Draft Final Document

Review of the operation of the Treaty, as provided for in its article VIII (3), taking into account the decisions and the resolutions adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference and the conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions adopted by the 2010 Review Conference.

Articles I and II and first to third preambular paragraphs

1. The Conference recognizes the Treaty as the cornerstone of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime, the foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament and an important element in facilitating the benefits of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

2. The Conference reaffirms that the full and effective implementation of the Treaty and the regime of nuclear non-proliferation in all its aspects plays a vital role in promoting international peace and security by preventing the spread of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices without hampering the peaceful uses of nuclear energy by States parties to the Treaty.

3. The Conference remains convinced that universal adherence to the Treaty and full compliance of all parties with all of its provisions are the best way to achieve the shared objectives of the total elimination of nuclear weapons and preventing, under any circumstances, the further proliferation of nuclear weapons. The Conference calls upon all States parties to exert all efforts to promote universal adherence to the Treaty, to fully comply with the Treaty and not to take any action that can negatively affect prospects for its universality and effective implementation.

4. The Conference reaffirms that it is essential for the Treaty to be implemented in all its aspects in order to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices without hampering the peaceful uses of nuclear energy by States parties. The Conference recognizes that the full and effective implementation of the Treaty is a common responsibility of all States parties to the Treaty and remains convinced that universal adherence to the Treaty and full compliance of all parties with all its provisions are the best way to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices and to achieve a world without nuclear weapons.
5. The Conference notes that the nuclear-weapon States reaffirmed their commitment not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly, and not in any way to assist, encourage or induce any non-nuclear-weapon States to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices, in accordance with article I of the Treaty.

6. The Conference notes that the non-nuclear-weapon States reaffirmed their commitment not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly, not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and not to seek nor receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, in accordance with article II of the Treaty.

7. The Conference recalls that the non-nuclear-weapon States entered into legally binding commitments not to receive, manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices in the context, inter alia, of the corresponding legally binding commitments by the nuclear-weapon States to nuclear disarmament in accordance with the Treaty.

8. The Conference reaffirms the continued validity of all commitments undertaken by States parties towards the full and effective implementation of the objectives and provisions of the Treaty, through the decisions and the resolution adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference and the conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions of the 2010 Review Conference, all of which were adopted by consensus.

9. The Conference reaffirms that the strict observance of all provisions of the Treaty is central to achieving the shared objectives of the total elimination of nuclear weapons, as well as preventing, under any circumstances, the further proliferation of nuclear weapons, and preserving the Treaty’s vital contribution to international peace and security.

10. The Conference recalls the commitment by all States parties to pursuing policies that are fully compatible with the Treaty and the objective of achieving and maintaining a world without nuclear weapons.

11. The Conference emphasizes that measures should be taken to ensure that the rights of all States parties under the provisions of the Treaty are fully protected and that no State party is limited in the exercise of those rights in accordance with the Treaty.

12. The Conference emphasizes that responses to concerns over compliance with any obligation under the Treaty by any State party should be pursued by diplomatic means, in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty and the Charter of the United Nations. The Conference recognizes that breaches of the Treaty’s obligations undermine nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation and peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

**Article III and fourth and fifth preambular paragraphs, especially in their relationship to article IV and sixth and seventh preambular paragraphs**

13. The Conference emphasizes that the safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) are a fundamental component of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, are essential for peaceful nuclear commerce and cooperation and that IAEA safeguards make a vital contribution to the environment for peaceful nuclear development and international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The
Conference considers that safeguards should be implemented in a manner designed to comply with article IV of the Treaty and to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the States parties or international cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities.

14. The Conference reaffirms that the IAEA is the competent authority responsible for verifying and assuring, in accordance with the Statute of the IAEA and the IAEA safeguards system, compliance by States parties with the safeguards agreements undertaken in fulfilment of their obligations under article III, paragraph 1, of the Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. It is the conviction of the Conference that nothing should be done to undermine the authority of the IAEA in that regard.

15. States parties that have concerns regarding non-compliance with safeguards agreements concluded in connection with the Treaty by States parties should direct such concerns, along with supporting evidence and information, to the IAEA to consider, investigate, draw conclusions and decide on necessary actions in accordance with its mandate. In this regard, the Conference calls upon the States parties to extend their cooperation to the IAEA. The Conference underscores the importance of resolving such matters in a timely manner in full conformity with the Statute of the IAEA and the respective legal obligations of States parties. The Conference further expresses its concern for cases of non-compliance with the Treaty and with safeguards obligations by States parties and calls on States to ensure that they remain in or promptly return to compliance with their obligations.

16. The Conference emphasizes the importance of access to the Security Council and the General Assembly by the IAEA, including its Director General, in accordance with article XII.C. of the Statute of the IAEA and paragraph 19 of INFCIRC/153 (Corrected), and the role of the Security Council and the General Assembly, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, in upholding compliance with IAEA safeguards agreements and ensuring compliance with safeguards obligations by taking appropriate measures in the case of any violations notified by the IAEA.

17. The Conference welcomes voluntary measures aimed at facilitating and strengthening the implementation of safeguards and confidence building, including bilateral and multilateral arrangements for enhanced verification, and notes that such arrangements build greater trust among parties.

18. Bearing in mind the obligation of States to cooperate with the IAEA to facilitate the implementation of safeguards agreements, the Conference emphasizes that there is a distinction between voluntary, confidence-building measures and the legal obligations of States.

19. The Conference recalls the importance of the application of IAEA safeguards pursuant to comprehensive safeguards agreements based on INFCIRC/153 (Corrected) on all source and special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities in the States parties in accordance with the provisions of article III, paragraph 1 of the Treaty for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

20. The Conference welcomes the fact that 179 States parties have in force comprehensive safeguards agreements with the IAEA and that six additional States have brought into force comprehensive safeguards agreements with the IAEA since the 2015 Review Conference. The Conference urges the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty that have yet to bring into force comprehensive safeguards agreements to do so as soon as possible and without further delay in order to support
the IAEA’s efforts to universalize the comprehensive safeguards agreement legally required by the Treaty.

21. The Conference reaffirms that the implementation of comprehensive safeguards agreements pursuant to article III, paragraph 1, of the Treaty should be designed to provide for verification by the IAEA of the correctness and completeness of a State’s declaration so that there is credible assurance of the non-diversion of nuclear material from declared activities and of the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities. The Conference recognizes that comprehensive safeguards agreements based on INFCIRC/153 (Corrected) have been successful in their main focus of providing assurance regarding declared nuclear material and have also provided a limited level of assurance regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities.

22. The Conference notes that the implementation of the measures specified in the Model Additional Protocol (INFCIRC/540 (Corrected)) equips the IAEA with broader information and access so that it can provide increased assurances regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in a State as a whole.

23. The Conference notes that it is the sovereign decision of any State to conclude an additional protocol, but once in force the additional protocol is a legal obligation. The Conference underlines that any State applying provisionally the additional protocol must comply with its provisions. The Conference notes that in the case of a State party with a comprehensive safeguards agreement concluded pursuant to article III, paragraph 1, of the Treaty and supplemented by an additional protocol in force, the measures contained in both instruments represent the enhanced verification standard for that State.

24. The Conference welcomes the fact that 138 States parties have brought additional protocols into force and that 14 of these States parties have brought the additional protocol into force since the 2015 Review Conference. A growing number of States implement the comprehensive safeguards agreement together with the additional protocol as an integral part of the IAEA strengthened safeguards system. The Conference encourages all States parties that have not yet done so to conclude and bring into force an additional protocol and to support the IAEA’s efforts to encourage broader adherence to the additional protocol.

25. The Conference notes technological developments in nuclear activities and nuclear-related items especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material. The Conference takes note of the work of the IAEA to keep abreast of these developments and their potential relevance to the strengthened safeguards system.

26. The Conference welcomes the fact that 22 States parties have amended their small quantities protocols since the 2015 Review Conference and that another six States parties have rescinded their small quantities protocols. The Conference notes that it is becoming increasingly challenging for the IAEA to draw a soundly based safeguards conclusion for those States with small quantities protocols based on the original standard text. The Conference calls on all States parties with small quantities protocols which have not yet done so to amend or rescind them as a matter of priority.

27. The Conference encourages the IAEA to further facilitate and assist the States parties upon request in the conclusion, entry into force and implementation of comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols and amendment or rescission of small quantities protocols and welcomes the efforts of the IAEA Director General in this regard.
The Conference recognizes that bilateral and regional safeguards, such as those implemented by the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) and the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC), play an important role in the further promotion of transparency and mutual confidence between States and support the non-proliferation objectives of the Treaty.

The Conference welcomes the continuing efforts of the IAEA to strengthen the effectiveness and improve the efficiency of IAEA safeguards, including through the development and implementation of State-level safeguards approaches in line with States’ legal obligations. In this regard, the Conference emphasizes the importance of close consultation and coordination with States as well as the relevant assurances contained in resolutions of the IAEA General Conference. The Conference supports continued engagement in open and active dialogue between States and the IAEA on safeguards matters. The Conference recognizes that IAEA safeguards should be regularly assessed and evaluated, taking into account technological developments and the increasing number of facilities and locations outside facilities under safeguards.

The Conference considers that the strengthening of IAEA safeguards should not adversely affect the resources available for technical assistance and cooperation, taking into account the need for the IAEA to meet its legal obligations under safeguards agreements as well as IAEA statutory functions, including that of encouraging and assisting the development and practical application of atomic energy for peaceful uses with adequate technology transfer.

The Conference recognizes the IAEA for maintaining high standards of professionalism in ensuring the verification of States’ non-proliferation commitments and stresses the importance of continuing to undertake its responsibilities in an effective, transparent, impartial, technically based, non-discriminatory and objective manner.

