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<sup>16</sup> The *amicus curiae*, too, argues that a small number of state laws is sufficient so long as there is not overwhelming evidence of an enduring tradition to the contrary. See Dkt. 45, at 11-13. This turns the test and its burden on their heads. The *Bruen* Court itself rejected several outliers and was looking for a “broad tradition” of states “meaningfully restrict[ing] public carry.” *Bruen*, 142 S.Ct. at 2156.

<sup>17</sup> As *Bruen* noted, courts are “not obliged to sift the historical materials for evidence to sustain” the challenged statute; “that is [the State’s] burden. *Bruen*, 142 S.Ct. at 2150.

<sup>18</sup> Indeed, *Bruen* searched for an “enduring American tradition of state regulation.” 142 S.Ct. at 2155. And the Court gave little weight to territorial enactments that, like the territories themselves, were “short lived.” *Id.*; see also *id.* at 2155 n.31 (“short lived”).

<sup>19</sup> The Nation’s historical tradition is that individuals may carry arms on private property unless the property owner chooses otherwise. See generally D. Kopel & J. Greenlee, The “Sensitive Places” Doctrine: Locational Limits on the Right to Bear Arms, 13 *Charleston L. Rev.* 205, 290-91 (2018).



then: (1) the property owner, must (2) do so. When the State does so, it runs afoul of the Second Amendment.<sup>20</sup>

The State posits that a self-governing society may choose one of two default rules, namely, that carrying on private property is (a) generally permitted absent the owner's prohibition, or (b) never permitted unless the owner affirmatively consents. Dkt. 33, at 15. Maybe so. But the scope of the *right codified in the Second Amendment* demonstrates that this society—*this nation*—has historically had *the former* default arrangement. The latter proposed default was not part of any historical tradition to the contrary, and did not form a limitation of the scope of the right so codified in the Bill of Rights. Instead, the State's current policy preference is one that, because of the interest balancing *already struck by the people* and enshrined in the Second Amendment, is no longer on the table. *See Heller*, 554 U.S. at 636; *Bruen*, 142 S.Ct. at 2131.

In sum, the vast majority of land in New York is held privately, and it encompasses homes, farms, businesses, factories, vacant land, hotels, parking lots and garages, grocery stores, pharmacies, medical offices, hospitals, cemeteries, malls, sports and entertainment venues, and so on. These are places that people, exercising their rights, frequent *every day* when they move around *outside their homes*. The exclusion here makes all of these places presumptively off limits,

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<sup>20</sup> The State has not identified any historical tradition for its “inversion”—whereby the government now affirmatively exercises the right to exclude concealed carriers *on behalf of all private property owners*, thereby creating a *vast default exclusion zone across the state*.

backed up by the threat of prison. The Nation’s historical traditions have not countenanced such an incursion into the right to keep and bear arms across all varieties of private property spread across the land. The right to self-defense is no less important and no less recognized on private property.<sup>21</sup> The Constitution *requires* that individuals be permitted to use handguns for the core lawful purpose of self-defense. *McDonald*, 561 U.S. at 767. And it protects that right *outside the home*. *Bruen*, 142 S.Ct. at 2021.

Nothing in the Nation’s history or traditions presumptively closes the door on that right *across all private property*. As in *Bruen*, where the Court stated that, “[n]othing in the Second Amendment’s text draws a home/public distinction with respect to the right to keep and bear arms,” *id.* at 14, nothing there casts outside of its protection all private property. New York’s exclusion violates “the general right to publicly carry arms for self-defense.” *Id.* Again, it is one of the policy choices taken “off the table” by the Second Amendment. *Heller*, 554 U.S. at 636.

For these reasons, New York’s private property exclusion “violates the Fourteenth Amendment by preventing law-abiding citizens with ordinary self-defense needs from exercising their right to keep and bear arms.” *Bruen*, 142 S.Ct. at 2156. Plaintiff is likely to succeed on the merits of his constitutional claim.

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<sup>21</sup> Nothing in this decision purports to impact the traditional property right to exclude others, so long as *the property owner* (not the State) is the one actually exercising that right.

### C. Irreparable Harm Absent Preliminary Injunctive Relief

Irreparable harm is “certain and imminent harm for which a monetary award does not adequately compensate.” *Wisdom Imp. Sales Co., L.L.C. v. Labatt Brewing Co., Ltd.*, 339 F.3d 101, 113 (2d Cir. 2003). Irreparable harm exists “where, but for the grant of equitable relief, there is a substantial chance that upon final resolution of the action the parties cannot be returned to the positions they previously occupied.” *Brenntag Int’l Chem., Inc. v. Bank of India*, 175 F.3d 245, 249 (2d Cir. 1999).

Here, absent a preliminary injunction, Christian’s constitutional rights are being violated. Law-abiding citizens are forced to give up their rights to armed self-defense outside their homes, being left to the mercy of opportunistic, lawless individuals who might prey on them and have no concern about the private property exclusion.<sup>22</sup> And for the reasons stated above in Section II.B, the State is wrong to

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<sup>22</sup> Justice Alito queried, “Will a person bent on carrying out a mass shooting be stopped if he knows that it is illegal to carry a handgun outside the home?” *Bruen*, 142 S.Ct. at 2157. He continued: “And while the dissent seemingly thinks that the ubiquity of guns and our country’s high level of gun violence provide reasons for sustaining the New York law, the dissent appears not to understand that it is these very facts that cause law-abiding citizens to feel the need to carry a gun for self-defense.” *Id.* at 2158. Finally, he noted that “[t]he police cannot disarm every person who acquires a gun for use in criminal activity; nor can they provide bodyguard protection for the State’s nearly 20 million residents . . . . Some of these people live in high-crime neighborhoods. Some must traverse dark and dangerous streets in order to reach their homes after work or other evening activities. Some are members of groups whose members feel especially vulnerable. And some of these people reasonably believe that unless they can brandish or, if necessary, use a handgun in the case of attack, they may be murdered, raped, or suffer some other serious injury.” *Id.* Indeed, “[o]rdinary citizens frequently use firearms to protect themselves from criminal attack. According to survey data, defensive firearm use

suggest that irreparable harm does not exist because the case involves a policy decision between two defaults that should be left to the legislature to decide. *See* Dkt. 47, at 4. The private property exclusion is all-encompassing and leaves Christian no alternatives as he moves around outside his home.

In an analogous case, the Supreme Court has held that the loss of “First Amendment freedoms, for even minimal periods of time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.” *Roman Cath. Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo*, 141 S.Ct. 63, 67 (2020) (quoting *Elrod v. Burns*, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976)). Here as well, there “can be no question that the challenged restrictions, if enforced, will cause irreparable harm.” *See id.* Christian satisfies the irreparable harm element.

#### **D. Public Interest**

The Court must consider whether a preliminary injunction is in the public interest. *See Bronx Household of Faith*, 331 F.3d at 349. The State argues that broad legal carrying in dense congregate settings can result in spontaneous violence or accidental shootings. *See* Dkt. 33, at 42-43. But the State does not show that the lawful carrying of firearms on private property has resulted in an increase in handgun violence, or that public safety would be impaired if the private property restriction is enjoined.

A preliminary injunction would, however, serve the public interest of fostering self-defense across the state. The public has a significant interest in the

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occurs up to 2.5 million times per year.” *Id.* (citation omitted).

“strong sense of the safety that a licensed concealed handgun regularly provides, or would provide, to the many law-abiding responsible citizens in the state too powerless to physically defend themselves in public without a handgun.” *Antonyuk v. Bruen*, No. 22-CV-0734, 2022 WL 3999791, at \*36 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 31, 2022). A preliminary injunction is in the public interest.

### **E. Security**

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(c) requires the Court to consider whether it should require plaintiffs to post security and, if so, in what amount. *See Dr.’s Assocs., Inc. v. Distajo*, 107 F.3d 126, 136 (2d Cir. 1997) (“Rule 65(c) gives the district court wide discretion to set the amount of a bond, and even to dispense with the bond requirement [in certain situations].”).

On these facts, the Court will not require Christian to post security because a bond requirement does not fit the fact-pattern and interests involved in this case. *See Dr.’s Assocs.*, 107 F.3d at 135-36 (affirming district court’s decision not to require security where the district court “found that [defendants] would not suffer damage or loss from being forced to arbitrate in lieu of prosecuting their state-court cases”); *see also Clarkson Co. v. Shaheen*, 544 F.2d 624, 632 (2d Cir. 1976) (Because no request for a bond was ever made in the district court, and because, under Fed. R. Civ. P. 65, “the amount of any bond to be given upon the issuance of a preliminary injunction rests within the sound discretion of the trial court.”)

## F. Scope

The State argues that Christian can only bring a facial—rather than an as-applied—challenge to the private property exclusion, which would succeed only “if Plaintiffs ‘show that no set of circumstances exists under which the [statute] would be valid, *i.e.*, that the law is unconstitutional in all of its applications,’ or at least that it lacks a ‘plainly legitimate sweep.’” Dkt. 33, at 11 (quoting *United States v. Decastro*, 682 F.3d 160, 168 (2d Cir. 2012)). The argument fails.

Christian has shown, at a minimum, that the private property exclusion lacks a “plainly legitimate sweep” in that it forces individuals to give up their rights to armed self-defense outside the home. *See Decastro*, 682 F.3d at 168 (to prevail on a facial challenge, a plaintiff “would need to show that no set of circumstances exists under which the statute would be valid, *i.e.*, that the law is unconstitutional in all of its applications, or at least that it lacks a plainly legitimate sweep”) (internal citation omitted). And it bears noting that neither the parties nor the Court’s imagination has identified a plainly legitimate sweep.

## G. Stay Pending Appeal

The State requests a three-day stay pending appeal. The State’s request is denied. The factors “relevant to granting a stay pending appeal are the applicant’s ‘strong showing that he is likely to succeed on the merits,’ irreparable injury to the applicant in the absence of a stay, substantial injury to the nonmoving party if a stay is issued, and the public interest.” *Uniformed Fire Officers Ass’n v. de Blasio*, 973 F.3d 41, 48 (2d Cir. 2020) (citing *Nken v. Holder*, 556 U.S. 418, 434 (2009)). The

first two factors “are the most critical, but a stay is not a matter of right, even if irreparable injury might otherwise result, it is an exercise of judicial discretion, and the party requesting a stay bears the burden of showing that the circumstances justify an exercise of that discretion.” *Id.* (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).

Here, a stay pending appeal is not warranted. As discussed above, Plaintiff’s constitutional rights are being violated absent a preliminary injunction. The State has not established irreparable injury in the absence of a stay. The balance of hardships and public interest weigh in favor of Plaintiff, also as discussed above. Finally, it is *Plaintiff* who has demonstrated that he is likely to succeed on the merits. As in *Hardaway*, legislative enactments may not eviscerate the Bill of Rights. Every day they do is one too many. *Hardaway*, 2022 WL 16646220, at \*19.

### CONCLUSION

For the above reasons, the Court GRANTS the motion for a preliminary injunction as follows: it is

ORDERED that Defendants and their officers, agents, servants, employees, and all persons in concert or participation with them who receive notice of this preliminary injunction, are enjoined, effective immediately, from enforcing N.Y. Pen. L. § 265.01-d with respect to private property open to the public, and their regulations, policies, and practices implementing it;


ORDERED that this preliminary injunction shall remain in effect pending disposition of the case on the merits; and

ORDERED that no bond shall be required.

The portions of Plaintiffs' motion addressing public parks and public transportation will be addressed in a subsequent decision.

SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 22, 2022  
Buffalo, New York

  
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JOHN L. SINATRA, JR.  
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE