

2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

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Draft Report of Subsidiary Body 1*

“Nuclear Disarmament and Security Assurances”

The Review Conference of the Parties to Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,

Mindful of the devastation that would be visited upon all humanity by a nuclear war and the consequent need to make every effort to avert the danger of such a war and to take measures to safeguard the security of peoples,

Expresses deep concern about the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of any use of nuclear weapons and affirms that awareness of these consequences must underpin all approaches and efforts towards nuclear disarmament,

Recalls all States’ obligation to pursue the total elimination of nuclear weapons as the highest disarmament priority and expresses deep concern about the slow pace of progress towards that end,

Reaffirms that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought, and commits to ensuring that nuclear weapons will never be used again under any circumstances,

Reaffirms that the principles of transparency, verifiability and irreversibility must be applied to all measures related to nuclear disarmament,

Reaffirms the validity of all existing commitments undertaken, including in the outcome documents adopted by the 1995, 2000 and 2010 NPT Review Conferences, especially the unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament, to which all States parties are committed under article VI, stresses that these commitments are not conditional, and reaffirms the need for their full and effective implementation.

To avert danger of nuclear war and to accelerate progress towards the collective goal of a world free of nuclear weapons, the State Parties agree to the following commitments:

1. States Parties reaffirm the urgency and importance of achieving universality of the Treaty and urge States not yet party to the Treaty, namely India, Israel, Pakistan and South Sudan, to accede to the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States, promptly and

* Established by the decision contained in [NPT/CONF.2020/DEC.1](#) adopted by States Parties on 1 August 2022

without conditions, and, pending their accession, to adhere to its terms; particularly those States that operate unsafeguarded nuclear facilities.

2. The nuclear-weapon States undertake to pursue reductions or further reductions in all types of nuclear weapons, including through bilateral and multilateral negotiations and unilateral initiatives.

3. The Russian Federation and the United States commit to the negotiation of a successor framework to the “New START” Treaty before its expiration in 2026.

4. All nuclear-weapon States commit to dialogue on the establishment of a multilateral arms control framework.

5. The nuclear-weapon States and their allies agree to take steps to reduce and eliminate the role of nuclear weapons in national and collective security doctrines; for nuclear-weapon States this should include the adoption of no-first use or sole purpose doctrines.

6. The nuclear-weapon States commit to enhanced transparency measures related to, inter alia, their nuclear arsenals, doctrines and postures.

7. The nuclear-weapon States acknowledge and take into account the grave concerns of non-nuclear weapon States regarding the extensive investment in the modernization of nuclear forces and the development of new types of nuclear weapons and delivery systems.

8. States Parties commit to the immediate commencement and early conclusion of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament of a treaty banning the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other explosive devices in accordance with the mandate of CD/1299.

9. States Parties commit to the prompt entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and urge all States that have yet to ratify the CTBT to do so without delay, particularly the remaining eight States listed in its Annex 2.

10. Pending the entry into force of the CTBT, States Parties commit to strictly maintain all existing moratoria on explosive nuclear tests, and refrain from any action that would defeat the object and purpose of the CTBT.

11. States Parties agree that multilateral disarmament verification is a vital component of a world free of nuclear weapons. They commit to strengthen support for initiatives to develop multilateral disarmament verification and capacity-building as an effective step towards the implementation of article VI, and to further conceptual and practical work on nuclear disarmament verification, taking into account the importance of partnerships between nuclear-armed States and non-nuclear-weapon States on this matter.

12. States Parties agree that nuclear-weapon-free zones established by means of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the respective regions and recognized by the General Assembly must be respected by all States without any reservations or limitations.

13. The nuclear-weapon States commit to take all measures necessary to bring about the entry into force of the relevant protocols to treaties establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones without reservations or unilateral interpretative declarations that are incompatible with the object and purpose of such treaties.

14. States Parties commit to support the establishment of nuclear-weapons-free zones in all regions of the world on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among States of the region concerned.

15. States Parties reaffirm the Resolution on the Middle East adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference.
16. States Parties recognize that the only absolute guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons is their total elimination. States Parties also recognize that strengthening negative security assurances would contribute to building confidence in the non-proliferation regime, progress in nuclear disarmament as well as improving the overall security environment.
17. Pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons, as interim measures, the nuclear-weapon States commit
 - a. not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear weapon State Party to the Treaty under any circumstances; and
 - b. to provide effective, universal, unconditional, non-discriminatory and irrevocable legally binding security assurances to all the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty through the urgent commencement of negotiations on such assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons under all circumstances.
18. States Parties acknowledge that as long as nuclear weapons exist nuclear risk will persist and affirm that only their elimination can eliminate all risks associated with nuclear weapons. Efforts to reduce the risk of nuclear war are not a substitute for but rather are complementary to and a catalyst for the implementation of nuclear disarmament obligations under Article VI.
19. States Parties acknowledge that, while the avoidance of nuclear war is the responsibility of all States, the nuclear-weapon States have a special responsibility to reduce nuclear risks and that the implementation of the disarmament obligation in accordance with Article VI and of existing commitments can contribute to reducing risks. As these risks directly affect all States, there is a shared interest in risk reduction.
20. For these reasons, the nuclear-weapon States commit to the following immediate measures:
 - a. To take all necessary measures to reduce the risks that nuclear weapons could be used as a result of miscalculation, misperception or by accident;
 - b. To the issuance of political declarations of restraint to increase trust and reassurance;
 - c. To intensify dialogue, within the P5 process, bilaterally and with the non-nuclear weapon States on risk perceptions, nuclear doctrines and force postures;
 - d. To engage in sustained efforts to enhance transparency on nuclear arsenals;
 - e. To reduce the operational status of nuclear weapons systems;
 - f. To create and enhance effective crisis prevention and management tools, including notification and data exchange agreements, enhanced leader-to-leader and military-to-military contact, the establishment of crisis-proof communication lines and risk reduction centres;
 - g. To take steps to better understand and minimize vulnerabilities related to potentially disruptive new technologies and cyber capacities; and to avoid any actions related to those technologies and capacities that could increase nuclear risks; and
 - h. Further investigate operational uncertainties, pathways to nuclear use, sharing of best practices and de-escalation pathways.

21. States Parties commit to
 - a. Reinvigorate and participate in transparency and confidence-building measures and other appropriate measures that can, directly or indirectly, improve predictability in international relations and help to reduce the risk of nuclear-weapon use;
 - b. Foster forms of dialogue that are aimed at easing international tensions, strengthening trust between States and contributing to the advancement of nuclear disarmament.
22. In order to pursue a credible, result-oriented process for further work related to risk reduction in the context of this Treaty, States Parties commit to
 - a. Include in their national reports on their fulfillment of obligations and commitments under the Treaty information on measures and initiatives in the context of risk reduction during the course of the next and future review cycles; and
 - b. Devote time to a structured discussion about risk reduction at future sessions of the Preparatory Committee as a specific issue under Cluster 1 and future Review Conferences under a specific agenda item.
23. States Parties recognize the vital importance of educating and empowering individuals of all generations and genders regarding the dangers and imperatives to reach a world without nuclear weapons, including the risks and humanitarian consequences associated with them. States Parties commit to take concrete measures to raise awareness of the public, in particular of younger and future generations, as well as of leaders, disarmament experts and diplomats, on all topics relating to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, including through interactions with and directly sharing the experiences of the survivors and the communities affected by nuclear weapons use and testing, to know their humanitarian impact.
24. States Parties recognize the importance of, and commit to ensure the equal, full and effective participation and leadership of both women and men in the NPT implementation and review and to further integrate gender perspectives in all aspects of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation decision-making processes.
25. States Parties commit to empower and enable youth to participate in formal and informal initiatives and in nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation decision-making processes.
26. States Parties also commit to promote the participation of civil society, including research centres and academia, in nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation decision-making processes and in raising public awareness on the urgency and importance of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament.
27. Nuclear-weapon States commit to report at every session of the Preparatory Committee and at every Review Conference, on the status of their nuclear forces, their nuclear doctrine, and on the progress of their implementation of the Treaty and of commitments made at previous Review Conferences, in line with Action 20 of the 2010 Action Plan, including, inter alia, the use of benchmarks and targets to measure progress.
28. States Parties commit to submit regular reports on implementation of Article VI of the Treaty and of commitments made at previous Review Conferences, in line with Action 20 of the 2010 Action Plan.
29. States Parties commit to devote time at every session of the Preparatory Committee and at every Review Conference to the presentation and discussion of the

reports of all nuclear-weapon States and the reports of interested non-nuclear weapon States.