The Conference commends the IAEA for its continued diligent work in implementing safeguards during the COVID-19 pandemic as well as States parties for facilitating the in-field verification activities of the IAEA during this period. The Conference calls upon States parties to continue to cooperate with the IAEA to facilitate the maintenance of high levels of effectiveness in safeguards implementation during adverse conditions.

The Conference expresses its grave concern for the military activities being conducted near or at the Zaporizhzya nuclear power plant and other facilities and locations within Ukraine, the loss of control by the competent authorities of Ukraine over such locations due to military activities, and the profound negative impact of these events on safety, security, including physical protection of nuclear material, and safeguards. The Conference further notes that the loss of control over nuclear facilities and other locations by the competent authorities of Ukraine prevents those authorities and the IAEA from ensuring that safeguards activities can be implemented effectively and safely.

The Conference expresses its appreciation for the efforts of the Director General of the IAEA to seek access to enable the IAEA to undertake urgent safeguards activities to verify the status of the reactors and inventories of nuclear material at the Zaporizhzya nuclear power plant and other locations in the armed conflict areas in Ukraine and to ensure the non-diversion of nuclear material from peaceful activities at those locations.
36. The Conference notes that the use of nuclear material in non-proscribed military activities provided for under comprehensive safeguards agreements, in particular with respect to the topic of naval nuclear propulsion, has generated interest among States parties to the Treaty regarding, inter alia, arrangements to ensure that such nuclear material will not be used for the production of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. In this regard, the Conference notes the importance of the IAEA’s consideration, in consultation with the States concerned, of arrangements related to naval nuclear propulsion and for continuing dialogue and transparency in accordance with the rules of the relevant bodies.

37. The Conference calls for the full, equal and meaningful participation of women in non-proliferation and safeguards, through cooperation with the IAEA in its capacity-building activities, through science and technology education, in policy and legal roles, through international partnerships and through participation in activities relevant for safeguards and non-proliferation at the IAEA and related organizations. The Conference underscores its support in this regard for the IAEA Marie Skłodowska-Curie Fellowship Programme, and the aim of increasing the number of women in the nuclear field and supporting an inclusive workforce of both men and women who contribute to and drive global scientific and technological innovation.

38. The Conference welcomes the efforts of the IAEA to assist the States parties upon request in strengthening their national legal and regulatory frameworks related to safeguards, including assistance for the establishment and maintenance of State systems of accounting for and control of nuclear material – in particular the IAEA Comprehensive Capacity-Building Initiative for SSACs and SRAs (COMPASS) and International SSAC Advisory Services (ISSAS) missions – as well as the IAEA’s Legislative Assistance Programme. The Conference encourages the IAEA to continue supporting capacity-building in research and development and science and technology related to nuclear verification.

39. The Conference stresses the importance of maintaining and observing fully the principle of confidentiality regarding all information related to the implementation of safeguards in accordance with safeguards agreements, the Statute of the IAEA and its confidentiality regime. The Conference notes the steps taken by the IAEA Secretariat to protect classified safeguards information and that the Secretariat will continue to review and update the established procedures for the protection of classified safeguards information within the Secretariat.

40. The Conference notes the considerable increase in the IAEA’s safeguards responsibilities and the financial constraints under which the IAEA safeguards are functioning. The Conference calls upon all States parties to ensure that IAEA continues to have the necessary political, technical and financial support so that it is able to effectively meet its responsibility to apply safeguards as required by article III of the Treaty.

41. The Conference welcomes additional technical and financial contributions by States to help the IAEA meet its safeguards responsibilities and to develop and enhance the development and use of safeguards technologies. The Conference welcomes the assistance provided by IAEA Member States and relevant organizations to the IAEA, including through Member State Support Programmes, to facilitate capacity-building, including related research and development, and implementation of safeguards.

42. The Conference reaffirms that nuclear security – including the physical protection of nuclear material, cybersecurity and the protection of nuclear facilities against such acts as theft and sabotage – supports the objectives of the Treaty. The Conference acknowledges existing and emerging nuclear security threats and its
States parties commit to addressing such threats. The Conference recognizes that the responsibility for nuclear security within a State rests entirely with that State.

43. The Conference stresses the importance of effective physical protection of all nuclear material and nuclear facilities. The Conference calls upon all States, within their responsibility, to achieve and maintain highly effective nuclear security, including physical protection, of nuclear and other radioactive material during use, storage and transport and of the associated facilities at all stages in their life cycle, as well protecting sensitive information. In this regard the Conference encourages all States, in their efforts to strengthen nuclear security, to take into account and apply, as appropriate, the IAEA’s Nuclear Security Series publications.


45. The Conference encourages States to make further use of assistance in the field of nuclear security, where such assistance is needed and requested, including through the relevant IAEA services, such as the Integrated Nuclear Security Support Plans (INSSPs), International Nuclear Security Advisory Service (INSServ) and International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS) missions.

46. The Conference welcomes the entry into force of the amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, recognizing the importance of its acceptance, approval or ratification by further States, and notes the importance of its full implementation and universalization. The Conference welcomes the outcome of the 2022 Conference of the Parties to the Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material.

47. The Conference stresses the importance of all States parties improving their national capabilities to prevent, detect and respond to illicit trafficking in nuclear and other radioactive materials throughout their territories, in accordance with their national legislation and relevant international obligations. The Conference notes the work of the IAEA in support of the efforts of States to combat such trafficking, including the IAEA’s activities undertaken to provide for an enhanced exchange of information and the continued maintenance of its incident and trafficking database. The Conference calls upon those States parties in a position to do so to work to enhance international partnerships and capacity-building in this regard.

48. The Conference calls upon States parties to establish and enforce effective domestic controls to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons in accordance with their relevant international legal obligations. States parties express concerns related to the threat of terrorism and the risk that non-State actors might acquire nuclear weapons and their means of delivery. In this regard, the Conference underscores the essential role played by the relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions, including resolution 1540 (2004), and recalls the obligation of all States to implement binding provisions of those resolutions.

49. The Conference encourages all States that have not yet done so to become party to the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism as soon as possible.

50. The Conference recalls that, when developing nuclear energy, including nuclear power, the use of nuclear energy must be accompanied by appropriate and effective levels of nuclear security, consistent with States’ national legislation and respective international obligations.
51. The Conference stresses the central role of the IAEA in strengthening the nuclear security framework globally and emphasizes the need for the involvement of all States in nuclear security-related activities and initiatives in an inclusive manner. The Conference encourages the IAEA to continue, in coordination with its Member States, to play a constructive and coordinating role in other nuclear security-related initiatives, within their respective mandates and memberships, including the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism and the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials Mass Destruction, and to work jointly, as appropriate, with relevant international and regional organizations and institutions.

52. The Conference recalls that all States parties have undertaken in article III, paragraph 2 of the Treaty not to provide source or special fissionable material or equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material, to any non-nuclear-weapon State for peaceful purposes, unless the source or special fissionable material shall be subject to the safeguards required by article III of the Treaty. The Conference notes that a number of States parties, which are suppliers of material or equipment, have adopted certain minimum, standard requirements for IAEA safeguards in connection with their exports of certain equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing use or production of special fissionable material (IAEA document INFCIRC/209 and addenda).

53. The Conference recalls that paragraph 12 of decision 2, adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference affirmed that new supply arrangements for the transfer of source or special fissionable material or equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material to non-nuclear-weapon States should require, as a necessary precondition, acceptance of full-scope IAEA safeguards and internationally legally binding commitments not to acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. The Conference reaffirms that supplier arrangements should continue to be transparent and ensure that the export guidelines formulated by them do not hamper the development of nuclear energy for peaceful uses by States parties in conformity with the Treaty.

54. The Conference recognizes that there are nuclear-related dual-use items of equipment, technology and materials not identified in article III, paragraph 2, of the Treaty that are relevant to the proliferation of nuclear weapons and therefore to the Treaty as a whole. The Conference calls upon all States parties to ensure that their exports of nuclear-related dual-use items do not assist any nuclear-weapons programme. The Conference reiterates that each State party should also ensure that any transfer of such items is in full conformity with the Treaty. The Conference notes that a number of States which are suppliers of material or equipment, have adopted guidelines and a control list for transfers of nuclear-related dual-use equipment, materials, software, and related technology (IAEA document INFCIRC/254 and addenda).

55. The Conference highlights the aim of export controls to ensure that nuclear trade for peaceful purposes does not contribute to the proliferation of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. The Conference calls upon all States parties, in acting in pursuance of the objectives of the Treaty, to observe the legitimate right of all States parties, in particular developing States, to full access to nuclear material, equipment and technological information for peaceful purposes.

56. The Conference recognizes that sound national laws and regulations of States parties are necessary to ensure that the States parties are able to give effect to their commitments with respect to the transfer of nuclear and nuclear-related dual-use items to all States in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Treaty. In this
context, the Conference urges States parties to establish, maintain and strengthen the effectiveness of national laws and regulations for export controls of such items.

57. The Conference welcomes the increasing adherence of States parties to multilaterally negotiated guidelines and understandings in developing their own national export controls. The Conference encourages States parties to consider whether a recipient State has brought into force IAEA safeguards obligations in making nuclear export decisions.

58. The Conference encourages all States parties to facilitate transfers of nuclear technology and materials and international cooperation among States parties, in conformity with articles I, II, III and IV of the Treaty, and to eliminate in this regard any undue constraints inconsistent with the Treaty.

Article IV Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy

59. The Conference reaffirms that nothing in the Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with articles I, II, III and IV of the Treaty.

60. The Conference reaffirms that all States parties to the Treaty undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy in conformity with all the provisions of the Treaty. States parties to the Treaty in a position to do so should also cooperate in contributing with other States parties or international organizations, such as the IAEA, to the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, in particular in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty, with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world.

61. The Conference recognizes that the realization of the rights in Article IV, without discrimination and in conformity with articles I, II and III, without any undue constraints inconsistent with the Treaty constitutes one of the fundamental objectives of the Treaty, which provides the essential framework for international cooperation in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy, including with regards to future developments in this area.

62. The Conference emphasizes the important role of the NPT for peace and development in the 21st century. The Conference recognizes the NPT’s achievements in facilitating cooperation on nuclear science, technology and applications for peaceful purposes. The Conference acknowledges, in this regard, the significant contribution that peaceful uses of nuclear energy can make to meet the social and economic needs of States parties and to helping to overcome the technological and economic disparities between developed and developing countries. The Conference further acknowledges that access by all States parties to the peaceful uses of nuclear science, technology and applications, in particular amongst developing countries and the least developed countries, should be further facilitated.

63. The Conference underlines the essential role of the IAEA, including through its Technical Cooperation Programme, in assisting States parties upon request to build human and institutional capacities, including regulatory capabilities, for the safe, secure and peaceful applications of nuclear science and technology, under the motto “Atoms for Peace and Development” and in accordance with the IAEA Statute and guiding principles, as well as relevant directives of the General Conference and the Board of Governors.
64. The Conference:
   a. calls upon all States parties, pursuant to the objectives of the Treaty, to observe the legitimate right of all States parties, in particular developing States, to full access to nuclear material, equipment and technological information for peaceful purposes, without discrimination and in conformity with the Treaty.
   b. calls upon all States parties to respect each country’s sovereign choices and decisions relating to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy in line with international obligations, in particular in conformity with the articles I, II, III and IV of the Treaty, without jeopardizing its policies or international cooperation agreements and arrangements for peaceful uses of nuclear energy policies and its nuclear fuel cycle policies.
   c. calls upon all States parties to facilitate transfers of nuclear technology and international cooperation among States parties in conformity with articles I, II, III and IV of the Treaty, and eliminate in this regard any undue constrains inconsistent with the Treaty.
   d. calls upon all States parties, in all activities designed to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear science, technology, and applications to give preferential treatment to the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty, in particular taking into account the needs of developing countries and least developed countries.

Nuclear science, technology and development

65. The Conference notes that peaceful uses of nuclear energy are being acknowledged increasingly as delivering an important contribution to meeting global challenges and socioeconomic development needs. The Conference emphasizes the important role of nuclear science and technology in the implementation of national development strategies, and in achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), and the climate goals in the context of the 2015 Paris Agreement and in ‘building back better from the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) while advancing the full implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development’. The Conference considers that nuclear technologies can contribute to address climate change, mitigate and adapt to its consequences, and monitor its impact. The Conference welcomes the role of the IAEA at COP26 in Glasgow, United Kingdom in 2021, COP27 in Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt in 2022 and COP28 in the UAE in 2023.

66. The Conference underlines that IAEA activities in the field of technical cooperation and nuclear applications, contribute in an important way to meeting energy needs, improving human and animal health, combating poverty, protecting the environment, developing agriculture, managing the use of water resources, optimizing industrial processes and preserving cultural heritage, thus helping to improve the quality of life and the well-being of the peoples of the world. The Conference underlines that these activities, as well as bilateral and other multilateral cooperation, contribute to achieving objectives set forth in the Treaty.

67. The Conference welcomes, in this regard, the flagship initiatives of the IAEA Director General cutting across different areas of nuclear science and technology, including on cancer control (Rays of Hope), strengthening preparedness and capability for zoonotic diseases outbreaks (ZODIAC), and addressing plastic marine pollution (NUTEC Plastics). The Conference welcomes the IAEA support provided to Member States in response to natural disasters, outbreaks as well as emergency situations, such as the COVID-19 pandemic, as well as Zika and Ebola outbreaks.
68. The Conference underlines the importance of the IAEA’s Nuclear Applications Laboratories in Seibersdorf, at the IAEA’s Headquarters in Vienna, and in Monaco, in developing and refining relevant nuclear techniques and in delivering them to Member States, and welcomes in particular the progress made in the Renovation of the Nuclear Applications Laboratories (ReNuAL) project.

69. The Conference reiterates that each State party has the right to define its own energy policy. The Conference acknowledges the growing need for affordable energy security and respects the right of States parties to decide on their energy mix and choose the most appropriate technologies to achieve their climate targets. The Conference recognizes that while not all States parties wish to pursue nuclear power, for those that do so nuclear technologies and innovations, including advanced reactors and small and medium-sized or modular reactors (SMRs), as well as large capacity power reactors and fast neutron reactors, can play an important role in facilitating energy security, decarbonization and transitioning to a low carbon energy economy.

70. The Conference recognizes the important issue of managing spent fuel and radioactive waste in a safe manner, while also recognizing the continuing international efforts to address those issues, including deep geological disposal and closed nuclear fuel cycle related issues.

71. The Conference:
   a. encourages States parties to further support the activities of the IAEA in expanding the role of nuclear science and technology and its contribution to the achievement of the SDGs and to share knowledge and technology in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
   b. encourages States parties to further engage in education and public communication efforts to raise the awareness among the general public on the importance of nuclear science and technology and its diverse applications.
   c. encourages States parties to enhance opportunities for the promotion of and access to nuclear science, technology and applications in order to meet socio-economic needs.
   d. encourages States parties to support the IAEA’s efforts to assist its Member States in building their capacity to achieve the SDGs, and emphasizes the importance of providing adequate, financial and human resources.
   e. encourages States parties to support nuclear fuel suppliers in working with and assisting recipient States, upon request, in the safe and secure management of spent fuel.

Fostering international cooperation

72. The Conference reaffirms that the Treaty fosters the development of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy by providing a framework of confidence and cooperation within which those uses can take place. Moreover, the Conference emphasizes that cooperation to accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity throughout the world, is one of the core objectives enshrined in the IAEA Statute.

73. The Conference recognizes the need to ensure that the IAEA has the adequate necessary support to enable it to provide, upon request, the support needed by Member States. The Conference welcomes the contributions by States parties and groups of States parties in support of IAEA activities.
74. The Conference emphasizes the importance of the technical cooperation activities of the IAEA, and stresses the importance of nuclear knowledge-sharing and the transfer of nuclear technology to developing countries and least developed countries for the sustainment and further enhancement of their scientific and technological capabilities. The Conference stresses that the IAEA Technical Cooperation Programme, as the major vehicle for the transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, is formulated in accordance with the IAEA Statute and guiding principles, and in accordance with relevant directives of the General Conference and the Board of Governors. The Conference recognizes the importance of ensuring that the IAEA resources for technical cooperation activities are sufficient, assured and predictable to meet the objectives mandated in article II of the IAEA Statute. The Conference also recognizes the critical contributions made by the IAEA to the research and development of peaceful nuclear technologies that can be deployed through its Technical Cooperation Programme.

75. The Conference notes developing countries and least developed countries should be given priority in the allocation of the IAEA Technical Cooperation Fund (TCF). The Conference also notes recipient states should have full ownership of technical cooperation programmes.

76. The Conference recognizes the role of the IAEA Peaceful Uses Initiative (PUI) in mobilizing extrabudgetary contributions to support technical cooperation and projects aimed at promoting broad development goals in States parties, and welcomes the extrabudgetary contributions received through the PUI.

77. The Conference notes the development and promotion of advanced nuclear technologies, nationally and through cooperation in all relevant international initiatives such as the International Project on Innovative Nuclear Reactors and Fuel Cycles (INPRO), the International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER) and the Generational IV International Forum.

78. The Conference recognizes that regional and cooperative agreements under the auspices of the IAEA for the promotion of the peaceful use of nuclear energy can be an effective means in facilitating technical and technology transfers. The programmes under these agreements address key priorities from different regions, focusing on pressing needs related to nuclear solutions for food security, human health, water and environment, industry, and radiation and nuclear safety, among others. It notes the contributions of the African Regional Cooperative Agreement for Research, Development and Training related to Nuclear Science and Technology, the Regional Cooperative Agreement for the Advancement of Nuclear Science and Technology in Latin America and the Caribbean, the Regional Cooperative Agreement for Research, Development and Training related to Nuclear Science and Technology for Asia and the Pacific, and the Cooperative Agreement for Arab States in Asia for Research, Development and Training related to Nuclear Science and Technology, as well as the strategy for the IAEA regional technical cooperation programme in Europe and Central Asia.

79. The Conference underlines the importance of continuing to discuss in a non-discriminatory and transparent manner under the auspices of IAEA or regional forums, the development of multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle, including the possibilities to create mechanisms for assurance of nuclear fuel supply, as well as possible schemes dealing with the back-end of the fuel cycle, without affecting rights under the Treaty and without prejudice to national fuel cycle policies,
while tackling the technical, legal and economic complexities surrounding these issues, including in this regard the requirement of IAEA full scope safeguards.

80. The Conference welcomes the establishment of an IAEA-owned and operated Low Enriched Uranium (LEU) Bank located in Kazakhstan, and its full operationalization in 2019, and the voluntary contributions from Member States in this regard. The Conference also notes other established mechanisms to ensure access to nuclear fuel, such as the guaranteed reserve of low enriched uranium (fuel bank) at the International Uranium Enrichment Center in Angarsk in the Russian Federation, and the United Kingdom nuclear fuel assurance proposal, as well as national efforts such as the American Assured Fuel Supply.

81. The Conference acknowledges the role of intergovernmental agreements between States with mature nuclear industries and newcomer States, which can facilitate further cooperation through project specific agreements, for instance between regulatory authorities, operators and entities in charge of waste management, training and research and development, noting the existence of model agreements in this context.

82. The Conference recognizes the existence of challenges and obstacles to the further expansion of the role of nuclear science, technology and applications in meeting States parties’ socio-economic needs, in particular in developing countries. The Conference acknowledges that such challenges and obstacles are caused by, inter alia, a lack of awareness of the benefits of nuclear science and technology by national and international development agencies; practical difficulties in accessing the peaceful uses of nuclear science, technology and applications in developing countries; a lack of availability of sufficient resources and adequately trained experts; the need to improve communication between and within relevant international and multilateral agencies and organizations.

83. The Conference furthermore emphasizes that efforts related to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy would benefit from the involvement of a wider variety of stakeholders, including government and international development agencies, non-governmental organizations, medical and research communities, universities, and nuclear regulators and operators. The Conference also notes the important role that nuclear industry can play in promoting peaceful uses of nuclear energy and technologies. The Conference welcomes efforts of States parties to attain full equal and meaningful participation of women in this regard.

84. The Conference acknowledges the importance of providing assistance, in particular to developing countries and least developed countries, in order to enhance their access to nuclear science and technology, through capacity building, provision of equipment, strengthening of regional networking and regional cooperation frameworks, North-South and South-South and triangular cooperation.

85. The Conference welcomes new initiatives aimed at expanding access to the benefits of peaceful uses of nuclear energy for developing countries, and aimed at taking concrete action consistent with Article IV, such as the Sustained Dialogue on Peaceful Uses.

86. The Conference:

a. encourages the strengthening of international cooperation in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear science, technology and applications.
b. calls upon States parties to support the IAEA and its technical cooperation programme, and to continue efforts, within the IAEA, to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of the technical cooperation programme.

c. calls on States parties, to make every effort and take practical steps to ensure that the IAEA resources for technical cooperation activities are sufficient, assured and predictable, to meet the objectives mandated in article II of the IAEA Statute.

d. encourages States parties in a position to do so to continue and to increase their extrabudgetary voluntary contributions for technical cooperation activities devoted to peaceful uses of nuclear energy, including through contributions to the Peaceful Uses Initiative.

e. encourages States parties to support the IAEA’s efforts in strengthening partnerships with interested parties, other organizations of the UN system, multilateral financial institutions, regional development bodies and national development agencies, and to take into account the important contribution of nuclear science, technology and applications when developing their respective national development plans.

f. encourages States parties to engage in bilateral, regional, multilateral, South-South and triangular cooperation in peaceful uses of nuclear science, technology and applications and to support technical cooperation at regional level, hereby ensuring their long-term benefits.

g. Encourages States parties to engage collaboratively with global industry partners to promote the wide variety of uses of nuclear energy and technologies.

**Nuclear safety and related issues**

87. The Conference stresses the importance of nuclear safety and nuclear security for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The Conference recognises that the responsibility for safety and security rests with individual States and reaffirms the central role of the IAEA in the development of safety standards and nuclear security guidance and relevant conventions based on best practice in strengthening and coordinating international cooperation on nuclear safety and security.

88. The Conference reaffirms that the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes must be accompanied by commitments to and on-going implementation of safeguards, as well as appropriate and effective levels of safety and security consistent with IAEA standards and guidance and consistent with States’ national legislation and respective international obligations.

89. The Conference emphasizes that measures and initiatives aimed at strengthening nuclear safety and security should be in full conformity with relevant articles under the Treaty, including the inalienable right of States parties to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

90. The Conference notes that although safety is a national responsibility, international cooperation on all safety-related matters is important. The Conference encourages the efforts of the IAEA, as well as of other relevant forums, in the promotion of safety in all its aspects, and encourages all States parties to take the appropriate national, regional and international steps to enhance and foster a safety culture. The Conference welcomes and underlines the intensification of national measures and international cooperation in order to strengthen nuclear safety, radiation protection, safe transport of radioactive materials and radioactive waste management,
including activities conducted in this area by the IAEA. In this regard, the Conference recalls that special efforts should be made and sustained to increase awareness in these fields, through participation of States parties, particularly those from developing countries, in training, workshops, seminars and capacity-building in a non-discriminatory manner.

91. The Conference stresses the need for facilitating a high level of safety and security in the deployment of nuclear technologies globally. It notes that the development of advanced reactors as well as small and medium-sized or modular reactors (SMRs), for those who may wish to use them, should be done in a safe, secure and safeguarded manner, and underlines the important role of the IAEA in this field. and notes the IAEA Director General’s Nuclear Harmonization and Standardization Initiative and the cross-IAEA Platform on SMRs.

92. The Conference recalls the importance of the international legal framework in the field of nuclear safety and security, including the Convention on Nuclear Safety, the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident, the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency, the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management, the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and its 2005 Amendment, and the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism. The Conference recognizes the IAEA’s role in promoting the conventions concluded under the auspices of the Agency, as well as its assistance to Member States, upon request, with adherence, participation and implementation of these Treaties.

93. The Conference welcomes efforts to use non-highly enriched uranium technologies for the production of radioisotopes, taking into account the need for an assured and reliable supply of medical isotopes. The Conference welcomes the voluntary efforts by State parties, when technologically and economically feasible, to minimize the use of HEU in civilian stocks and use, share experiences on HEU minimization, take stock of status and provide updates on progress made in this regard.

94. The Conference recalls the Paris Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy, the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage, the Brussels Convention Supplementary to the Paris Convention, the Joint Protocol Related to the Application of the Vienna Convention and the Paris Convention, the protocols amending these conventions, and the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage, and notes that these instruments can provide the basis for establishing a global nuclear liability regime based on the principles of nuclear liability.

95. The Conference recognizes that, historically, the safety record of civilian transport, including maritime transport, of radioactive materials has been excellent, and stresses the importance of international cooperation to maintain and enhance the safety of international transport. The Conference reaffirms maritime and air navigation rights and freedoms, as provided for in international law and as reflected in relevant international instruments.

96. The Conference stresses the importance of international cooperation to maintain and enhance the safety and security of international transport of radioactive materials. The Conference endorses the IAEA standards for the safe transport of radioactive material and affirms that it is in the interest of all States parties that the transportation
of radioactive materials continues to be conducted consistent with international safety, security and environmental protection standards and guidelines.

97. The Conference takes note of the concerns of all coastal States including small island developing States with regard to the transportation of radioactive materials by sea and, in this regard, welcomes efforts to improve communication between shipping and coastal States for the purpose of addressing concerns regarding transport safety, security and emergency preparedness. The Conference notes efforts by shipping States in this regard.

98. The Conference notes the efforts to apply best practices and principles, as promoted by IAEA, in mining and processing, including those related to environmental management of uranium mining.

99. The Conference reminds all States Parties of the importance of nuclear safety and security regarding peaceful nuclear facilities and materials in all circumstances, including in armed conflict zones, and of the IAEA Director General’s “Seven Indispensable Pillars on Nuclear Safety and Security” derived from IAEA safety standards and nuclear security guidance.

100. The Conference expresses grave concern with the safety and security of Ukraine's nuclear facilities and materials, in particular the Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant, and expresses appreciation for the IAEA's and its Director General's efforts to address this concern.

101. The Conference expresses grave concern at attacks or threats of attack on nuclear facilities devoted to peaceful purposes, which jeopardize nuclear safety and nuclear security. The Conference also considers that attacks or threats of attack on nuclear facilities devoted to peaceful purposes have dangerous political, economic, human health, and environmental, implications and raise serious concerns regarding the application of international law, which could warrant appropriate action in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations.

102. The Conference:
   a. encourages all States parties to become party to and adhere to conventions, and instruments in the field of nuclear safety and security.
   b. encourages States parties that have not yet done so to consider becoming party to and implement international legal instruments on civil liability for nuclear damage and adopt suitable national legislation in this regard.
   c. encourages States parties developing their capacities in the field of advanced reactors and SMRs to work with the IAEA in support of their safe and secure deployment.
   d. encourages States parties to transport radioactive materials consistent with relevant international standards of safety, security and environmental protection, and to continue communication between shipping and coastal States for the purpose of confidence-building and addressing concerns regarding transport safety, security and emergency preparedness.
   e. encourages States parties concerned, on a voluntary basis and where technically and economically feasible, to further minimize highly enriched uranium in civilian stocks and use.
f. reiterates the appeal of previous Review Conferences to all Governments and international organizations that have expertise in the field of clean-up and disposal of radioactive contaminants to consider giving appropriate assistance, as may be requested, for remedial purposes in affected areas, noting the efforts that have been made to date in this regard.

g. calls upon all States parties, pursuant to action 64 of the Action Plan adopted by the 2010 Review Conference, to abide by the decision of the IAEA General Conference of 18 September 2009, on “Prohibition of armed attack or threat of armed attack against nuclear installations, during operation or under construction” (GC(53)/DEC/13).

h. encourages States parties to support the IAEA Director General’s efforts to restore the safety and security of Ukraine’s nuclear facilities and materials, within its internationally recognized borders.

103. The Conference recognizes that nuclear science and technology contributes to achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), in particular through the IAEA support to member States, with a more direct contribution to SDG 2 (Zero Hunger), SDG 3 (Good Health and Well-Being), SDG 6 (Clean Water and Sanitation), SDG 7 (Affordable and Clean Energy), SDG 9 (Industry, Innovation and Infrastructure), SDG 13 (Climate Action), SDG 14 (Life below Water), SDG 15 (Life on Land) and SDG 17 (Partnerships for the Goals). The Conference further recognizes the contribution of nuclear applications in ‘building back better from the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) while advancing the full implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development’.

104. The Conference encourages States parties, as part of their efforts to attain these goals, to support the following:

a. Bilateral, regional and international, North-South, South-South and triangular cooperation, as well as the development of more robust cooperation with non-traditional partners, including academic and research institutions, industry, private sector, multilateral financial institutions, regional development bodies and development agencies;

b. IAEA Director General’s flagship initiatives, including Renovation of the Nuclear Applications Laboratories (ReNuAL), Zoonotic Disease Integrated Action Project (ZODIAC), Rays of Hope—cancer care for all, Nuclear Technology for Controlling Plastic Pollution (NUTEC Plastics), and Marie-Sklodowska Curie Fellowship Programme (MSCFP) through political, financial or in-kind support;

c. Participation of the IAEA in relevant high-level meetings related to global challenges and development such as High Level Political Forum on Sustainable Development, and Climate Change Conferences, including COP26 in the United Kingdom, COP27 in Egypt and COP28 in the United Arab Emirates;

d. Participation in the upcoming IAEA International Ministerial Conference on Nuclear Power in the 21st Century and a planned upcoming international ministerial conference on nuclear science, technology and applications and the technical cooperation programme;

e. Convening of a High-level event organized by UN Secretary-General and Director General of the IAEA aimed at fostering dialogue on peaceful uses of nuclear energy for sustainable development, including with UN development agencies;
f. New initiatives on expanding access to the benefits of peaceful uses, such as the Sustained Dialogue on Peaceful Uses; Atoms for Heritage; Capacity Building International Initiative to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy (CB2I); and Framework for Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation;

g. Enhanced efforts by States parties to raise awareness of national development agencies and the general public on how nuclear science and technology can help meeting national socio-economic needs; and

h. Enhanced efforts by States parties in education, and training, including through the inclusion in school curricula, to introduce the benefits and potential of nuclear science and technology to the youth and to support workforce development.

Article V

105. The Conference affirms that the provisions of article V of the Treaty with regard to the peaceful applications of any nuclear explosions are to be interpreted in the light of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

Article VI and eighth to twelfth preambular paragraphs

106. The Conference notes the reaffirmation by all States parties of their commitment to the full and effective implementation of article VI of the Treaty and the reaffirmation by the nuclear-weapon States of their unequivocal undertaking to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament, to which all States parties are committed under article VI of the Treaty.

107. The Conference deeply regrets the lack of tangible progress in the implementation of Article VI and related commitments, which, if not addressed, would jeopardise the integrity and credibility of the Treaty.

108. The Conference recalls and reaffirms the importance of the full and effective implementation by all States parties of article VI of the Treaty, paragraphs 3 and 4 (c) of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference decision entitled “Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament”, the practical steps for achieving nuclear disarmament adopted by consensus in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference as well as the conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions adopted by the 2010 Review Conference.

109. The Conference reaffirms the need for the nuclear-weapon States to comply with their nuclear disarmament obligations under the Treaty and to completely implement their nuclear disarmament commitments, including the 13 practical steps and the plan of action on nuclear disarmament that were adopted by consensus at the 2000 and 2010 Review Conferences of the Treaty, in order to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear weapons. The Conference reaffirms that these are not open-ended commitments, and that concrete and urgent progress towards nuclear disarmament remains essential in maintaining the integrity and credibility of the Treaty.

110. The Conference recalls the commitment by the nuclear-weapon States, in implementing their unequivocal undertaking to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals, to undertake further efforts to reduce and ultimately eliminate all types of nuclear weapons, deployed and non-deployed, including through unilateral, bilateral, regional and multilateral measures. The Conference reaffirms the applicability of the principle of irreversibility to nuclear disarmament, as well as nuclear and other related arms control and reduction measures.

111. The Conference reaffirms the ultimate goal of States Parties to achieve general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.
112. The Conference reaffirms the importance of concrete steps to reduce the alert status of nuclear-weapon systems that promote international stability and security, with a view to achieving the total elimination of nuclear weapons.

113. The Conference expresses concern at the increase in nuclear rhetoric and nuclear threats, and its impact on international peace and security as well as the integrity and credibility of the Treaty.

114. The Conference recognizes the importance of elaborated measures that can contribute to building confidence and reduce the risk of the use of nuclear weapons, whether intentionally, or by miscalculation, accident, miscommunication, or misperception, in the context of achieving nuclear disarmament. The Conference reaffirms that the full implementation of the Treaty, including the objective of the complete elimination of nuclear weapons in accordance with Article VI, remains the only way to eliminate nuclear risks.

115. The Conference reaffirms that nuclear risk reduction is an interim measure pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons, and does not legitimize the continued existence of nuclear weapons. The Conference reiterates that nuclear risk reduction is not a substitute for tangible progress in the fulfilment of nuclear disarmament obligations under the Treaty.

116. The Conference recognizes the importance for all States Parties to report regularly on their implementation of obligations and commitments under the Treaty. The Conference recalls the need for the nuclear-weapon States to continue efforts to agree on a standard reporting form and appropriate reporting intervals.

117. The Conference notes the meetings of the nuclear-weapon States held in Beijing (2019), London (2020) and Paris (2021), which fostered dialogue and common approaches among them to strengthen the implementation of the Treaty. The Conference notes the development of a glossary by the nuclear-weapon States, intended to increase mutual understanding and confidence among them and facilitate discussions with the non-nuclear-weapon States.

118. The Conference welcomes the commitments made by the nuclear-weapon States at the 2020 London and 2021 Paris Conferences, on continuing structured efforts to exchange views on concepts, doctrines and policies beyond the current Review Conference, and reiterates the need for reporting on concrete progress in this regard.

119. The Conference welcomes the affirmation by the nuclear-weapon States, through the Joint Leaders’ Statement by China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States on Preventing Nuclear War and Avoiding Arms Races of 3 January 2022 that, inter alia, a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. The Conference further welcomes the nuclear-weapon States’ reaffirmation of the importance of addressing nuclear threats, and of preserving and complying with their bilateral and multilateral non-proliferation, disarmament, and arms control agreements and commitments. The Conference emphasizes the importance of the adherence by all nuclear-weapon States to these affirmations.

120. The Conference reaffirms the importance of the preservation and continued implementation of bilateral arms control agreements between the Russian Federation and the United States. The Conference welcomes the extension of the Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation on Strategic Offensive Arms (New START Treaty) through February 4, 2026, and reaffirms the importance of further progress, including the negotiation of a successor agreement leading to further reductions in their stockpiles of nuclear weapons.
121. The Conference reaffirms the urgency of the nuclear-weapon States’ prompt and sustained engagement with a view to, inter alia, rapidly moving towards an overall reduction in the global stockpile of all types of nuclear weapons, regardless of their location, as an integral part of the general nuclear disarmament process, and further diminishing and eliminating the role and significance of nuclear weapons in all military and security concepts, doctrines and policies, which would promote international stability, peace and undiminished and increased security for all.

122. The Conference recognizes the importance of reporting on steps taken by States parties, as a significant transparency and confidence building measure, towards further diminishing and eliminating the role of nuclear weapons in all of their military and security concepts, doctrines and policies, whether national or collective.

123. The Conference reaffirms that all States parties to the Treaty have committed to applying the mutually reinforcing principles of irreversibility, verifiability and transparency in relation to the implementation of their Treaty obligations and underscores the importance of the nuclear-weapon States’ strict application of these principles in nuclear weapons reductions.

124. The Conference expresses concern at the qualitative improvement of and quantitative increase in nuclear weapons, and the development of advanced new types of nuclear weapons, as well as the lack of progress in diminishing the role of nuclear weapons in security policies, and the low level of transparency surrounding these activities.

125. The Conference recognizes that the indefinite extension of the Treaty at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference did not imply the indefinite possession of nuclear weapons by the nuclear-weapon States.

126. The Conference reiterates its deep concern at the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons, including any unintentional or accidental nuclear explosion. The Conference reaffirms the need for all States at all times to comply with applicable international law, including international humanitarian law.

127. The Conference acknowledges the devastation that would be visited upon all humankind by a nuclear war and the consequent need to make every effort to avert the danger of such a war and to take measures to safeguard the security of peoples.

128. The Conference recognizes that the immediate, mid- and long-term consequences of nuclear weapon detonations, inter alia, on health, the environment, biodiversity, infrastructure, food security, climate, development, social cohesion and the global economy are significantly graver than previously understood, are interlinked, and would not be constrained by national borders but have regional or global effects, and could even threaten the survival of humanity.

129. The Conference welcomes the presentation, during the past two review cycles, of findings and evidence on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons in fact-based discussions, including at international conferences.

130. The Conference acknowledges that the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons was adopted on 7 July 2017. It was opened to signature by the Secretary-General of the United Nations on 20 September 2017. The Conference further acknowledges that the Treaty entered into force on 22 January 2021 and held its first Meeting of States Parties on 21-23 June 2022, which concluded with the adoption of a declaration and an action plan.

131. The Conference recalls the International Court of Justice advisory opinion on the legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons issued at The Hague on 8 July 1996. The Conference notes its finding that there exists an obligation to pursue in
good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control.

132. The Conference notes the adoption of United Nations General Assembly resolution A/RES/75/45 on Follow-up to the 2013 high-level meeting of the General Assembly on nuclear disarmament, which among others, declared 26 September as the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons. The Conference welcomes the convening of annual meetings of the General Assembly to commemorate the International Day.

133. The Conference expresses disappointment at the failure of the Conference on Disarmament to commence negotiations on a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices, noting that such a treaty could make a substantial and concrete contribution towards nuclear non-proliferation in all its aspects, the implementation of article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and, ultimately, a nuclear-weapon-free world.

134. The Conference recognizes the 2018 consensus report of the high-level expert preparatory group of the treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and notes that its content will be useful for treaty negotiations.

135. The Conference reaffirms the importance of the immediate commencement of negotiations at the Conference on Disarmament, on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices, taking into account the contents of report CD/1299 and the mandate contained therein.

136. The Conference reiterates its encouragement, to all States that have not yet done so, to initiate a process towards the dismantling or conversion for peaceful uses of facilities for the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

137. The Conference reaffirms the importance of the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty at the earliest possible date, recalling the responsibility of all States signatories to promote that Treaty. The Conference welcomes the recent ratifications of the CTBT (Myanmar, 2016; Eswatini, 2016; Thailand, 2018; Zimbabwe, 2019; Comoros, 2021; Cuba, 2021; Dominica, 2022; Gambia, 2022; Timor-Leste, 2022; and Tuvalu, 2022) as a sign of the continuing salience of the Treaty in strengthening international security.

138. The Conference recognizes that the entry into force of the CTBT is of the utmost urgency as it will provide the global community with a permanent, non-discriminatory, verifiable and legally binding commitment to end any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion, as a means to constrain the development and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons, which combats nuclear proliferation.

139. The Conference reaffirms the importance of the ratification of the CTBT by nuclear-weapon States which have yet to do so, with all expediency, noting that positive decisions by nuclear-weapon States would have a beneficial impact towards the ratification of that Treaty.

140. The Conference recognizes the need for all States to uphold the existing moratorium on nuclear-weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosion and to continue efforts towards the long overdue entry into force of the CTBT, through advocacy and engagement vis-à-vis the States whose ratification is required for entry into force, as well as political, technical and financial efforts to further strengthen the
International Monitoring System (IMS) and the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO).

141. The Conference acknowledges the progress made to establish the CTBT verification regime, as evidenced by the work of the IMS and the International Data Centre (IDC) and by the experience gained with on-site inspections. The Conference acknowledges the importance of continued assistance by States parties to the Preparatory Commission for the CTBTO in its work in preparing for the entry into force of the Treaty. This includes the early completion, provisional operation and maintenance of the IMS, which serves as an effective, reliable, participatory and non-discriminatory element of the global verification and compliance regime of the Treaty.

142. The Conference expresses its appreciation for the scientific and civil benefits provided by the data gathered by the CTBT verification regime, and acknowledges the role that the CTBTO plays in disarmament and non-proliferation education.

143. The Conference recalls the adoption of United Nations General Assembly resolution A/RES/64/35, which among others, declared 29 August as the International Day against Nuclear Tests. The Conference welcomes the convening of annual meetings of the General Assembly to commemorate the International Day.

144. The Conference reaffirms that the total elimination of nuclear weapons is the only absolute guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. The Conference recalls United Nations Security Council resolution 984 (1995) noting the unilateral statements by each of the nuclear-weapon States, in which they gave conditional or unconditional security assurances against the use and the threat of use of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty, and the relevant protocols to nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties, recognizing that treaty-based unconditional and conditional security assurances are available to such zones. The Conference welcomes the reaffirmation of existing negative security assurances by the nuclear-weapon States in this regard.

145. The Conference reaffirms the importance of full adherence by all nuclear-weapon States to their existing obligations and commitments related to security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty, including the commitments under the Memorandum on Security Assurances in Connection with Ukraine’s Accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of 1994.

146. The Conference notes the urgency for the Conference on Disarmament to consider effective, universal, non-discriminatory, unconditional, legally binding arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons by all nuclear-weapon States, with a view to elaborating recommendations dealing with all aspects of this issue, not excluding an internationally legally binding instrument, and recognizes the need to fully honour and uphold all existing security assurances given unilaterally and multilaterally.

147. The Conference reaffirms the importance of effective and credible nuclear disarmament verification in achieving and maintaining a world without nuclear weapons and welcomes ongoing work in this regard aimed at ensuring full compliance and building trust and confidence among the nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States, as well as the development of appropriate multilateral technical capabilities. Nuclear disarmament verification should conform with international law and the principles laid out in the final document of the first special session devoted to disarmament (1978) and in the United Nations Disarmament Commission principles of verification (1988).
148. The Conference welcomes the work undertaken by the Group of Governmental Experts established under General Assembly resolution 71/67 to consider the role of verification in advancing nuclear disarmament, and the adoption by the General Assembly of resolution 74/50, through which it established a group of governmental experts to further consider nuclear disarmament verification issues.

149. The Conference further notes the contributions of activities and initiatives on nuclear disarmament verification, such as those carried out in the framework of the International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification.

"Nuclear Disarmament and Security Assurances"

150. The Conference recalls decision 1 of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, in which it was agreed, inter alia, that Review Conferences should look forward as well as back and identify the areas in which, and the means through which, further progress should be sought in the future.

151. The Conference recognizes that greater and accelerated efforts are required to implement article VI of the Treaty, paragraphs 3 and 4 (c) of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference Decision entitled “Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament”, the practical steps for achieving nuclear disarmament agreed by consensus in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference, as well as the conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions agreed by the 2010 Review Conference.

152. Without prejudice to any prior commitments undertaken, in order to avert the danger of nuclear war and to accelerate progress towards the collective goal of a world free of nuclear weapons, the State Parties agree to the following:

1. States parties recall that it has been 77 years since the use of nuclear weapons and affirm that nuclear weapons must never be used again.

2. States parties recognizes that the risk of nuclear weapons being used is now higher than at any time since the end of the Cold War.

3. States parties reaffirm that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought, and note the 3 January 2022 Statement from the leaders of China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States to this end,

4. States parties express deep concern about the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of any use of nuclear weapons and affirm that awareness of these consequences must underpin all approaches and efforts towards nuclear disarmament,

5. States parties reaffirm the need for all States at all times to comply with applicable international law, including international humanitarian law,

6. States parties recall their obligation to pursue the total elimination of nuclear weapons as the highest disarmament priority and express deep concern about the absence of tangible progress since the ninth Review Conference in 2015,

7. States parties reaffirm their legal obligation under Article VI of the Treaty to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament and stress that the conclusion of those negotiations is essential to the full and effective implementation of the Treaty, and emphasize the special responsibility of the nuclear-weapon States in this regard,

8. States parties reaffirm the validity of all existing commitments undertaken, including by the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference and the 2000 and 2010 NPT Review
Conferences, especially the unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament, to which all States parties are committed under Article VI and stresses that these commitments are not conditional.

9. States parties reaffirm the urgent need for the nuclear-weapon states to implement these commitments in a way that promotes international stability, peace and security, and based on the principle of undiminished and increased security for all.

10. States parties reaffirm the commitment of all States parties to pursue policies that are fully compatible with the Treaty and the objective of achieving a world without nuclear weapons.

11. States parties commit to the strict application of the principles of irreversibility, verifiability and transparency in relation to the implementation of their disarmament obligations under the Treaty.

12. The nuclear-weapon States commit to pursue immediate reductions or further reductions in all types of nuclear weapons, including through bilateral, plurilateral and multilateral negotiations and unilateral initiatives.

13. The Russian Federation and the United States commit to the negotiation in good faith of a successor framework to replace the “New START” Treaty before its expiration in 2026 in order to achieve deeper, verifiable and irreversible reductions in their nuclear arsenals.

14. All nuclear-weapon States commit to commence a dialogue to establish a multilateral nuclear arms control framework with the goal of achieving reductions in the overall size of nuclear arsenals.

15. The nuclear-weapon States agree to take steps to diminish, with a view to eliminating, the role and significance of nuclear weapons in all military and security concepts, doctrines and policies; for nuclear-weapon States this should include the adoption of no-first-use doctrines.

16. The nuclear-weapon States commit to enhanced transparency measures related to, inter alia, their nuclear arsenals, doctrines and postures, as well as to efforts to build mutual confidence.

17. The nuclear-weapon States acknowledge and take into account the grave concerns of non-nuclear weapon States regarding the modernization and expansion of nuclear forces and the development of new types of nuclear weapons and delivery systems.

18. States Parties call on the Conference on Disarmament to urgently agree on a comprehensive and balanced programme of work.

19. States Parties call on the Conference on Disarmament to immediately commence and bring to an early conclusion negotiations on a treaty banning the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other explosive devices in accordance with CD/1299 and the mandate contained therein.

20. Pending the negotiation and entry into force of such a treaty, States Parties call for declaring and upholding an immediate moratorium on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

21. States Parties commit to the prompt entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), urge all States that have yet to ratify the CTBT to do so in all expediency, particularly the remaining eight States listed in its Annex 2 and recall the special responsibility of nuclear-weapon States in this regard as stipulated in Action 10 of the 2010 Action Plan.
22. Pending the entry into force of the CTBT, the nuclear-weapons States commit to strictly maintain and enforce their existing moratoria on explosive nuclear tests, and refrain from any action that would defeat the object and purpose of the CTBT.

23. States Parties commit to assist the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization in its work in preparing for the entry into force of the Treaty. This includes the early completion, provisional operation and maintenance of the International Monitoring System.

24. States Parties agree that multilateral disarmament verification is a vital component of a world free of nuclear weapons. They commit to strengthen support for initiatives to develop multilateral disarmament verification and capacity-building in support of nuclear disarmament and as an effective step towards the implementation of Article VI, and to further conceptual and practical work on nuclear disarmament verification, taking into account the importance of partnerships between nuclear-weapons States and non-nuclear-weapons States on this matter.

25. States Parties recognise that further work is required to ensure the irreversibility of nuclear disarmament and, as a first step, are encouraged to exchange information on how they apply the principles of irreversibility in relation to the implementation of their Treaty obligations, in order to build understanding of when and where irreversibility measures can be put into practice in reaching and maintaining a world free of nuclear weapons.

26. States Parties recognize that the only absolute guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons is their total elimination. States Parties also recognize that strengthening negative security assurances would contribute to building confidence in the non-proliferation regime, progress in nuclear disarmament as well as improving the overall security environment.

27. Pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons, as interim measures, the nuclear-weapons States commit:

   a. to honour and respect all existing security assurances undertaken by them;
   b. not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon States Parties to the Treaty under any circumstances.

28. States Parties call on the Conference on Disarmament to immediately begin discussion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapons States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, to discuss substantively, without limitation, with a view to elaborating recommendations dealing with all aspects of this issue, not excluding an internationally legally binding instrument.

29. States Parties acknowledge that as long as nuclear weapons exist nuclear risk will persist and affirm that only their elimination can eliminate all risks associated with nuclear weapons. Efforts to reduce the risk of nuclear war are not a substitute or a prerequisite for but rather are complementary to and a catalyst for the accelerated implementation of nuclear disarmament obligations under Article VI.

30. States Parties also acknowledge that risk reduction measures should be matched with, commensurate, concrete measures on the implementation of disarmament commitments.

31. States Parties further acknowledge that, while the avoidance of nuclear war is the responsibility of all States, the nuclear-weapons States have a special responsibility to reduce nuclear risks and that the implementation of the disarmament obligations in accordance with Article VI and of existing commitments can contribute to reducing risks. As these risks directly affect all States, there is a shared interest in risk reduction.

32. For these reasons, and noting that this list is not exhaustive, the nuclear-weapons States commit to the following immediate measures:

   a. To take all necessary measures to reduce the risks that nuclear weapons could be used as a result of miscalculation, misperception, miscommunication or by accident;
b. To the issuance of political declarations of restraint to increase trust and reassurance;

c. To refrain from dangerous rhetoric and from directly and indirectly threatening the use of nuclear weapons, *inter alia*, for military coercion, intimidation and blackmail;

d. To intensify dialogue among the nuclear-weapon States, bilaterally and with the non-nuclear weapon States on risk perceptions, nuclear doctrines and force postures;

e. To engage in sustained efforts to enhance transparency on nuclear arsenals;

f. To reduce the operational status of nuclear weapons systems or to keep them at the lowest possible level;

g. To create and enhance effective crisis prevention and management tools, including notification and data exchange agreements, enhanced leader-to-leader and military-to-military contact, the establishment of crisis-proof communication lines and risk reduction centres;

h. To take steps to better understand and minimize vulnerabilities related to potentially disruptive new technologies and cyber capacities as they pertain to nuclear weapons; and to refrain from any actions related to those technologies and capacities that could increase nuclear risks;

i. Further investigate practical steps States can take to narrow and, if possible, close off pathways to inadvertent nuclear use, including through sharing of best practices.

j. To reinforce concepts of safety and security of nuclear weapons and special nuclear material, which complement these risk reduction measures.

33. States Parties commit to

a. Reinvigorate and participate in transparency and confidence-building measures and other appropriate measures that can, directly or indirectly, improve predictability in international relations and help to reduce the risk of nuclear-weapon use;

b. Foster forms of dialogue that are aimed at easing international tensions, strengthening trust between States and contributing to the advancement of nuclear disarmament.

**Article VII and the security of non-nuclear-weapon States**

153. The Conference reaffirms that, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, States must refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.

154. The Conference reaffirms the conviction that the further establishment of internationally recognized nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned enhances global and regional peace and security, strengthens the nuclear non-proliferation regime and contributes towards realizing the objectives of nuclear disarmament. The Conference reaffirms its support for internationally recognised nuclear-weapon-free zones that are established on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned, consistent with the principles and guidelines of the of the United Nations Disarmament Commission for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone. The Conference affirms that the extension of the areas of the world that are nuclear-weapon-free zones established in accordance with those guidelines should be further promoted and fostered as building blocks toward the total elimination of all nuclear weapons.
155. The Conference recognizes the continuing contributions that the Antarctic Treaty, the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco), the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Rarotonga), the Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (Bangkok Treaty), the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Pelindaba Treaty) and the Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia (Semipalatinsk Treaty), as well as Mongolia’s nuclear-weapon-free status, are making towards attaining the objectives of nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation. The Conference welcomes the parallel declarations adopted by the nuclear-weapon States and Mongolia on 17 September 2012 concerning Mongolia’s nuclear-weapon-free status. The Conference supports efforts of States parties to enhance the institutionalization, cooperation and consultations among the existing nuclear-weapon-free zones, and Mongolia.

156. The Conference urges further progress toward ratification by nuclear-weapon States of the relevant protocols to nuclear-weapon-free-zone treaties. In this regard, the Conference encourages the States concerned to conduct constructive consultations on the outstanding issues related to the signing of the Protocol to the Bangkok Treaty with a view to signing and ratifying the Protocol as soon as possible and welcomes their statements of readiness to engage for that purpose. The Conference welcomes the signature and ratification by nuclear-weapon States of the Protocol to the Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia. The Conference stresses the importance of the signature and ratification by the nuclear-weapon States of the relevant protocols to the regional nuclear-weapon-free-zone treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in the respective territories as envisaged in article VII of the Treaty.

157. The Conference encourages nuclear-weapon States to review any reservations or interpretative statements made in connection with ratification of the protocols to the nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties.

158. The Conference calls on nuclear-weapon States to ratify relevant protocols to nuclear weapon-free zone treaties and thereby bring into effect the security assurances provided by them.

159. The Conference underlines the importance of the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones where they do not exist, especially in the Middle East.

160. Bearing in mind paragraph 7 of Decision 1 adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, which states that Review Conferences should look forward as well as back and should evaluate the results of the period they are reviewing, including the implementation of undertakings of the States parties under the Treaty, and identify the areas in which, and the means through which, further progress should be sought in the future, the Conference recommends the following forward-looking actions:

1. The Conference endorses the call by previous review conferences for the application of comprehensive IAEA safeguards on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities in the States parties in accordance with the provisions of article III of the Treaty.

2. The Conference calls upon States parties to take concrete steps to facilitate the full, equal and meaningful participation of women in non-proliferation and safeguards and to foster an inclusive workforce of both men and
women who contribute to and drive global scientific and technological innovation.

3. The Conference, noting that seven States parties to the Treaty have yet to bring into force comprehensive safeguards agreements required by article III of the Treaty, urges them to do so as soon as possible and without further delay.

4. The Conference underscores the importance of complying with non-proliferation obligations and addressing all non-compliance matters in order to uphold the Treaty’s integrity and the authority of the safeguards system.

5. The Conference underscores the importance of resolving all cases of non-compliance with safeguards obligations in full conformity with the Statute of the IAEA and the respective legal obligations of States parties. In this regard, the Conference calls upon States parties to extend their cooperation to the Agency.

6. The Conference calls for the restoration of control by the Russian Federation to the competent Ukrainian authorities of the Zaporizhzya nuclear power plant and other relevant facilities and locations in Ukraine in order to ensure their safety and security, as well as the effective implementation of IAEA verification activities under Ukraine’s comprehensive safeguards agreement.

7. The Conference calls on States parties to consider specific measures that would promote the universalization of the comprehensive safeguards agreements, pursuant to Article III of the Treaty.

8. The Conference encourages all States parties which have not yet done so to conclude and to bring into force additional protocols as soon as possible and to implement them provisionally pending their entry into force.

9. The Conference calls for the wider application of safeguards to peaceful nuclear facilities in the nuclear-weapon States, under the relevant voluntary offer safeguards agreements, in the most economic and practical way possible, taking into account the availability of IAEA resources, and stresses that comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols should be universally applied once the complete elimination of nuclear weapons has been achieved.

10. The Conference calls upon all States parties with small quantities protocols which have not yet done so to amend or rescind them as a matter of priority.

11. The Conference encourages the IAEA to further facilitate and assist the States parties in the conclusion and entry into force of comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols and amendment or rescission of small quantities protocols.

12. The Conference recommends that IAEA safeguards should be assessed and evaluated regularly, including in light of technological developments and the increasing number of facilities and locations outside facilities under safeguards.

13. The Conference calls upon all States parties to ensure that the IAEA continues to have the necessary political, technical and financial support so that it is able to effectively meet its responsibility to apply safeguards as required by article III of the Treaty.
14. The Conference urges all States parties to ensure that their nuclear-related exports do not directly or indirectly assist the development of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and that such exports are in full conformity with the objectives and purposes of the Treaty as stipulated, particularly, in articles I, II and III of the Treaty, as well as the decision on principles and objectives of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament adopted in 1995 by the Review and Extension Conference.

15. The Conference encourages States parties to make use of multilaterally negotiated guidelines and understandings in developing their own national export controls.

16. The Conference encourages States parties to consider whether a recipient State has brought into force IAEA safeguards obligations in making nuclear export decisions.

17. The Conference calls upon all States parties, in acting in pursuance of the objectives of the Treaty, to observe the legitimate right of all States parties, in particular developing States, to full access to nuclear material, equipment and technological information for peaceful purposes.

18. States parties are encouraged to facilitate transfers of nuclear technology and materials and international cooperation among States parties, in conformity with articles I, II, III and IV of the Treaty, and to eliminate in this regard any undue constraints inconsistent with the Treaty.

19. The Conference encourages all States to maintain the highest possible standards of nuclear security, including the physical protection of nuclear materials and facilities, cybersecurity and the protection of nuclear facilities against such acts as theft and sabotage.

20. The Conference encourages all States parties to apply, as appropriate, the IAEA recommendations on the physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities (INFCIRC/225/Revision 5) and other relevant international instruments at the earliest possible date.

21. The Conference calls on all States parties to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material to become party to the Amendment to the Convention as soon as possible. The Conference also encourages all States that have not yet done so to adhere to the Convention and become party to the Amendment as soon as possible.

22. The Conference urges all States parties to implement the principles of the revised IAEA Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources and its supplementary guidance.

23. The Conference also calls upon States parties to establish and enforce effective domestic controls to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons in accordance with their relevant international legal obligations.

24. The Conference encourages all States parties that have not yet done so to become party to the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism as soon as possible.

25. The Conference encourages the IAEA to continue to assist the States parties, upon request, in strengthening their national regulatory controls of nuclear material, including the establishment and maintenance of the State systems of accounting for and control of nuclear material, as well as systems on the regional level. The Conference calls upon IAEA Member States to broaden their support for the relevant IAEA programmes.
The Middle East, particularly implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East:

161. The Conference reaffirms its support for the implementation of the Resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and recalls the affirmation of its goals and objectives by the previous Review Conferences.

162. The Conference reaffirms that the 1995 Resolution remains valid until the goals and objectives are achieved. The 1995 Resolution, which was co-sponsored by the three depositary states of the Treaty, is an essential element of the outcome of the 1995 Conference and of the basis on which the Treaty was indefinitely extended without a vote.

163. The Review Conference recalls the reaffirmation at the 2010 Review Conference by the five nuclear-weapon States of their commitment to a full implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East.

164. The Conference recalls the reaffirmation by previous Review Conferences of the importance of achieving universality of the Treaty, including in the Middle East.

165. The Conference stresses the necessity of strict adherence by all States Parties to their obligations and commitments under the Treaty. The Conference urges all States in the region to take relevant steps and confidence-building measures to contribute to the realization of the objectives of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East.

166. The Conference reaffirms the importance of the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones where they do not exist, including in the Middle East.

167. The Conference reaffirms the importance of advancing the full implementation of the Resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference.


Other regional issues

169. The Conference expresses its unwavering support for the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

170. The Conference, stressing that the DPRK must abide by its international obligations, and recalling relevant United Nations Security Council Resolutions, condemns the nuclear tests conducted by the DPRK in 2016 and 2017 and stresses that the DPRK must not conduct any further nuclear tests.

171. Recalling that the DPRK cannot have the status of a nuclear-weapon state pursuant to the NPT, the Conference calls on it to return without delay to the NPT and to the application of IAEA safeguards on all of its nuclear activities.
172. The conference further calls on the DPRK to take concrete measures as soon as possible to abandon all its nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles and related programmes in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner.

173. The Conference encourages the resolution of this issue through negotiations and diplomacy.

174. In this regard, the Conference stresses that all parties concerned should exercise restraint, refrain from escalatory steps, adhere to the general direction of political settlement and resolve their respective concerns through meaningful dialogue in order to promote peace and the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

175. The Conference expresses concern about other regions in Asia where nuclear stockpiles pose challenges to the nuclear non-proliferation regime and recalls the reaffirmation by previous Review Conferences of the importance of achieving universality of the Treaty. The Conference underlines the importance of concerned states strengthening their non-proliferation export control measures over technologies, material and equipment that can be used for the production of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems.

Article VIII

176. The Conference reaffirms the purpose of the review process as set out in article VIII of the Treaty and elaborated in the relevant decision of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and the 2000 Review Conference final document, and notes the relevant discussions undertaken in the 2010 and 2015 Review Conferences, as well as during the current review cycle.

177. The Conference acknowledges that the review process for the Treaty has generally served States parties well, and recognizes that there is scope to improve the overall effectiveness, transparency, inclusivity, efficiency and responsiveness of the review process. The Conference acknowledges that the Tenth Review Conference was exceptionally postponed from April 2020 to August 2022 due to the restrictions arising from the COVID-19 pandemic.

178. The Conference emphasizes that actions to strengthen the review process are no substitute for making progress on substantive outcomes, and that the goal of reviewing the Treaty working methods should be to facilitate substantive, transparent and inclusive dialogue, thereby contributing to efficient work within review conferences and ultimately, the effective implementation of the Treaty.

179. The Conference notes, in this regard, that enhanced accountability and transparency, including improving the process of reporting on the implementation of the Treaty, would further strengthen the review process.

180. Taking into account the above, the Conference:

   a. decides to establish a working group on further strengthening the review process of the Treaty, open to all States parties, based on the following arrangements:

      i. The working group will meet as close as possible to the beginning of the first meeting of the preparatory committee for the Eleventh Review Conference, to discuss and make recommendations to the Preparatory Committee of the Eleventh Review Conference on measures that would
improve the effectiveness, efficiency, transparency, accountability, coordination and continuity of the review process of the Treaty.

ii. The working group will operate according to the rules of procedure of the Tenth Review Conference which will be applied mutatis mutandis.

iii. The Secretariat will, in consultation with States parties and the chair-designate of the first meeting of the preparatory committee, facilitate a decision on the venue and duration of the working group, and provide States parties with an estimate of the costs of the working group, which will be covered through a one-time assessed contribution by States parties.

b. encourages States parties to ensure full, equal and meaningful participation of women in decision-making in the review process of the Treaty including in the bureau, in accordance with Security Council resolution 1325 (2000), and to actively support the participation of women in their delegations including through support for sponsorship programmes.

c. requests the Secretariat to collect, track and publish data disaggregated by sex and gender statistics.

181. In order to pursue a credible, result-oriented process for further work related to risk reduction in the context of this Treaty, States Parties commit to

a. Include in their national reports on their fulfilment of obligations and commitments under the Treaty information on measures and initiatives in the context of risk reduction during the course of the next and future review cycles; and

b. Devote time to a structured discussion about risk reduction at future sessions of the Preparatory Committee as a specific issue under Cluster 1 and future Review Conferences under a specific agenda item.

182. States Parties stress the necessity of strengthening accountability through enhanced transparency and measurability of the implementation of nuclear disarmament obligations and commitments. To this end,

a. Nuclear-weapon States commit to report at every session of the Preparatory Committee and at every Review Conference, on the status of their nuclear forces, their nuclear doctrine, and on the progress of their implementation of the Treaty and of commitments made at previous Review Conferences, in line with Actions 20 and 21 of the 2010 Action Plan, in a manner that enables the progress on implementation to be regularly monitored and reviewed over the course of the review cycle, including, inter alia, through the use of benchmarks and targets.

b. States Parties commit to submit regular reports on implementation of Article VI of the Treaty and of commitments made at previous Review Conferences, in line with Action 20 of the 2010 Action Plan.

c. States Parties commit to devote time at every session of the Preparatory Committee and at every Review Conference to the presentation and discussion of the reports of all nuclear-weapon States and the reports of interested non-nuclear weapon States.

183. The Conference acknowledges the value of increased and positive interaction with civil society during the review cycle and greater engagement with non-governmental organizations in the context of the review process of the Treaty, as well as in the pursuit of nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation objectives.
Article IX

184. The Conference remains convinced that universal adherence is essential as well as an urgent and continuing priority for the full realization of the objectives of the Treaty.

185. Taking into account the above, the Conference:

   a. calls upon India, Israel and Pakistan to accede to the Treaty without further delay and without any conditions as non-nuclear-weapon States.
   b. encourages South Sudan to accede, as soon as possible, to the Treaty.
   c. calls upon all States parties to exert all efforts to promote universal adherence to the Treaty, and not to take any action that can negatively affect prospects for the universality of the Treaty.

Article X

186. The Conference reaffirms that each State party, in exercising its national sovereignty, has the right to withdrawal from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of the Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests. The Conference also reaffirms, pursuant to article X, that notice of withdrawal shall be given to all other parties to the Treaty and to the United Nations Security Council three months in advance and shall include a statement of the extraordinary events the State party regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests. The Conference also underscores that the procedures laid out in article X must be followed fully by any State party that invokes its right to withdraw from the Treaty.

187. The Conference affirms States parties’ commitment not to reinterpret any provision of the Treaty.

188. The Conference emphasizes that it will not limit, restrict or undermine the rights of States parties to withdraw from the Treaty, but notes the relevance of customary international law in connection with the withdrawal of States from treaties, including those rules reflected in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, under which States parties, in exercising their rights under Article X, will remain responsible for any violation of the Treaty committed prior to withdrawal.

189. The Conference emphasizes that withdrawal does not change any other existing legal obligations or political commitments between the withdrawing State and any other party, including the obligations that apply to nuclear materials, equipment and scientific and technological information acquired by a State prior to withdrawal, which should remain under safeguards pursuant to relevant agreements to be concluded in connection with the withdrawal from the Treaty.

190. The Conference notes that nuclear supply States parties can consider incorporating dismantling and/or return clauses or provisions for maintaining safeguards in the event of withdrawal in their arrangements or agreements concluded with other State parties.

191. Taking into account the above, the Conference:
a. encourages all States parties, to undertake consultations and exert every diplomatic effort to persuade the withdrawing State to reconsider its decision, addressing the legitimate security needs of parties directly involved.

Cross-cutting matters

192. States Parties recognize the vital importance of educating and empowering individuals of all generations irrespective of their gender regarding the dangers of nuclear weapons and the imperatives to reach a world without nuclear weapons, including the risks and humanitarian consequences associated with nuclear weapons. States Parties commit to take concrete measures to raise awareness of the public, in particular of younger and future generations, as well as of leaders, disarmament experts and diplomats, on all topics relating to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, including through interactions with and directly sharing the experiences of the survivors and the communities affected by nuclear weapons use and testing, to know their humanitarian and environmental impact.

193. States Parties recognize the importance of, and commit to ensure the equal, full and effective participation and leadership of both women and men in the NPT implementation and review and to further integrate a gender perspective in all aspects of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation decision-making processes.

194. States Parties commit to empower and enable youth to participate in formal and informal initiatives and in nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation decision-making processes.

195. States Parties also commit to promote the participation of civil society, including research centres and academia, in nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation decision-making processes and in raising public awareness on the urgency and importance of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament.