	IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
	STATES OF AMERICA,  Plaintiff,  vs.  No. 17-CV-2133 GAG  VAELLO-MADERO,  Defendant.
	TRANSCRIPT OF CIVIL HEARING  D BEFORE THE HONORABLE CHIEF JUDGE GUSTAVO A. GELPÍ  U.S. BANKRUPTCY COURT, PONCE, PUERTO RICO  GURSDAY, DECEMBER 20, 2018, BEGINNING AT 9:45 A.M.
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THE COURTROOM DEPUTY: All rise.

(The Court enters the room.)

THE COURTROOM DEPUTY: The United States

District Court for the District of Puerto Rico is now in session. All those having business before this

Court shall draw near, give your attention and you shall be heard. God save the United States of America and this Honorable Court. Honorable Judge Gustavo A. Gelpí presiding.

THE COURT: Please be seated. Let's call the matter for this morning.

THE COURTROOM DEPUTY: Civil case

No. 17-2133. United States of America versus

Vaello-Madero. Set for oral arguments. Will the

parties please identify themselves for the record.

MR. REISS: Good morning, Your Honor.

Daniel Riess for the United States, and my colleague

Ariella Zoltan from the Social Security

Administration.

THE COURT: Good morning.

MR. REISS: Good morning.

MR. FERRÉ: Hermann Ferré for Defendant

Vaello-Madero here with John Ferré-Crossley as

co-counsel, and colleague Juan Perla also from the

law firm of Curtis, Mallet-Prevost, Colt & Mosle.

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THE COURT: Okay, welcome.

MS. FERRAIUOLI-HORNEDO: Good morning, Your Honor. For the record, this is Veronica Ferraiuoli representing the Resident C.G.

THE COURT: Okay, good morning.

MS. PEÑAGARÍCANO-BROWN: Good morning, Your Honor. Susana Peñagarícano representing the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.

MR. LUGO-FIOL: Good morning. Carlos

Lugo-Fiol also representing Amicus the Commonwealth

of Puerto Rico.

THE COURT: Thank you very much all for being here and being here in Ponce. The reason this argument is being held here is this is a very comfortable courthouse and I try to use it for matters as this. I think it's more quiet and everybody can focus on the task at hand.

I want to -- first of all, I want to commend both the United States and Counsel Vaello's attorneys, as well as Congressman González, and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico for the briefs. All the briefs filed in this case are top quality. I've had the pleasure of reading them and re-reading them over again. And this is the quality of litigation that as a federal judge I expect and I would like to see more

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I also want to note that counsel for Vaello-Madero, Mr. Ferré and his law firm and local counsel, are doing this on a pro bono basis, they were court appointed by the Court. So I'm very thankful because this type of litigation without the proper resources is very hard to handle. So thanks for that. And I know that you all flew from New York for this hearing, except local counsel, so thank you very much.

I also want to note that Counsel Gregorio

Igartúa who has filed an amicus, he will not be

arguing, is here in court and I recognize his

presence. And also I note that Counsel Nicolás

Nogueras, who is a former senator here in Puerto Rico

for many years, also filed an amicus. That's part of

the record and it's been duly noted even though these

two other amicus briefs will not be arguing.

Now, the way I'm going to proceed this morning is as follows: I will make some general statements and observations and then I'm going to pose some questions both -- and I want to hear as to these questions from the United States and from Vaello's attorneys. And what I will do is I'll

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After that I'm going to have the amicus counsel for the Commonwealth make a statement and argument, I'll perhaps ask some questions for approximately ten minutes, and then counsel for Congresswoman González. After that I'm going to allow counsel first for the United States to make any other arguments and presentations that I have not covered in my questions to please make that, and take your time, and then I'll have Counsel Ferré do the same on behalf of Mr. Vaello, and then I'll allow a short rebuttal time for the government and for counsel. So that's the proceedings we're going to have.

Okay. So let me begin, and I think -- and I'll start my questions. Now let me -- I think it's -- I want to point to the amicus brief filed by Congresswoman González. And in that brief in her conclusion I would like to open up with a statement. And, again, that's a statement of the amicus, not necessarily a statement of the Court but I think it's a very good starting point. And I'll read from her conclusion.

"Of all the disparities that Americans

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living in Puerto Rico face, none is as shocking to
the conscience as the disparity in the assistance
available to the most vulnerable citizens -- people
who under no circumstance can support themselves. An
American citizen living under the poverty line in the
continental United States is no more needy,
vulnerable, or deserving of assistance than an
American citizen living under the poverty line in
this territory.

"Supplemental Social Security income, SSI, is a means tested entitlement program which, unlike Social Security" -- or I would add Medicare -- "does not require a beneficiary to make payments into the program to be entitled to the benefits. An American in a state receiving SSI is as likely to pay federal taxes as an American living in Puerto Rico. There is no justifiable reason for this statutory discrimination."

So what I would ask, beginning with the United States and then I'll hear from Vaello's counsel, in regards to that collusion, are you in agreement or in disagreement and why? So Counsel you may proceed. And you can -- let's do this so we don't have to shuffle back and forth, at least for this part of the argument, you can remain sitting

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MR. RIESS: Thank you, Your Honor. And may it please the Court.

THE COURT: Good morning.

MR. RIESS: Good morning, sir. We do respectfully disagree with the statement by the respective amicus, and I'd just like to focus on this response. Residents of Puerto Rico generally do not pay federal income tax. And there are exceptions, but that's very important, and I'll explain why and why that pertains to Supplemental Security Income.

So there are at least two models for how to handle paying for governmental benefits. One is to assess a specific tax that pays for that specific benefit and the other is to use general revenues as the source of payment. So an example of a specific tax approach is the federal payroll tax, that pays for specific benefits. So it pays for Title II retirement and disability. Residents of Puerto Rico pay payroll taxes and as a result they can and do receive Title II benefits, including the defendant here, Mr. Vaello-Madero. He receives Title II retirement benefits.

But Supplemental Security Income, SSI,

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that's a different model. It's paid for by general
revenues, and those general revenues are funded in
very significant part by individual federal income
tax. And so because Puerto Rico residents generally
don't pay federal income tax, they are not eligible
for SSI.

THE COURT: Let me ask you a question because most individuals even in the mainland, and in the Mariana Islands where they receive SSI, these are poor, disabled, sick individuals who even if they lived in the States or in the CNMI, in the Marianas, they would likely not even be contributing to these systems. Wouldn't that make a difference?

MR. RIESS: Respectfully, no, Your Honor, and here's why. As a matter of law, it's reasonable for Congress to decide as a general matter that if residents of Puerto Rico don't pay federal income tax, regardless of an individual's circumstances, therefore Puerto Rico residents are not eligible for SSI benefits from general revenues. The Constitution of the line drawing, it doesn't turn on whether or not any individual might have paid federal income tax. As -- the rationale here is --

THE COURT: It's more like the jurisdiction paying or providing federal income to the general

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treasury, correct?

MR. RIESS: That's correct, Your Honor. The rationale --

Statistics and I believe they are discussed in some of the amicus briefs. But, for example, Puerto Rico individuals generally don't pay federal taxes, even those who file their tax returns, because federal law allows the money to remain in Puerto Rico. That's a given. But Puerto Rico notwithstanding collects and provides to the general fund more federal funds, more taxes, again from all sorts of possible taxes, than at least one state of the union and almost as much as two other states. So in the Government's position that still would not make a difference?

MR. RIESS: Respectfully, no, Your Honor. Whether or not the Court disagrees ultimately with the policy here, respectfully that doesn't render it unconstitutional under rational basis. It could have queries about the wisdom of the policy or about the logic of the policy, but respectfully speaking that does not render a federal statute unconstitutional.

THE COURT: Okay. Let me then -- anything else? If not, I'll hear from Mr. Ferré.

MR. RIESS: I don't believe so, Your Honor.

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THE COURT: As it pertains to this particular question.

Okay, Mr. Ferré, let me hear your position, if your client is in agreement or disagreement with the statement made by Congresswoman Jenniffer González.

MR. FERRÉ: Your Honor, thank you. Well, certainly we are entirely in agreement. We agree that it is shocking the different treatment with respect to the most needy in Puerto Rico versus the most needy stateside.

Now we'd like to just in recent examination -- after reviewing again the amicus briefs and including the amicus brief for Congressman González, we note that the Tax Policy Center has reported that in 2016 over 44 percent of all U.S. residents paid no federal income tax. So, certainly the fact that some and many U.S. citizens in Puerto Rico do not pay federal income tax should not be determinative on this issue of the level of support for the most needy.

And I think the Court also has on the record the fact that Puerto Rico indeed does pay into the general treasury. In 2016 alone, Puerto Rico paid nearly \$3.5 billion, and we can see that on the IRS

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mentioned the word "shocking." Obviously shocking does not make a federal statute or federal action unconstitutional. There has to be a violation, again in this case, of equal protection or some other constitutional provision. So my question is, when these -- when SSI was enacted and Puerto Rico was excluded, for purposes of either rational basis or higher scrutiny, should we look to the moment the action was taken by the Federal Government, or can we look at Puerto Rico's current situation?

And I'm going to ask the response also from the U.S. government as to this question. Should we look at the situation now in 2018 almost 2019, or we go back and everything that has changed? Or if it hasn't changed then there's nothing the Court can do. What would be Mr. Vaello's position beginning with Mr. Ferré?

MR. FERRÉ: I would argue that certainly you could look at either the point in time at which the statute was enacted or today, and I think you would come out with the same result. I think -- our position is the very fact that the statute excludes a politically powerless group makes the statute's

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THE COURT: Let me hear from counsel for the United States then as to that particular question.

MR. RIESS: Just to be clear, Your Honor, on Counsel's point or as to your question?

THE COURT: No, as to the question. For purposes of either rational basis or strict scrutiny Mr. Riess, do we look at the moment the legislation was enacted or do we continue to look at the overall big picture up to the present to see if the effect at present violates equal protection?

MR. RIESS: Respectfully, Your Honor, we look to the moment that the statute was created. And on this point, the First Circuit in the Montalvo-Huertas case, which is 885 F.2d at 971, explained that and I quote, "Evaluating the continued need for and suitability of legislation of this genre is exactly the kind of policy judgment that the rational basis test was designed to preclude."

I also note that the pertinent situation

here -- that the most important facts that were found

in Califano and Harris is that this is a law that

provides for governmental payment of money benefits,

and because Puerto Rico is a United States

territory -- and when Congress acts under its

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Territory Clause it has extremely broad discretion -those were true in 1978 and 1980 when the Supreme

Court decided *Califano* and *Harris* as they are today.

THE COURT: Okay, thank you. And I'll ask first from the government and then from Mr. Vaello. I now go to the amicus filed by the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, particularly page 12. And this is something that until I read this amicus and saw these statistics -- and let me comment this, I think the amicus briefs in this case obviously they support the position of Mr. Vaello but they brought to light -- there's a lot of research and statistical research that's been done which is very helpful to understanding the whole situation.

I will read from page 12 to 13. "...the SSI program clearly aims at individuals who do not pay federal income taxes because their income is too low. Moreover, the beneficiaries of SSI do not pay federal taxes regardless of the state they reside in.

Additionally" -- and this is what I'm going to ask disagree or agree or comments from the parties.

"Additionally, even noncitizens" -- and, again, I'll repeat non U.S. citizens -- "may qualify for SSI benefits from which the U.S. citizens of Puerto Rico are excluded. In fact, in 2017, 6 percent of all SSI

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So my question first to Mr. Riess, isn't there some sort of discrimination in favor of noncitizens who live in the mainland or the states or the Mariana Islands versus U.S. citizens who live in the territory, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico?

And let me note that, again, when I refer to -- I don't like to use the term Puerto Ricans because it's -- obviously, you know, it's an ethnic group and it goes to ethnicities, but when I'm referring to anybody who is discriminated by the statute it's U.S. citizens residing in Puerto Rico. Because there are many U.S. citizens here who are natural-born citizens of Puerto Rican origin but we also have a percentage of U.S. citizens here who moved to Puerto Rico, who retired, same as in the Virgin Islands or any other territory. They come here to retire or to work for X, Y, Z purposes and when they move here also they lose that benefit.

So isn't that a problem? Or what's your reaction to the statement that there are aliens, resident aliens, in the United States who receive SSI

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when there are U.S. citizens that are not receiving
SSI and they are as equally poor, as equally sick,
and need these helps and they're not -- and these
U.S. citizens are not getting SSI here in the
territory? Let me hear first from Mr. Riess.

MR. RIESS: Yes, Your Honor. So I present two points on the statement on pages 12 and 13 regarding the tax as it applies to SSI. I guess, number one, as a matter of law, the eligibility of -- to -- for SSI doesn't depend on whether or not someone pays federal income tax. That is -- whether or not -- their taxpayer status is not relevant as to whether they qualify for SSI.

And, number two, respectfully as a matter of fact we don't know for a fact that beneficiaries of SSI don't pay federal taxes. We noted in our response to the amicus that SSI recipients may have any number of income and revenue streams and may incur federal tax liability. So, for example, in 2019 a person with only earnings income could earn up to more than \$1,600 a month and still be eligible for SSI.

With regard to the statement --

THE COURT: But in a sense somebody who makes -- again, we're talking about the mainland, for

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example, somebody in New York who makes \$1,600 a
month even in the poorest suburbs probably most if
not all of that money will go to rent, other
expenses. And, again, when you're talking the
mainland, you know, somebody who lives somewhere in
North Dakota makes 1600 a month probably lives pretty
well off.

Again, I don't think that's totally dispositive because somebody who makes \$1600 a month in Puerto Rico and is disabled probably won't have too much money left over if the person is not healthy to move around. Please continue.

MR. RIESS: Sure. Thank you, Your Honor. I understand that. Respectfully I believe that the statement by amicus boils down to a statement that amicus disagrees fundamentally with the policy behind this. And respectfully the -- whether or not one agrees with the wisdom or the logic of the policy, that does not constitute a basis for striking it down under rational basis review when the link is --

THE COURT: In other words, and this is something I learned when I went through my confirmation hearing, federal judges, district, appellate, Supreme Court justices are not super-legislators. There's one hundred senators,

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there's, I don't know the number, 600-plus
representatives but they make policy. And, again,
it's not up to one single judge or justice or group
of judges to say, Well, that policy, we don't like
that policy. That's very clear. It has to be a
violation of equal protection or some other
Constitutional provision and that's where the judges
can exercise, you know, the case in controversy power
and determine the constitutionality.

So I'm very clear with that, that just because Mr. Vaello doesn't like the policy, just because I don't like it, perhaps even the United States Government doesn't like the policy, the Attorney General's Office; but, again, if that is the policy through Congress obviously that's within our separation of powers, that's pretty clear. Please continue.

MR. RIESS: Respectfully that's correct,
Your Honor. What we're dealing with here is a
statute that is about the payment of monetary
benefits. And what the Supreme Court and other
courts have made clear is that when you have that,
and this is the Lyng case, 485 U.S. 373, the review
by courts of distinctions that Congress makes in
order to make allocations from a finite pool of

U.S. v. Vaello-Madero - Civil Hearing resources has to be differential because the discretion about how to spend money to improve the general welfare is lodged in Congress rather than in the courts. So a policy disagreement respectfully is simply not sufficient to strike down a statute.

THE COURT: Okay, let me hear from Mr. Ferré as to the statement in the Commonwealth's amicus brief.

MR. FERRÉ: Thank you, Your Honor. Two points to make and that is, first, I think that the issue with respect to the fact that resident aliens are able to participate in the SSI program I think that the resident commissioner's point is that the very fact that aliens can participate in the program and U.S. citizens residing in the territories cannot is irrational. I think that highlights the irrationality of the exclusion of Puerto Rico.

The other point is --

assume you refer that if there's X or Y or Z number of limited federal funds out of the federal treasury, before we start giving medical assistance to poor aliens who have not become U.S. citizens, we should -- when I say "we" I mean the American nation or the Congress -- should first consider or

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treat or provide that assistance to its own citizens,

and after it's done so, if there's any additional

funds, then provide it to resident aliens. That's I

believe what you're arguing, correct? There's no

rationality as to providing noncitizens benefits that

citizens don't have.

MR. FERRÉ: Well, one would imagine, that's correct, Your Honor.

The other point that we'd like to highlight is the case law establishes that it would be difficult for Congress to exclude aliens from the program and that's because the exclusion of aliens from the program would then be subject to --

THE COURT: Strict scrutiny.

MR. FERRÉ: -- strict scrutiny. These are a politically powerless group. We would expect that the same then standard of scrutiny should apply to the exclusion of the residents of the territories and that is but for the insular cases which appear to hold that the standard of review then would be rational basis. So, again, it goes to show that the framework in which we are operating, something doesn't seem correct. It seems that --

THE COURT: You're aware that obviously if there's resident aliens, and there's a lot here in

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Puerto Rico and I'm sure they would also -- you know,
a lot of Dominican nationals are here -- and, again,
we naturalize them every month, many of them, but
there's many who still are resident aliens. Those
are denied the benefits also just like the U.S.
citizens in Puerto Rico. Wouldn't that make a
difference? because it's everybody who is in the
territory, it's not just U.S. citizens.

MR. FERRÉ: That's correct. All residents of Puerto Rico are excluded.

THE COURT: So, I guess for this argument you in that sense would also argue that we could include the resident aliens and the U.S. citizens of Puerto Rico being discriminated against everybody else who is in the mainland in that sense.

MR. FERRÉ: Yes. If you were to compare how U.S. citizens and aliens are treated in the territories, in the territory of Puerto Rico, and U.S. citizens and aliens are treated stateside, then yes.

THE COURT: Okay. Next question, moving on.

And let me make -- point this out first and just to

make sure we're all -- I think we're all in the same

boat. Obviously the amicus curiae briefs are argued

in a big picture. The case we have before the Court

U.S. v. Vaello-Madero - Civil Hearing today involves whether Mr. Vaello has to reimburse the United States -- it's a collections, in that sense a collections case -- he has to reimburse approximately \$30,000 plus any interests to the United States treasury. And obviously as a defense he's bringing these arguments which obviously from amicus's perspective, and that's why I thought it was important for them to participate, any ruling here could eventually have a broader context. But insofar as we're concerned in this case, if Mr. Vaello prevails, it is the remedy -- again, he's not moving for declaratory relief class-wide or island-wide, it is simply limited to his defense that right now he does not have to reimburse that money. And I ask Mr. Ferré you're in agreement that that is the case that we have before the Court right now?

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MR. FERRÉ: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: And Mr. Riess I think you're also in agreement that it is limited to whether there's reimbursement or not. We're not talking -- again, this is not a declaratory judgment for a much broader group of citizens right now, correct?

MR. RIESS: We are in agreement, Your Honor, yes.

THE COURT: So I just wanted to make that

Very clear because whatever the ruling is in this case, either in favor or Mr. Vaello or in favor of the United States, I'm sure it will probably be appealed one way or another, but it is limited to Mr. Vaello at this particular case. Obviously whatever precedent is set obviously it may lead to further actions or other matters but obviously at this time we're concerned with Mr. Vaello.

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Let me go back to something Mr. Riess mentioned when he was responding to my earlier question that Mr. Riess brought up the Territory Clause of the Constitution in Article IV and mentioned that based on that Territory Clause, citing the Califano case and the Harris case, that the Congress and Federal Government, its agencies, have broad discretion in treating Puerto Rico differently, distinctly from the states, actions that cannot be taken in the States can be taken in the territories. And, as we have seen, each territory can be treated differently because there is -- and, again, we'll discuss this maybe later a little bit. The Mariana Islands, citizens there have full Social Security, full Medicare, full SSI benefit, and other federal benefits. Obviously the population there is about 50,000 U.S. citizens compared to about 3.5, but

U.S. v. Vaello-Madero - Civil Hearing there's those distinctions.

But Mr. Riess, again, the bottom line is that under the jurisprudence that is still a good law up to this moment, the government's position, as it's been the position throughout the years, is that the Federal Government, the Congress, whether we like it or not individually, the Congress has unrestraint power as long as it does not violate a constitutional provision. If it's strict scrutiny it's very hard, but if it's rational basis the Congress has basically unrestrained, unfettered authority to pass federal laws as to the territories. Am I correct?

MR. RIESS: That's correct, Your Honor. And just two points on that very briefly. Just to be clear, that's one basis that it boils down to that. The Harris case talked about the Territory Clause. The Califano case also talked about when there's a program that creates social and economic welfare benefits Congress's line drawing as to eligibility requirements gets a strong presumption of constitutionality. So I just want to be clear it's not just the Territory Clause, it's also that.

But, second, with respect to the Territory

Clause --

THE COURT: As interpreted by the Supreme

U.S. v. Vaello-Madero - Civil Hearing Court Congress has that additional leeway.

MR. RIESS: Correct, Your Honor.

THE COURT: And, again, this pertains to federal benefits. Now, within that context -- this is a broader question and I think I know what the answer is but I just want to hear it for the record -- but in theory Congress tomorrow could, you know, as to Social Security, Medicare there is a cap to U.S. citizens here and any resident aliens who may qualify.

And, again, this includes U.S. citizens who may move from the mainland to Puerto Rico, many perhaps for the climate, medical reasons, but Congress could take that cap and if it wants it could say tomorrow no more cap, or it could say that cap is limited here, we're going to reduce that cap even more. Just the same way Congress tomorrow could say, well, we feel like extending SSI to Puerto Rico, we can do so or we're going to provide 43 percent SSI benefits when compared to the states. That would be at the discretion of the Congress and the agencies that administer those particular funds. Am I correct?

MR. RIESS: That's correct, Your Honor. I see no reason why Congress wouldn't be able to do

U.S. v. Vaello-Madero - Civil Hearing that, as you say, tomorrow.

But I just want to be clear that the

Territory Clause continues to be recognized by the

First Circuit in more recent cases like the

Rivera-Torres case which we've cited in our briefs,

that's an opinion by Judge Torruella about the

plenary powers under that; and then two cases from

this district earlier this year, the Centro de

Periodismo Investigativo, and In Re Financial

Oversight about the broad sweeping even plenary

powers under the Territory Clause.

THE COURT: And those last two you mentioned they pertain to the PROMESA law, correct?

MR. RIESS: Correct, Your Honor.

again, this is at the Circuit level that, again, the Congress can enact PROMESA, statutes like PROMESA which in a sense Puerto Rico has -- and it's very interesting because Puerto Rico since 1952 Congress had not enacted any federal statute that had a local implication, a statute directly, specifically for Puerto Rico. And in the case of PROMESA you have a Constitution locally with three branches of government but basically in the FLOW chart, the government FLOW chart basically the fiscal board

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So, again, that would be another example, unless the Supreme Court were to say at some point — and I don't know if that challenge has been made, but unless the Supreme Court were to say it's unconstitutional, it is an example of the Congress acting with that unrestrained power for the benefit or whatever — sometimes it may be for the benefit of Puerto Rico, sometimes it can have repercussions, but Congress basically has that power unless Puerto Rico were to become a state. Correct?

MR. RIESS: That is my understanding, Your Honor, yes, sir.

THE COURT: And recently, this is another example, Congress has legislated, I believe it's up to the president to sign the law, but Congress has prohibited or will prohibit a year from now cockfighting in all the territories. That's another example of congressional power. Am I correct?

MR. RIESS: It is Your, Honor. And, as I said, it is broad and sweeping and plenary and it's been recognized very recently. It's not just cases from the Supreme Court going back to 1978 and 1980.

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THE COURT: Okay, let me ask, because in one of the briefs there -- one thing is to treat the territory differently, another thing is the U.S. citizens in the territory. And, for example, there are programs medical -- Medicare or Medicaid that go to the Commonwealth Fisc versus others such as SSI that the aid would go directly to the U.S. citizen. Would that make a difference, or the fact that the U.S. citizens have decided to remain in Puerto Rico or live in Puerto Rico he falls within the Territorial Clause and the benefits or non benefits of being in a territorial jurisdiction?

MR. RIESS: So I think here -- yes, Your Honor, I think here we're talking about a residency classification. For SSI this is a classification that's based on residency rather than, say, race or national origin. So, for example, a Puerto Rico resident who would otherwise be eligible for SSI benefits if he or she were to move to the 50 states or the District of Columbia, he or she, if they met all the other requirements, would be eligible for SSI.

THE COURT: And, for example, if somebody who is Asian American in origin and became a U.S. citizen came from, let's say, Japan, moved to

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California, became a U.S. citizen and was receiving

all the benefits and happens to move to Puerto Rico,

that's not a discrimination based on being an

American moving to Puerto Rico or somebody who is

Native American and getting the benefits and moves

here, that's based on residency is what you're

saying, correct?

MR. RIESS: Yes, that's correct, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Let me hear then as to the arguments of Mr. Riess, Mr. Ferré.

MR. FERRÉ: Thank you, Your Honor. Your Honor has highlighted the PROMESA act and also Public Law 600 which were specific laws of Congress that dealt with the governance of -- in the case of Public Law 600 the governance of the territory of Puerto Rico, and with respect to the PROMESA act really pertaining to all the territories. These are laws that unquestionably are passed under Congress's Territorial Clause power.

Similarly, the law that Your Honor mentioned with respect to prohibiting cockfighting applicable to the territories, again, this is law -- laws passed by Congress in its capacity as the local legislature for the territories.

Now --

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THE COURT: And when you say "local legislature," it's like when the states were still territories. For example, there's cases cited in the briefs. For example, Congress could pass a federal law but had local implications because -- for example, in Utah, because it was acting as -- because there's no state Constitution, it's still not a state, it's acting as the local legislature. Am I correct?

MR. FERRÉ: Yes, yes, Your Honor, precisely.

I think that -- and this goes back as well to Your Honor's question with respect to the treatment, how Congress might treat the territory versus a law that specifically addresses individuals. Mr. Vaello-Madero's position is that the analysis should be first an analysis of whether -- under what power is Congress acting. Is it acting under its general welfare clause power of the taxing and spending clause or under the Territorial Clause power?

Mr. Vaello-Madero's position is that once you engage in that analysis and determine that Congress is acting pursuant to a broader power, then all of the constitutional limitations would apply.

THE COURT: Let me ask one question because

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you mentioned the spending clause and the tax clause.
I assume when you say tax clause it's the Uniformity
Clause, correct?

MR. FERRÉ: Yes. But in addition, aside from the fact of a requirement for uniformity of certain tax laws, there's a power for Congress to enact legislation with respect to the general welfare, and our position is that the SSI program is in fact a program that was enacted pursuant to that power.

THE COURT: Okay, and let me ask this question because back to 1901 when Downes versus Bidwell was decided that dealt with the Uniformity Clause. The spending clause is in that same constitutional provision, they are together. And basically if we read strictly Downes, these clauses would not apply to Puerto Rico. But what has happened over the year is, for example, the spending clause has been used in Puerto Rico for multiple instances. Even the First Circuit, without going into Downes versus Bidwell has basically inferred that the spending clause applies to Puerto Rico, and in many cases it's been the source of the decision. I don't have the citations here.

But my question would be, is it Mr. Vaello's

U.S. v. Vaello-Madero - Civil Hearing position that the Uniformity Clause and spending clauses, based on the constitutional evolution of Puerto Rico throughout the years and the way it's treated by Congress, should apply to Puerto Rico?

MR. FERRÉ: Yes, it definitely is our position that it should apply to Puerto Rico, uniformity.

THE COURT: What does -- Mr. Riess, what do you have to say about those clauses applying to Puerto Rico or not, if you're in a position to answer?

MR. RIESS: Thank you, Your Honor. I guess first we would respectfully disagree that there is an analysis as to which power that the Congress was working under. So, for example, in the recent ObamaCare case, NFIB v. Sebelius, the Court rejected the commerce power but upheld under the taxing power. When the Court looks at legislation, it doesn't look to whether Congress acted under one power or another if there's a power under which the legislation is currently --

THE COURT: So Congress doesn't have to say,

Today I'm acting pursuant to the Commerce Clause or

I'm acting pursuant to X power. As long as the

Constitution allows it Congress can do it and then

U.S. v. Vaello-Madero - Civil Hearing can justify, We could do it under this power or under all these powers but not under this one, correct?

MR. RIESS: That's correct, Your Honor. And so here where Harris Made clear that social and economic welfare benefits legislation that applies to Puerto Rico is justifiable under the Territory Clause power, that dictates it here, as I said, together with Califano's statement of how when Congress makes line drawing decisions about such welfare benefits legislation, it gets a strong presumption of constitutionality. So that would be our response.

THE COURT: Let me then -- and this is another argument that's been discussed in the briefs by Mr. Vaello. The situation with the U.S. residents in Puerto Rico, and the word was mentioned already here -- disenfranchised. The issue that -- and, again, I think everybody's in agreement that because Puerto Rico is not a state and Congress has not legislated in any manner that would allow a quasi-enfranchisement, let's put it that way, the problem is these federal statutes if they're capped or there's reductions or whatever changes are made, there's no direct participation of two senators, five congressmen who can participate in that process.

All we do have or, the Commonwealth has, is

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a congresswoman right now who has a voice but no
vote. She can present bills, but she has no equal
power to other Congress people. And when it comes to
Congress obviously, you know, you're a Congress
person or a senator from a state you can get allies
in other jurisdiction by saying, Well, I have this
voting power and I can help you but you need to help
me. But in the case of Puerto Rico we, when I say
"we" I mean the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, doesn't
have that voting power. It has one congressperson
who does the work of five Congress people and two
senators and the problem is that unless Puerto
Rico -- this is where I'm going to ask you if you
agree, and I think you mentioned it.

If Puerto Rico were to become a state this would not be an issue. The problem is until and if it were to become a state this is going to be like a never-ending loop. And it's a vicious circle because there's no end. There's no enfranchisement, no representation, and the U.S. citizens who are here are politically powerless to change this process unless at some point they decide let's become a state, and then it's up to Congress to admit Puerto Rico.

But my question specifically is the fact

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that there's disenfranchisement, would that in any
way affect the analysis you have mentioned or that is
something that should not be taken into consideration
when doing the equal protection analysis or
challenging the legislation?

MR. RIESS: Respectfully, Your Honor, so the difficulty with that position, and I believe Counsel refers to it as a discreet and insular minority, the difficulty here is that there are two circuit courts that have rejected that argument, and they are from different circuits, but the First Circuit relies on the same sort of arguments here. We don't know any case law adverse to --

THE COURT: I think one of the cases that you mention is the opinion of then Circuit Judge Ginsburg and the *Quiban* case, correct?

MR. RIESS: Correct, Your Honor.

THE COURT: And, again, that is not binding on the First Circuit but you would submit that that is the correct rule of law, correct?

MR. RIESS: Correct. We don't know of anything adverse to it and, as I said, their holdings are based on Congress's broad authority when it legislates under the Territory Clause. And I can -- let's see, that's what the *Quiban* case said at 928

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F.2d at 1160 to 61, so there it was Filipino World

War II veterans.

THE COURT: If I'm not mistaken, they were not U.S. citizens, they were World War -- when the Philippines became -- before the Philippines in '46 becomes independent, throughout World War II -- and when you go to D.C. you see the World War II memorial, there's a whole wall of Filipinos who participated in the war. And they were veterans, they were asking for benefits, they as a group get discriminated but obviously -- they say, Obviously we're politically powerless.

But isn't there a distinction between non

U.S. citizens World War II veterans who are

Filipinos, not U.S. citizens versus U.S. citizens who are disenfranchised and will, unless Puerto Rico becomes a state, be disenfranchised per saecula saeculorum? Wouldn't that be a difference between the Quiban case?

MR. RIESS: Two points on that, but the first, respectfully, no because the difficulty there is that what the D.C. circuit says is that you can't at the same time say that Congress has these broad powers to legislate with respect to U.S. territories, regardless of whether it is citizens or noncitizens,

U.S. v. Vaello-Madero - Civil Hearing and then also say that heightened scrutiny applies whenever that legislation has a disparate effect on residents of a territory.

THE COURT: And the reason it was considered a territory was because all these Filipino citizens were residents of once at a time U.S. territory, correct?

MR. RIESS: That's my understanding, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Let me hear regarding disenfranchisement and then since the *Quiban* case was raised, Mr. Ferré.

MR. FERRÉ: Your Honor, the *Quiban* case relies on *Califano* and *Harris* versus Rosario and to the extent that it does we think it reaches the wrong conclusion. If as we see in other cases dealing with different treatment of aliens from national programs the *Hampton* and the *Graham* cases basically would hold that strict scrutiny should apply when an exclusion is specifically targeted at a politically powerless group. And --

THE COURT: And I think you would add politically powerless group of U.S. citizens, am I correct?

MR. FERRÉ: Correct, making it even more

U.S. v. Vaello-Madero - Civil Hearing egregious that we're dealing here with U.S. citizens that are politically powerless. And, again, what we have specifically in this case is the SSI program which expressly excludes residents of Puerto Rico.

THE COURT: Let me further along these same lines when I talk to disenfranchisement -- and I raise this because this has been raised in a death penalty certified case that U.S. DOJ recently certified, but one of the arguments that's being brought is all these federal laws apply to the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico without the consent of the government.

And obviously a death penalty case has consequences that \$30,000 in no way could compare to a possible death penalty, but the issue is isn't the doctrine of consent of the government something that the Court could look, along with disenfranchisement, and, if that is the case, issue some sort of remedy, or would the government's position be that that is a doctrine, it's more a historical doctrine, it's not part of any amendment or constitutional provisions therefore even though this may be a grave injustice or even though it may smell that it's antidemocratic but it is still good law under U.S. constitutional law? What would be the government's position?

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MR. RIESS: I guess two, Your Honor, that I think we can't reconcile Defendant's argument with the Quiban and the Besinga cases, that's number one. And I think number two is the, fundamental point is, that the argument is respectfully not an argument for declaring a federal statute unconstitutional. believe that the First Circuit in Igartúa said several times that the problem -- the solution to the problems of the limited representation lies in the political process and it wasn't a constitutional violation there. Perhaps it could be a policy argument for statehood and perhaps it could be a policy argument for amending the U.S. Constitution, but respectfully it is not a reason to declare a federal benefit statute unconstitutional.

THE COURT: Thank you. Let me move on then to another point. Obviously we have Califano, which is a precedent whether anybody likes it or not, but the question is can a federal court, either district or appellate -- obviously the Supreme Court you don't have to ask that question, they can -- as happened in the recent Trump case -- basically the holding in Korematsu was basically the legal landscape had changed and the Supreme Court basically said that was simply wrong. But can a U.S. District Court or

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perhaps a circuit court find that the Social Security

denial of benefits is unconstitutional on arguments

that are different or additional or were never

presented in, let's say for example, Califano? So

let me hear from Mr. Ferré first.

MR. FERRÉ: Our position is yes, Your Honor, that the circumstances are different and in fact the Califano decision was not based -- the ruling was based on a right-to-travel claim and no equal protection issue was actually before the Court.

The other consideration is that the Court can take note, and in fact this Court has taken note in the Consejo v. Rullán case that Boumediene puts in doubt whether in fact the entire framework that has been set up by the Insular Cases and on which Califano and Harris versus Rosario is based -- is still good law. And I think it's worth noting the specific passage of Boumediene that puts in doubt the validity of all these Insular Cases including Califano and Harris versus Rosario.

THE COURT: At least Boumediene upholds the doctrine of the Insular Cases, but you would refer to the language that says that with the passage of time the ties between the territory and the mainland can rise to the level of having constitutional

U.S. v. Vaello-Madero - Civil Hearing significance, that's what you're mentioning. That would be a new judicial or Supreme Court jurisprudential event that the Court can take into consideration which did not exist at the time of Califano, correct?

MR. FERRÉ: Yes, Your Honor. In addition, I think that Your Honor noted, most importantly, about the Boumediene case, and I'll quote from the case. It says, "Our basic charter cannot be contracted away like this. The Constitution grants the Congress and the President the power to acquire, dispose of, and govern a territory, not the power to decide when and where its terms apply."

Even when the United States acts outside its borders, its powers are not absolute and unlimited but are subject to such restrictions as are expressed in the Constitution. So if that's outside of its borders certainly within its borders as well with respect to the territories -- and then I'll continue in the quote from the Boumediene case. "Abstaining from questions involving formal sovereignty and territorial governance is one thing. To hold the political branches have the power to switch the Constitution on and off at will is quite another."

We think that quote in Boumediene really

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does put in doubt the -- to the extent that the

Insular Cases would restrict certain provisions of
the Constitution when dealing with the territories.

We think that that --

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THE COURT: So Califano would -- at least
I'm sticking to the Califano case, which deals with
SSI and right to travel, it should be reexamined in
new light; and Boumediene I guess you posit that it
would basically -- it's inconsistent with Califano,
am I correct?

MR. FERRÉ: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Before I hear from the government, Mr. Riess, let me also note that in Califano that was an SSI case. It was -- and it's like the typical Social Security case, benefits are There's an appeal, direct appeal to the U.S. District Court, and it followed its way and it went to the Supreme Court because it was a private case, for example, the Social Security review. And, again, district courts act in appellate review. Obviously the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico is not the party, nobody had any idea probably that that case was It goes to the Supreme Court, probably a there. Social Security attorney who brings that issue and is asking for SSI to be allowed in an analogous

U.S. v. Vaello-Madero - Civil Hearing situation to Mr. Vaello, but the Supreme Court there issues its ruling and obviously it affects every individual in Puerto Rico who would otherwise qualify for SSI.

So, let me ask Mr. Riess, can you distinguish or do you understand that again *Califano* is good law, that there are -- again, it involved the right to travel but do you think just because the way it was presented it is still dispositive? And what's your position regarding *Boumediene* and *Califano*; are they consistent with each other or should this Court begin to re-examine this new doctrine laid by *Boumediene*?

MR. RIESS: Thank you, Your Honor. I guess first the Supreme Court and the First Circuit both made clear even if it looks like later case law might undermine a prior precedent, it's up to the Supreme Court to decide whether to overturn a decision.

That's the Supreme Court in the Agostini case, the State Oil case in our briefs, and the First Circuit in the Figueroa --

THE COURT: But doesn't there -- again, every challenge must begin -- again, if Mr. Ferré were to bring this case all the way to the Supreme Court and he raises this for the first time, the

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Supreme Court is going to say, or at least the

Circuit, You did not raise it below. So it has to be raised at the district level.

Now, let me make an analogy, and sorry to interrupt. But in the same-sex marriage case the Supreme Court precedence was Baker. That's one of these cases that -- again, I don't think this happens in the Supreme Court, but it was summarily denied but it was still good law, Baker.

Now, the district courts, I believe in California or Utah, analyzed the whole situation, and based on other Supreme Court, other precedents, decided contrary to Baker. These cases went on appeal. At some point we probably had 50 to 100 between Circuit and district court rulings mostly finding that same-sex marriage precluding that violated the Constitution, but obviously it was the Baker ruling. And eventually the Supreme Court said we overrule Baker, I just want to make it very clear. But these cases begin from the bottom up, you just don't litigate the other way around.

So isn't at least Counsel entitled to present these arguments? And if this Court -- for example, let's assume I were to agree with the plaintiffs, my ruling is not a final ruling, it's

U.S. v. Vaello-Madero - Civil Hearing subject to appeal and subject to review. Wouldn't Counsel be able to make these arguments based on Boumediene, equal protection rather than right to travel? Wouldn't he be allowed similarly to -- if that was not the case, Baker, you know, would still be the law of the land if we go further back. And if we go further back, Plessy versus Ferguson would probably still be the law of the land. And there's been many other examples where cases begin to be litigated all the way from, you know, the bottom all the way up. Let me hear from Mr. Riess.

MR. RIESS: Yes, Your Honor. Counsel certainly has the right to present his arguments. The question just is whether or not the circuit courts and the district courts can contradict clear Supreme Court precedent. And respectfully both the Supreme Court and First Circuit have made clear that the answer to that is no.

The difficulty with the --

THE COURT: Isn't Baker an example where the district courts did and basically said that precedent is no longer good law and the legal landscape has changed?

MR. RIESS: Respectfully, no, Your Honor, and here's the difference. There in Baker what you

U.S. v. Vaello-Madero - Civil Hearing had was a dismissal for want of a substantial federal question without an opinion. There was no opinion there. And so in the -- what the First Circuit said in Massachusetts, 682 F.3d 8, "A Supreme Court summary dismissal prevents lower courts from coming to opposite conclusions on the precise issues that are presented and necessarily decided by those courts." So where there's no opinion there can't be a precise issue that's presented and necessarily That was the case in Baker. That's not the decided. case here. We have Califano. And we don't address whether or not there's later involvement that's undermined Califano or Harris because there is an opinion on that.

And what those cases come down to is that residents of Puerto Rico generally don't pay income tax, federal income tax, and that Congress has broad line drawing power when it sets eligibility requirements for social and economic benefits.

That's Califano. And that it also, Congress, has broad sweeping Territorial Clause power. That's Harris. Respectfully, that hasn't changed since those cases and, therefore, there isn't a basis to distinguish them.

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THE COURT: What about when I mentioned

Califano was an SSI appeal, that's a per curiam

opinion, and that's a review of an administrative

decision. This, contrary to a review of

administrative decision, which obviously had at the

time and has continued to have broader implications,

but this is being raised not as a review of

administrative decision of denial of SSI benefits.

It's raised as a defense to a collection of moneys

filed by the United States. Wouldn't that allow

Mr. Vaello to raise it as a defense?

Because, again, this is right now it's a defense. This is not a claim that he's making, I'm entitled to prospective SSI. Or he's not arguing I want a declaratory judgment that every U.S. citizen in Puerto Rico, including Mr. Igartúa who is here is entitled to SSI. Wouldn't that be a distinction in the way that the Court can handle this as a defense versus a declaratory judgment that perhaps would run contrary to Califano? And I'll hear from Mr. Ferré in that respect later.

MR. RIESS: Respectfully, Your Honor, two points on that. Number one, we had earlier presented arguments as to whether or not the Court has jurisdiction to entertain the case as an affirmative

U.S. v. Vaello-Madero - Civil Hearing defense, but setting that aside --

THE COURT: That's been ruled and it's preserved for the record, so if the case goes on appeal, that's another argument you will have in due course.

MR. RIESS: Understood, Your Honor, so I'll move to my second point.

So I don't think the procedural stance distinguishes Califano because so there, like here, what you had were recipients of SSI benefits and those benefits were discontinued when the recipients moved to Puerto Rico. The facts are on all fours with the circumstances here. And there was an equal protection challenge that was raised in that case respectfully. But the source that there wasn't was a single justice dissenting opinion, that was not joined by any others.

And respectfully in a footnote the *Califano* court noted, in addition to the right to travel, the complaint also relied on the equal protection clause of the due -- equal protections of the Due Process Clause. Now, set that aside, regardless of that, *Harris*, which came two years later, addressed an equal protection challenge and it said that it was a "similar statutory classification as that in

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Califano," which is the SSI and rational basis

applied to that. So we don't think that that is a

basis for distinguishing it.

because Harris dealt with a different statute. That was the assistance to mothers with dependent children. And, again, there is the expression that it's the similar sort of statute, but Harris does not deal with SSI. So what you're saying is that Harris should be still considered for SSI purposes rather than just merely Califano. And, again, the rulings are almost exactly the same as to different statutes. But what you're saying is that Harris makes it broader and basically says equal protection should also apply to Califano, that's what you're saying, correct?

MR. RIESS: Yes, Your Honor, you can't get by it because it specifically says that SSI was "a similar statutory classification." That's what Harris said about the statutory scheme in Califano, SSI, that it was similar, so I don't think that Harris can be distinguished on that grounds.

THE COURT: Okay, let me hear from Mr. Ferré in regards to this argument that this is being raised as a defense rather than a declaratory judgment or a

U.S. v. Vaello-Madero - Civil Hearing much broader ruling. Would that allow the Court to go into this, again, just for purposes of raising it as a defense rather than like an affirmative action?

MR. FERRÉ: I'm not sure that it does make a difference in that respect, but I would like to note for the record as well that while my colleague has pointed out that one justice noted that no equal protection issue was before the Court in Califano, I think that if one justice noted that that issue was not actually before the Court it's because in fact that issue was not before the Court. So we can be assured that in Califano the equal protection argument just was not raised, certainly was not briefed, and it was not argued.

So we don't have a -- the *Califano* ruling was decided on a completely different basis, and that is the right to travel claim. And *Harris versus*\*Rosario simply just relies and makes an assumption by relying on \*Califano\* without really doing the analysis as to what the proper standard of review would be.

THE COURT: Okay, thank you. Let me move on to another area and I'm going to read a quote or some quotes from *U.S. versus Windsor*, 2013, and that is the case, just for the record, in which the Supreme Court found that the federal statute known as the

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Defense of Marriage Act was unconstitutional. So,

I'm going to read three separate quotes and then I'm

going to ask for reaction of the parties should this

analysis apply to this particular case.

The first one is," The power the

Constitution grants, it also retains. And though

Congress has great authority" -- which we've been

discussing here, and for purposes of territory it has

probably greater authority -- "to design laws to fit

its own conception of sound national policy, it

cannot deny the liberty protected by the Due Process

Clause of the Fifth Amendment."

Second quote. "What has been explained to this point should more than suffice to establish that the principle purpose and the necessary effect of DOMA are to demean" -- and I repeat demean -- "those persons who are in lawful same-sex marriage. This requires the Court to hold, as it does now, that DOMA is unconstitutional as a deprivation of the liberty of the person protected by the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution."

And the final citation. The liberty protected by the Fifth Amendment's due process clause contains within it the prohibition against denying to any person the equal protection of the laws. While

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the Fifth Amendment itself would draw from government
the power to degrade or demean in the way this law
does, the equal protection guarantee of the
Fourteenth Amendment makes the Fifth Amendment right
all the more specific and all the better understood."

So let me begin by asking Counsel Ferré, can you analogize the situation with the U.S. citizens residing in the territories where there's a statute that is treating them distinctly from their brethren in the U.S. mainland, and under the Windsor analysis would that constitute unconstitutional demeaning which would violate the protections of the Due Process Clause and the equal protection component? Is there an analogy that could be made and/or is Windsor applicable, or a new along -- you mentioned Boumediene, but would Windsor give your client a stronger argument?

And, again, I'm talking not about just generally saying Puerto Ricans and ethnic origins, I'm talking about U.S. citizens residing in territories that are, as you all mention in the briefs, you know, 95 percent of the population is of Hispanic ethic origin, would Windsor apply?

MR. FERRÉ: Yes, Your Honor. And I think that, as mentioned in the Windsor case, the power

U.S. v. Vaello-Madero - Civil Hearing granted to Congress of course is a restrained power. The question here is whether in excluding U.S. residents in Puerto Rico there's a continuation of U.S. citizens residing in Puerto Rico continuing to feel like second-class citizens. And we know that this is much discussed in the press and it is much felt certainly in the territory of Puerto Rico.

I think that the fact that Congress can continue to treat Puerto Rico at will to exclude Puerto Rico entirely at its discretion without otherwise considering its needs we think is demeaning and in fact falls within the framework of Windsor and would show then that there's an improper basis or purpose in excluding U.S. citizens of Puerto Rico.

THE COURT: Let me say when you say U.S. citizens of Puerto Rico, let me go to the purpose of the SSI statute; that is to, make payments to the poor, sick, needy. So wouldn't -- would you agree that more than normal healthy everyday, run-of-the-mill U.S. citizens in the territory, we're talking about a smaller subgroup that is even further discriminated because they are needier, they don't perhaps have federal assistance, and again they are U.S. citizens who are deprived of that. Wouldn't that again fall squarely within Windsor? Would that

U.S. v. Vaello-Madero - Civil Hearing be your position? 1 2 MR. FERRÉ: Yes. In fact, what this 3 exclusion does is fall most heavily on the poor, the 4 sick, and the needy in Puerto Rico and, again, 5 continues this pattern of treating Puerto Rico differently. And there's a long history of that. 6 7 THE COURT: And based on Windsor you would 8 of course, based on your brief, request on behalf of 9 your client a strict scrutiny analysis, correct? 10 MR. FERRÉ: Yes, Your Honor. THE COURT: But let's say even if it were a 11 12 rational basis analysis there's some circuit case law 13 which you cite -- I don't have the exact case. MR. FERRÉ: It's a more exacting 14 15 examination. 16 THE COURT: It's a little higher standard 17 than rational basis. MR. FERRÉ: Yes. 18 19 THE COURT: You would say that's still not 20 helping the U.S. citizens who are poor, sick, and 21 needy that would also not satisfy that First Circuit 22 standard, correct? 23 MR. FERRÉ: Yes, Your Honor. 24 THE COURT: Let me then hear from Mr. Riess 25 regarding the Windsor ruling. What's the

U.S. v. Vaello-Madero - Civil Hearing government's position? Wouldn't this be applicable to the situation? And, again, Windsor was a 2013-case, it's five years old. That's after 1978, after Califano was decided and many years after also the SSI enactment. What would be the government's position as to Windsor?

MR. RIESS: Thank you, Your Honor. Windsor,
I believe, was a challenge to DOMA, the Defense of
Marriage Act.

THE COURT: Also a federal statute just like the SSI.

MR. RIESS: Correct. But I guess the difference there is that this is a residency classification. This is not a limitation as to an arbitrary group, there, for example, gays and lesbians. Here it is a classification based on residency because if Puerto Rico residents who are otherwise eligible for SSI benefits move to the 50 states or district Of Columbia, they are eligible; that could not be said for the participants in Windsor who were denied the benefit in question regardless of where they lived. So I think that would be a basis for distinguishing there.

And respectfully the Supreme Court in the Califano and Harris cases did say that it was

U.S. v. Vaello-Madero - Civil Hearing rational basis and they did understand that the supplemental security and low-income program was aimed at low-income individuals. I don't think that there are any changed circumstances from then that would justify a different result.

THE COURT: So your position would be -- and obviously we can't speak for the Supreme Court, but your educated legal analysis would be that had this situation instead of DOMA been the statute, the result would have been different to DOMA, correct, in the Supreme Court?

MR. RIESS: I believe that is correct, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay, let me then go to the 2015 decision also with same-sex marriage because this is -- I'm using this as an analogy because it is a sudden change in the law.

And, again, it's contrary to Brown versus

Board of Education where Plessy was the law for

decades and it took years of litigation. This is

something that within a shorter span the Supreme

Court resolved. But I'm going to read another quote

from Obergefell versus Hodges. Then I'll ask

Mr. Ferre and Mr. Riess to react to it.

"The dynamic of our constitutional system is

U.S. v. Vaello-Madero - Civil Hearing that individuals need not to await legislative action before asserting a fundamental right. The nation's courts are open to injured individuals who come to them to vindicate their own direct, personal stake in our basic charter. An individual can invoke a right to constitutional protection when he or she is harmed even if the broader public disagrees and even if the legislature refuses to act.

"The idea of the Constitution was to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of authorities and officials, and establish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts. This is why fundamental rights may not be submitted to a vote, depend on the outcome of no elections. Leaving the current state of affairs in place would maintain and promote instability and uncertainty. The disruption caused could is significant and ever-growing. We ask for equal dignity in the eyes of the law; the Constitution grants us that right."

Now, Obergefell deals with not the DOMA, but the situation was that at the time probably like three-quarters of the states recognized same-sex marriage, the other quarter did not.

Territorial-wise I believe one or two territories

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did; Puerto Rico was an example that didn't. And

what the Supreme Court does is -- and, again,

obviously that's the case applying the DOMA, the

Windsor rational to the states, but it talks about

certain principles that when legislature or Congress

has not acted -- and, again, we're not here to say

Congress has been wise or not, but what if there is a

prolonged period where Congress has not taken any

action?

And, again, there has to be a fundamental right, there has to be equal protection or some other constitutional provision. But Obergefell also talks about disruption and instability and uncertainty; wouldn't there be an uncertainty and instability of a constitutional nature? Because, for example,

Mr. Vaello of course as a U.S. citizens has a right to move to Puerto Rico, has a right -- he could have moved to the Mariana Islands. He moved here, he's got an alien wife and, you know, he moved here for his particular reasons. But the problem is that depending on where he moves and he goes to a territory, that constitutional right is -- well, his equal protection rights are affected.

And this is similar in a sense -- or the question is, is this similar to when, for example, a

U.S. v. Vaello-Madero - Civil Hearing same-sex couple would move let's say from Virginia where perhaps it was legal -- I don't know if that's correct as to Virginia at the time. But that couple happened to be on vacation let's say in Kentucky that didn't recognize it, and then one of the spouses suffers a heart attack and the other spouse has to make a decision as to a transplant or, you know, disconnect the person, and because that state doesn't recognize same-sex marriage.

Again, I think Obergefell stands for the greater proposition that equal protection, all these constitutional principles should be uniform throughout the nation. Because what we get is, you go one place, you go another -- and, again, in this case it applies to territories. You leave the mainland and you go to U.S. soil but as a citizen your rights vary and you can move to another territory where they can increase or decrease and that is the situation I think denounced Obergefell.

me ask Mr. Ferré, what would be your position regarding the SSI statute? Is this precedent helpful, applicable to your client; and is it an intervening or a change of legal landscape which would allow the Court to revisit the SSI argument in

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a constitutional context?

MR. FERRÉ: Thank you, Your Honor. We believe that the Obergefell case allows this Court to take note of additional developments that have taken place. Considering the constitutional landscape which would otherwise under Califano permit Congress to exclude residents of Puerto Rico, we think that the holding in Obergefell would allow the Court to take note of developments that would put in question the framework under which Califano was decided. So, yes, we do think it's helpful.

THE COURT: Let me hear from Mr. Riess.

MR. RIESS: Thank you, Your Honor. Three points on that. First, because *Obergefell* was not in our briefs I'm not certain of this, but I believe that the standard in that was intermediate scrutiny which would be a basis --

THE COURT: It would be higher than rational basis.

MR. RIESS: Correct.

THE COURT: And let me say this because it was not in your brief and because I have raised it because it's the sequel to Windsor, if you need to file a short five-, seven-page brief, feel free to do so. If you could do so perhaps by the 31st or by the

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30th. And I'll also allow of course Mr. Ferré on

behalf of his client if he wants to file a very short

supplemental brief, you have that simultaneous. Now

the 31st is a Monday so actually I think federal

court here closes, the chief judge authorized that,

it's only half a day of work anyway. So it's a court

holiday. So let's say by the 3rd -- let's say by the

4th of January so that way you can enjoy your

holidays, I know I brought you down here.

So I would ask the parties -- and, again, anything else that comes up in this argument that I ask should require a little further briefing let's set that deadline of January 4th so that way you have some additional time. So let me hear from you. And, again, if there's something you're not sure of feel free not to respond right now and feel free to put it in the brief.

MR. RIESS: Thank you, Your Honor. I just wanted to hedge there, I didn't want to make an incorrect statement to you.

The second and third points are, number two, as the Supreme Court in the Agostini and the State

Oil Co. and the First Circuit in the Figueroa and

Igartúa cases made clear, it is up to the Supreme

Court to decide whether to overturn a decision even

U.S. v. Vaello-Madero - Civil Hearing if it does look like later case law might undermine it. So we would respectfully disagree that -- it is the prerogative of the Supreme Court to make that decision.

And I guess, third, the difference here is that the line drawing in social benefits legislation, which I believe would distinguish this from Obergefell where we weren't talking about economic and social benefits legislation, it means that simply because Congress extends a benefit to residents of one territory that doesn't mean it's constitutionally required to extend the benefits to residents of all territories. As we noted in our brief, federal law is long distinguished between and among territories in many ways. And so we believe that that would be an additional basis for distinguishing Obergefell here.

THE COURT: Let me also point out -- and, again, this is something that you may not have the answer now and that could also come in the supplemental brief. One of the things that was interesting in Obergefell was that when -- or actually in the Windsor case specifically, the DOMA was a federal statute and the U.S. Department of Justice, the solicitor general, the task that he or

U.S. v. Vaello-Madero - Civil Hearing she has is to defend federal law.

In Windsor the solicitor general of the United States, and I guess this came from the executive, the decision was made that the law would not be defended. And obviously one thing led to the unconstitutionality. But that is an example where the United States realized that it had to be the Supreme Court to make the ruling. It could have been Congress that could have legislated and passed or, you know, repealed the DOMA.

But that's an example where the executive branch sees that a particular discrete -- and, again, because the same-sex marriage, gay, lesbian community is also within the United States. It's not necessarily a majority, it's a subgroup of individuals that was being discriminated. And in that sense the executive -- and, again, in the past the Supreme Court in Brown, for example, took the prerogative. Different branches have taken action during the '60s, and Civil Rights Act, but in Windsor it was the executive that took that affirmative step of not defending the law.

Wouldn't -- and, again, in this particular case obviously the executive is supporting a law which obviously there's no question that if there is

U.S. v. Vaello-Madero - Civil Hearing discrimination. Is there any difference between supporting or arguing to uphold the law that discriminates, again, this pertains to the benefits of U.S. citizens, insofar as, particularly the poor and needy, I'm specifically talking about SSI, the versus a law that discriminated against a group of individuals who were not necessarily needy but obviously had some -- what ultimately the Supreme Court held were constitutional violations? Would there be a distinction against that? And I don't know if there's an answer to that question. Let me hear from Mr. Riess first.

MR. RIESS: I think there is a distinction there, Your Honor. And I think it goes back again to the broad discretion that Congress has when it's providing for governmental payments of money benefits.

THE COURT: Or the executive as well, correct.

MR. RIESS: Correct, Your Honor. It gets to set line drawing as to those and that gets a strong presumption of constitutionality. I just note that in the Ninth Circuit in the Besinga case on the basis of the Territory Clause power. It's inconsistent there it was talking about heightened judicial

U.S. v. Vaello-Madero - Civil Hearing scrutiny, but similar here, a contrary rule that is applying heightened scrutiny would subject virtually every failure by Congress to extend federal benefits to U.S. territories to the charge that the decision was based on impermissible considerations of race or national origin. So that's inconsistent with the broad discretion under the Territory Clause that has been repeatedly reiterated by the First Circuit and the Supreme Court so I think that would be an additional basis for distinguishing Obergefell and Windsor.

THE COURT: One last question I'll first hear from you and then I'll have Mr. Ferré respond.

Let's assume that the Court agrees with you that a rational basis security will be applied under equal protection. When the needy and the poor specifically are not provided the same treatment because they are in a territory, doesn't that violate that rational basis standard; or you would agree that that's an economic reason and because it's made in economic terms that's the end of the analysis and it's up to the wisdom of Congress to -- it's a battle for another day and another time but that should not be fought in the court, that would be your position?

It would, Your Honor, I think

MR. RIESS:

U.S. v. Vaello-Madero - Civil Hearing for the basis that the Supreme Court specifically said in the *Califano* decision, that it was rational. And it was certainly aware at that point that the Supplemental Security Income program was aimed and targeted at low-income individuals. And so that was a question that was necessarily decided by it at that time. And since that situation has not changed, that requires the same result from the Court here. We don't relitigated the basis when the Supreme Court has determined its rational basis in these basis are rational.

THE COURT: Okay, thank you.

Last question, the same question to

Mr. Ferré. What is Mr. Vaello's position, for

example, comparing Windsor where the solicitor

general of the United States decided not to defend

that federal law versus a law here that has

discriminatory effect regardless of whatever scrutiny

but the U.S. government is defending that position?

MR. FERRÉ: Well, I think the Court can take note in instances in which the executive branch does not feel compelled or feels -- or has a tendency to enforce or defend a law that it deems to be unconstitutional. We see here that the government has taken a different stance, the executive branch

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has taken a different stance and in fact is defending
on the law as it is. Certainly that is something
that the Court can take note of, but I don't think it
changes the analysis of whether an individual right
has been affected. And as we've indicated, we think
that there are doctrinal changes, there are
circumstances that have also changed that the Court
can certainly consider in engaging its analysis of
the case before it.

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We also wanted to highlight that, you know, while it may be true that a specific pronouncement of the Supreme Court might be necessary to make absolutely clear that a precedent has been overruled, the Court noted in overruling in the Trump v. Hawaii case, the Court noted in overruling Korematsu that that precedent was gravely wrong the day it was decided and has been overruled in the court of history. To the extent that the issues here in this case impinge on the Insular Cases and its progeny, including Califano and Harris versus Rosario, we think the same thing applies. We think that there's certainly sufficient doctrinal and factual circumstances that should give the Court reason to question the validity of the Insular Cases.

THE COURT: Okay, thank you.

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One last question based on this argument that Mr. Ferré just mentioned, and I just want to make it clear. The position of the United States is that the Insular Cases, unless the Supreme Court were to overrule them, are still the law of the land. And during the Bush administration the U.S. DOJ argued regarding the Insular Cases in Boumediene, during the Obama administration Fia Fia Tuaua case from American Samoa, so the I understand the U.S. DOJ's position is that these cases remain the law of the land until either the Constitution is amended or the Supreme Court says they're no longer good law. Am I correct?

MR. RIESS: Three points on that, Your Honor. Number one, you are correct that as a general matter the Supreme Court cases remain in effect until they are expressly overruled by the Supreme Court. Number two, I want to make clear that we respectfully disagree that the Insular Cases were either the basis or the foundation for *Califano* and *Harris*.

Number one, these are cases that are decades later, they're in 1978 and 1980 they're not turn-of-the-century decisions. *Califano* said it once in a Footnote 3 of the Insular Cases, to be clear, it was not to support the proposition that Puerto Rico was incorporated or unincorporated. It was not to

U.S. v. Vaello-Madero - Civil Hearing say that because, for example, Puerto Rico has different customs and traditions they were entitled to less benefits. It was in a footnote to support the proposition that Puerto Rico has a special relationship with the United States. Instead of the Insular Cases, what these two cases were founded on were two premises that remain true today.

The text of *Califano*, this is 435 U.S. 5, not a footnote, explain why rational basis applied, and I quote, "We deal here with a constitutional attack upon a law providing for governmental payments and monetary payments benefits that's 'entitled to a strong presumption of constitutionality'." And then in a later footnote, Footnote 7 at the end, the Court explained the factors why it satisfied rational basis. *Harris*, the later case, didn't mention the Insular Cases at all. So we respectfully disagree that those were the basis here.

And I also want to make perfectly clear, we are not here to defend any of the rhetoric of some of the passages of the Insular Cases. That is not the position of the United States or of the Department of Justice or of the Social Security Administration.

THE COURT: And I think that's important that it be made clear. The proposition is that the

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Insular Cases there's different types of territories,

territories become states or non-states.

mentioned that, let's assume the fact -- let's assume Congress has taken after the Sánchez-Valle position that Puerto Rico is not incorporated, there's some circuit case law to that extent. But my question is, whether Puerto Rico were to be incorporated or whether it's not incorporated, and I believe you explained this in your brief, it doesn't make a difference to the equal protection analysis if it's made on the basis of an economic benefit to a territory that has not become a state -- and that would be a equal protection analysis -- and your result would be exactly the same, correct?

MR. RIESS: That's correct, Your Honor. And two points on that. Boumediene talked about unincorporated and incorporated. It would only be a question if there were an open question as to whether equal protection principles apply to Puerto Rico and they do. That's the Torres case we cited in our brief. So regardless of whether Puerto Rico is an incorporated territory, the defendant here is still challenging a classification that is based on residency. It's one that is made under Congress's

U.S. v. Vaello-Madero - Civil Hearing broad Territory Clause power, and it is one that involves social benefits legislation. And so under equal protection such a classification is subject to rational basis.

And just number two very quickly. As we pointed out in our brief, if the Insular Cases were overturned tomorrow, that would not affect the decision in this case because all of those factors that I mentioned would still be the case.

THE COURT: Okay, and taking Boumediene in the light most favorable to Mr. Vaello, and let's assume under Boumediene because of constitutional or legislative developments in Puerto Rico, the creation of a commonwealth, Puerto Rico has -- you, know, Puerto Rico is not a state, so that's clear. But let's assume that from an unorganized, unincorporated territory is incorporated of whatever gradations, let's assume under Boumediene Puerto Rico has constitutionally evolved in ways that have constitutional significance, and let's say it's a pseudo sort of -- whether incorporated or non-incorporated, it's basically Puerto Rico.

And citing Justice O'Connor from her

Circuit -- I forget the name of the case. And she's

citing the Supreme Court case and it said, Puerto

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Rico is like a state. And Justice O'Connor said,

It's not a state of the union, but it is a state. So

Puerto Rico has -- still the analysis as long as it's

not a state, the analysis, no matter if it's from an

unincorporated, the most basic type of unincorporated

territory all the way to 99.9 percent, but it's still

not a state, it hasn't crossed that finish line, the

analysis of the United States, regardless of the

nature of the territorial relationship, with greater

rights or whatever, it still would be the same

analysis, correct?

MR. RIESS: It would, Your Honor. I just want to quote one case on that and that's from the First Circuit, Mayhew v. Burwell, 772 F.3d at 95.

And the quote says, "Federal laws that have differing impacts on different states are an unremarkable feature of, rather than an affront to, our federal system." So for that reason, even if it were, it would not make a difference here because Defendant would still be challenging a classification on residency, still be challenging one under the Territory Clause power, and one that involved line drawing which relates to social benefits legislation.

THE COURT: Okay, Mr. Ferré, briefly if there's anything you wish to respond to this. And

U.S. v. Vaello-Madero - Civil Hearing after that I'm going to hear from counsel for Congresswoman González.

MR. FERRÉ: Thank you, Your Honor. I don't think there's any question that an equal protection challenge based on the classification of residency in one state versus another for a national program would be challenged. The only reason why in this case the government is arguing that the equal protection challenge is only subject to rational basis review is because we're talking about a classification based on residency in the territories. And that is entirely based and relies on the doctrine established in the Insular Cases.

So we're talking about residency in an unincorporated territory where then Congress's act is reviewed under a lesser standard, the rational basis review, purportedly because it's acting under the Territorial Clause. That's what we believe is actually the incorrect framework. So it's not true that the Insular Cases are not implicated. It's only because of the Insular Cases that the irrationality of excluding residents in the territories is permitted in this circumstance.

THE COURT: Okay, thank you. I'm going to hear now from Counsel Ferraiuoli on behalf of

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Congresswoman Jenniffer González. If you want to

come up to the podium because you're going to have -
I'm going to time you because I want to finish here

around noontime, 12:15. So you have ten minutes.

What I would ask is that obviously I have read the

brief, it has a lot of very informative background

data. It's excellent. So what I would ask is that

perhaps you divide your time if there's anything from

your brief that you want to highlight.

And, again, it's already in the record and it has been carefully read, but anything you -- and actually it's been responded to by the United States, but anything here that you would like to highlight. And what I would ask is that you take the thrust of your time if you want to on behalf of your client to make any statements regarding any arguments that you just heard from both of the parties. I think that would be the most protective. It's 11:25 so I will tell you when you have two minutes left.

MS. FERRAIUOLI-HORNEDO: May it please the Court.

THE COURT: Please go ahead.

MS. FERRAIUOLI-HORNEDO: For the record, this is Veronica Ferraiuoli on behalf of the Resident Commissioner Jenniffer González. We already know

U.S. v. Vaello-Madero - Civil Hearing that the Supplemental Security Income program was established in 1974 and it began as a relatively small program providing benefits largely to the elderly population.

And I wanted to point out, and this is important, that right now it is the only program that provides benefits to -- the only federal program that provides benefits to disabled children. So disabled children have no other program, federal program, from which to gain assistance. So that in Puerto Rico, because SSI does not apply, there are no federal programs that would allow these types of benefits for impaired children.

And SSI is important overall in the population that it serves because without it a lot of people -- most of the people -- actually 66 percent of the people that receives SSI would have fallen under the poverty line without SSI, and in children we're talking about 59 percent. And studies have shown that children that receive SSI have a stabler family life because of the particular stressors that families taking care of children with disabilities have. So we're not only talking about actual services but the SSI program also provides additional societal services and benefits to these children.

It's also important to note that the SSI is a program of last resort. That means that you have to -- you have to -- you have to apply for all other available programs before you can get the benefits. And the money that you get from any other program goes into determining whether you're eligible for SSI. So we are really talking about the people that have no other help from anywhere else.

mentioned disabled children and I have experience because I preside over consent decree pertaining to anybody over 21 who has Down syndrome or mental --what was known as mental retardation, now it's --there's another term, or have autism, and they're over 21 and are wards of the state. So all these --and I have close to 1,000 individuals and that population will -- and obviously they're under the health department auspices, when they're in their toddler years, they're also under the health department. So what you're telling me is that all these individuals, for example from this class that the Commonwealth is award of, they're not receiving these moneys.

MS. FERRAIUOLI-HORNEDO: That's correct, Your Honor.

THE COURT: They're only receiving the percentage of Social Security that under Social Security is provided to them.

MS. FERRAIUOLI-HORNEDO: That's correct,
Your Honor. The SSI, like I said, is the only source
of federal income support targeted to families caring
for children with disabilities. And that includes
the people that the Court just spoke about -children with Down syndrome, children with autism,
children with developmental disorder, children with
cancer, children with cerebral palsy and sensory
disabilities like blindness.

The program in Puerto Rico that applies currently in Puerto Rico, the AABD program, does not grant benefits to children.

THE COURT: And I know that I believe it's at page 29 of your brief that even to adults that AABD, it's Aged, Blind and Disabled, program, for example, the monthly -- average month paycheck if you live in a state or the District of the Columbia would be \$483.02; and if you live in Puerto Rico it's \$73.85. So that's like a fifth or a sixth of that. Again, with \$73 that's nothing here. Virgin Islands actually it's twice as much, 176.07, which is higher. Guam is \$150. And, incredibly, if you're in the

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Mariana Islands it's 525.69, higher than even in the mainland. So I note that's Table 7 of your brief.

MS. FERRAIUOLI-HORNEDO: Yes, that is correct. And not only that, because the maximum benefit allowable by law is one of the standards that you use to determine whether the person qualifies -- for example the person cannot have -- in Puerto Rico they would not be able to receive the local equivalent if their income that is taken into consideration exceeds \$65. So, the income limit in Puerto Rico is you need to make less than \$65, where in SSI, because the benefit is higher, now \$725, then you need to show that you earn less than \$725. So the standard by which you are allowed into these programs is markedly different.

And in Puerto Rico only the poorest of the super poor are able to receive just the tiny bit of benefit that they do receive, which is obviously not enough to move you out of under the poverty line which is one of the things that SSI is supposed to do.

THE COURT: Let me ask you, and sort of shift gears, but this is something discussed with the parties about disenfranchisement. What is the situation, the particular situation, of Congresswoman

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González's position as a U.S. Congresswoman? She's

a -- she's got a four-year term, she's been elected

and she's a member of Congress, but can't she simply

file a bill and move to have the Commonwealth of

Puerto Rico treated equally as a state? Or what is

the situation given the fact that she has no vote?

What difficulties -- again, from a very short in a

nutshell point, what are the -- because obviously one

of the things we're talking about is, well, this is

something Congress can remedy whenever it wants.

But obviously how effective is her filing of a bill or trying to lobby from Congressmen and senators compared to that of, let's say, in California if that were the case of 20, 30, 40, 50 Congressmen, or even the state of Hawaii with two congressmen, a small state like that? What would be the difference? How is that political process to overcome this problem in Puerto Rico? What's the situation.

MS. FERRAIUOLI-HORNEDO: Well, I could tell you that at least in Congress a bill has been filed to equate SSI benefits for residents of Puerto Rico. In every Congress ever since SSI was started.

And nothing has come of it. In Congress you not only file the bill, it gets assigned to a

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committee. The committee has to have a markup

session and they have to vote to send it to the next

level. If it's a subcommittee then it's voted

subcommittee, then committee, then the body. The

fact is that Congresswoman González and every single

other representative of the territories, they have no

vote. And there's five of us -- five, compared to

430 other representatives, is nothing. And even

those members of Congress that are of Puerto Rican

descent we are only few. I think right now they

would be only 11.

THE COURT: Well, those congressmen, for example, it could be in Idaho or in Chicago or whatever, but they represent their own citizens before they -- they don't represent the people of Puerto Rico.

 $$\operatorname{MS.}$  FERRAIUOLI-HORNEDO: That is correct, we are not number one on their agenda.

THE COURT: And what you say about committee markup, going through the whole process, I know Congresswoman González also presented a statehood bill, and if that went through that would resolve the situation because if Puerto Rico tomorrow would become a state then there's no more issues, there would be equal SSI.

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MS. FERRAIUOLI-HORNEDO: Yes.

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THE COURT: That bill obviously -- and, again, I am not auguring or promoting statehood or that it be passed or not, that's not my prerogative, but as a possible remedy that is something that would also face the whole political legislative -- and now we have a new Congress -- type situation. And this could -- in theory, statehood could come in a year. In theory statehood could take 50 years or never come, correct, and then the problem would still remain.

MS. FERRAIUOLI-HORNEDO: That is correct, Your Honor. And the fact is that even though the representatives of the territories vote in committee, they don't vote in -- you know, for the bill, which is really where the political power lies. Everybody knows that the political process includes not only convincing your fellow members of Congress but it also deals with, I'll help you here if you help me And basically we have nothing to trade other there. than the fact that there are 3 -- probably now 3 million American citizens in Puerto Rico that have no The fact is that the Congresswoman representation. represents more than any other congressperson there and she has less power.

And the situation of Puerto Rico is even worse in the senate. In the senate everybody has two representative and we have none. So when you're talking about fewer votes and fewer people that you have to garner in order to pass a bill through the chamber, we have no representation there whatsoever.

THE COURT: And in the particular committee

Congresswoman González if her vote would be the

decisive vote, it will not count, correct?

MS. FERRAIUOLI-HORNEDO: It doesn't count, that's correct, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. And you have two more minutes, the anything else you want to add? And, again, I think the brief it's been extremely helpful. Anything else you want to add?

MS. FERRAIUOLI-HORNEDO: No, Your Honor. I just wanted to really make the point that especially for children the lack of application of the SSI program to Puerto Rico affects children more than it affects any other group that currently receives funds from SSI because there is just no other program that helps this population. And we're talking about disenfranchised citizens, you know, citizens that have absolutely no other rights, political rights, you know pretty much. This is the population that

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THE COURT: Okay, well, thank you very much.

On behalf of the Commonwealth ten minutes

for argument. Ms. Peñagarícano, welcome to Ponce

again.

MS. PEÑAGARÍCANO-BROWN: Thank you.

THE COURT: You're a frequent customer here, frequent litigant here I mean. And, again, thank you for the Commonwealth's brief. I must say it is of even superior quality than when I was solicitor general of Puerto Rico. I hope I did a good job back then. I think this is what amicus briefs should be because they bring forth the big picture and provide a lot of information that is perhaps not as to the particular individuals but it's the bigger, broader picture. And it's important that these briefs be filed, I think, at the outset. So please go ahead. Anything you want to comment from the parties' arguments. I've read your briefs several times, so please go ahead.

MS. PEÑAGARÍCANO-BROWN: Thank you, Your Honor. For the record, Susana Peñagarícano on behalf of the Commonwealth. May it please the Court.

THE COURT: Yes.

MS. PEÑAGARÍCANO-BROWN: I would like to

U.S. v. Vaello-Madero - Civil Hearing first say that I'll be dividing the arguments with Attorney Lugo-Fiol within the time allotted by the Court. And I'll be discussing the scrutiny and he will be discussing the Insular Cases.

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I would like to start by saying that we echoed defendant's arguments in that the exclusion of Puerto Rico residents from the SSI benefits program under the Social Security Act is subject to a strict scrutiny because it discriminates against U.S. citizens for the sole reason that they reside in Puerto Rico where most of its residents are Puerto Rican or identify as Hispanics or Latinos. I also must stress the fact that this benefit is aimed at individuals, not at a territory. Therefore, also by excluding the Puerto Rico residents as a class, the Social Security Administration is creating a suspect classification singling out an entire group of people on the wrong premise that they belong to a class of alien races. And this is subject to a heightened judicial solicitude.

The Equal Protection Clause directs that all similarly situated be treated alike and Puerto Ricans are similarly situated to U.S. citizens in terms of citizenship and also as to the conditions that the SSI benefit wishes or seeks to address or aims to

U.S. v. Vaello-Madero - Civil Hearing address. Because --

THE COURT: Let me ask, when you mention treated differently alien or ethnic races, let's forget the population in the entire U.S. mainland and focus simply on the Mariana Islands and Puerto Rico. And the Mariana U.S. citizens have full SSI. They are of Chamorro and Carolinian descent versus Creole, black, Indian, you know, mulatto -- here it's a big mixture of everything. Would that apply the strict scrutiny if we were to simply say Puerto Rico is being discriminated vis-a-vis the CNMI?

MS. PEÑAGARÍCANO-BROWN: It would apply the strict scrutiny. We're talking about a classification based on ethnicity, race, national origin. So it is our theory that it would apply as strict scrutiny.

THE COURT: And that would be -- and let me analogize here. The Supreme Court case from Hawaii, U.S. Supreme Court, Rice versus Cayetano or Cayetano versus Rice where that was cases for plebiscite, but those cases were like the state or jurisdiction saying only people of X ethnic origin can vote, that's considered racial origin, and that's the effect that you're saying is happening in Puerto Rico.

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MS. PEÑAGARÍCANO-BROWN: Correct, Your Honor, that would be the effect. And regarding that issue particularly, the constitutional interpretation or the race-based reasoning crafted by the Insular Cases have been applied to justify the unequal treatment of citizens residing or living in Puerto These cases in particular provide a historical Rico. animus against a politically powerless and historically disadvantaged group. Aside -- under the plaintiff's stance, and a mechanical reliance in the case of Califano and Harris, cases like Brown versus Board of Education, Afroyim, and Obergefell which overruled previous Supreme Court precedent extending equal protection to those historically disadvantaged never would have happened.

I would like to address quickly the argument regarding residency. Even if we were to entertain that argument for the sake of argument, we would have to say that then disparate treatment analysis would come into play. The disparate treatment is evident from a law that bears more heavily on a race than another. And the exclusion of Puerto Rico residents from the SSI program serves no legitimate government end under any standard of review and therefore it must fail.

If we were to apply the same exclusion to another state in the mainland, you wouldn't get the same disparate result as it does when applied to Puerto Rico. And it is our contention, the Commonwealth's contention, that the economic law cannot be rational if it's grounded in a suspect classification like race or ethnicity because it is against a powerless -- a discrete and powerless group of people before Congress.

And the Commonwealth is well aware of Congress's plenary powers and authority; however, it is our contention that that plenary authority is limited by the Constitution which does not make a distinction between incorporated and unincorporated territories so, therefore, it shouldn't be.

Including the Territory Clause does not make a distinction either.

As to the alleged rational basis for -THE COURT: Let me just go back to something
that you mentioned because I believe that the
argument you're making, the SSI law on its face,
there's no direct evidence of discrimination. What
you're -- and let me analogize this to Title 7, which
I know you handle many cases in your office at the
Department of Justice. But what Title 7 provides is

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that you can have the smoking gun direct evidence but
you also have disparate impact cases. And I assume
what you're sort of saying is that here based on the
circumstances, the statistics, the population of
Puerto Rico historically has been Hispanic, Latino,
you know, 95 percent approximately. That would
definitely evidence then, in your position, the
disparate impact of the law which would obviously
trigger ethnic origin or the heightened scrutiny. Am
I correct?

MS. PEÑAGARÍCANO-BROWN: That's correct, your Honor. If you would do the same exclusion in a state, you wouldn't get the same disparate impact; you would get a more uniform treatment. So, yeah, that would correct. If we were to assume that a residency classification applies -- which we disagree totally, we believe that this is a suspect classification based on alienage and there's like race and ethnicity.

If we were to address the allege rational basis for excluding Puerto Rico from the SSI program, the three basis were the unique tax status of Puerto Rico, the high cost of treating Puerto Rico as a state under the statute, and also that providing greater benefits would disrupt the Puerto Rico

U.S. v. Vaello-Madero - Civil Hearing economy.

THE COURT: Which there is no economy right now.

MS. PEÑAGARÍCANO-BROWN: Those three premises are totally wrong. If we were to start with the first one, we would have to say that this Court can take judicial notice of the fact that residents in Puerto Rico do pay, individually or corporations, do pay federal taxes. Many of them.

Also, we would have to say that the SSI program is aimed at the individuals who do not pay federal income tax regardless of the residency because they make very low income. Also, we would have to bring what the Court brought today to the attention which is that even nonresidents, noncitizens who are not similarly situated to other U.S. citizens, are allowed to participate in the program. Also, we have the scenario with the Northern Mariana Islands who also have a unique tax status and are considered unincorporated territory and do participate in the SSI benefits.

THE COURT: And the Commonwealth of the CNMI, if you look at the legislative history, it was patterned after the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. So that would be, I assume, more towards your argument,

MS. PEÑAGARÍCANO-BROWN: Correct. That's correct, Your Honor. And all these arguments disprove the belief that treating Puerto Rico as a state would be too costly.

Also, there is no basis to support the speculative fear that providing greater benefits would disrupt the Puerto Rico economy. To the contrary, Your Honor. The lack of SSI benefits or other federal benefits would contribute to the out-migration to the states and would actually adversely affect the Puerto Rico economy.

THE COURT: And let me say, those three prongs of the Califano and Harris analysis they were -- and let me put it this way, that was, in a sense, argued by the United States before the Supreme Court which upheld those arguments. These were not arguments raised by the, I guess, plaintiff appellant, because it was an individual person, and in those cases those were cases that the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico literally had no way of tracking or even knowing that those cases ended up before the Supreme Court until the ruling came out. So in a sense it was an ex parte presentation from the United States without the Commonwealth having the benefit to

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address those particular issues. Am I correct?

MS. PEÑAGARÍCANO-BROWN: That's correct. As

the Court mentioned --

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THE COURT: I'm sorry. And my question is, when Mr. Riess gets an opportunity at the end to respond he can do so, but would that in a sense from the Commonwealth's perspective allow these arguments to be considered for the first time in the record and to respond to these arguments?

MS. PEÑAGARÍCANO-BROWN: Your Honor, I believe that because Califano did not touch upon the issue of the equal protection by right to travel and because in Harris there was a cursorily -- the Court cursorily addressed the equal protection without the benefit of argument and briefing, we believe that these cases should not be applied to this particular case, and that the Court should have a chance to revisit the issue which is long overdue for reversal. We believe that if that was not the position then all the other cases like Obergefell and Brown versus Board of Education would have never happened. So we believe that the issue should be revisited with the opportunity for the parties to have a full briefing and argument regarding that issue.

THE COURT: Okay, thank you. You have one

U.S. v. Vaello-Madero - Civil Hearing more minute then I'll hear from Mr. Lugo.

MS. PEÑAGARÍCANO-BROWN: I'll allow him to.

THE COURT: Okay, so Mr. Lugo welcome to Ponce.

MR. LUGO-FIOL: Thank you, Your Honor, and may it please the Court.

THE COURT: Yes, please proceed.

MR. LUGO-FIOL: Before 1901, it was generally assumed that the full protection of the Constitution applied to the territories that the United States were acquiring, be it by treaty or by conquest, whatever. In 1901, the Supreme Court decided two cases regarding Puerto Rico on the same day, May 27, 1901. The first one is DeLima v. Bidwell, and I'm going to talk a little bit about those cases because they establish contrast.

In DeLima, the Supreme Court decided that upon ratification of the Treaty of Paris, Puerto Rico was no longer a foreign country and became domestic. And in so deciding, at page 198, the Court rejected two ideas: The first idea it rejected is that a country could be domestic for some purposes and foreign for others. And the second idea it rejected it was that territories could be held indefinitely by the United States. And it rejected these ideas

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However, in that same date the Supreme Court also decided Downes versus Bidwell and began the establishment of what is now known as the Incorporation Doctrine. And essentially this doctrine, decided by Downes provided that Congress could treat Puerto Rico as foreign for some purposes, which it has been doing ever since, and that Congress is allowed to hold these "distant possessions" indefinitely as territories of the United States. It's basically contradicting itself. In our view, it basically contradicted itself.

And the reason why -- in the consideration, the reason why the Court did this, in our view, is expressed at pages 286 to 287 of *Downes v. Bidwell* if which I will read if I may --

THE COURT: Please go ahead.

MR. LUGO-FIOL: This is citing a paragraph.

"Patriotic and intelligent men may differ widely as
to the desirableness of this or that acquisition, but
this is solely a political question. We can only
consider this aspect of the case so far as to say
that no construction of the Constitution should be
adopted which would prevent Congress from considering

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each case upon its merits, unless the language of the
instrument imperatively demand it. A false step at
this time might be fatal to the development of what
Chief Justice Marshall called the American Empire.

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"Choice in some cases, the natural gravitation of small bodies towards large ones in others, the result of a successful war in still others, may bring about conditions which would render the annexation of distant possessions desirable. those possessions are inhabited by alien races, differing from us in religion, customs, laws, methods of taxation and modes of thoughts, the administration of government and justice, according to Anglo-Saxon principles, may for a time be impossible, and the question that once arises whether large concessions ought not to be made for a time, that, ultimately our own theories may be carried out, and the blessings of a free government under the Constitution extended to We decline to hold that there is anything in them. the Constitution that forbid such action."

I'm stressing on this because this establishes that the real classification in this case is not residency, it's alienage because this decision, and the decision of *Balzac* which followed in 1922, they're founded on the same type of thought,

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though the current Congress and Congress 20, 30 years ago is no longer -- and is affirmatively not using race and ethnic origin, the fact that the power to do so comes from a decision of the Supreme Court that based that power on alienage, classification, basically is tainting or converting the whole treatment into alienage?

MR. LUGO-FIOL: Yes, into alienage, yes.

THE COURT: Because it's still promoting that -- again, the people in Guam still they're basically Chamorros in origin. The people in the Virgin Islands they're basically Afro-American. In Puerto Rico it's basically Hispanic, Latinos. And in American Samoa it's native Samoans, and same in the Marianas.

MR. LUGO-FIOL: Yes. And that ties up also with the position that there is a gross disparate impact by the legislation that -- of the legislation that is the object of this case. It has a disparate impact upon residents of Puerto Rico most of which are Puerto Ricans, so it has a gross disparate impact on a discrete ethic group.

THE COURT: And I understand that the

U.S. v. Vaello-Madero - Civil Hearing individual who moves from New York or let's say somebody who is from Anglo-Saxon origin but is in New York or Florida, California, moves to Puerto Rico, that person is being treated as a Puerto Rican alienage because by living here he's treated as such, correct?

MR. LUGO-FIOL: Well, it is a collateral effect. I mean, it is more -- it would affect them.

THE COURT: But it's also affecting individuals who not necessarily are Hispanic, but any U.S. citizen who moves to Puerto Rico is being affected by being treated within this group, correct?

MR. LUGO-FIOL: Yeah, that is correct. But the impact is much, much larger upon Puerto Ricans than upon persons from other states or other residents or other nationalities.

In 1922, the Court decided Balzac, and in the Balzac the Court had the opportunity, it could've simply said, Well, the Jones Act extended U.S. citizenship to Puerto Ricans and under Rassmussen v. United States they did the same in Alaska. In Alaska, we decided back in 1905 that Alaskans were citizens of the United States and it was incorporated --

THE COURT: And actually in Rassmussen the

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Supreme Court of the United States said Alaska is incorporated because it's part of the Ninth Circuit. 

Puerto Rico is part of the First Circuit and that didn't do the change.

MR. LUGO-FIOL: No. And, well, I'm not going to enter into all the distinctions. I mean, it made some distinctions from Alaska that are really mainly geographical, which geographical location is really about a piece of land --

THE COURT: Alaska was mainly uninhabited,
Puerto Rico was packed just like the Philippines.

MR. LUGO-FIOL: Yes, but the individual protections of the Constitution should not be guided or governed by such type of consideration.

THE COURT: Who lives there or --

MR. LUGO-FIOL: Yes. And then we go to Califano and Harris. And the issue that the Insular Cases have to be considered in this case is because in Harris versus Rosario -- Califano versus Torres, to begin with, is a right-to-travel case. And the Court in a footnote really states clearly that the equal protection controversy was not before the Court. And therefore clearly the statement it made at the end of the decision about equal protection and rational basis is dictum.

And in Harris versus Rosario in two
paragraphs they relied upon the dictum in Califano,
without any sort of consideration or argument
whatsoever, and simply struck out from the picture
any possibility that a person could go and allege -in an equal protection claim assert that he is
entitled to strict scrutiny. Why? because it simply
says, the Court in Harris v. Rosario simply says, if
it's legislation by Congress that affects a territory
under the Territorial Clause, it's always rational
basis. It's an absolute opinion, and there's no
reasoning why. And the dissent by Justice Marshall
is very illustrative of this.

And we understand that all these cases together have formed the basis of a situation which is discriminatory to American citizens who live in Puerto Rico, and particularly residents of Puerto Rico, people who were born in Puerto Rico, who live in live in Puerto Rico, who have made Puerto Rico their home and who, in order to enjoy the full privileges that all other Americans citizens have, have to move. And that situation -- we understand that this situation is discriminatory. And this is a proper case in which at least, even if it's only limited to one individual defending himself against a

U.S. v. Vaello-Madero - Civil Hearing claim for reimbursement to the United States, this opinion -- this -- a decision in his favor will be influential in future -- in all sorts of decisions that may be taken in the future.

I think the Insular Cases, in particular the Incorporation Doctrine should be reexamined, can be reexamined and, can be reversed and should be reversed. And that would be our upon in support of Plaintiff, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you very much, Mr. Lugo.

MR. LUGO-FIOL: Defendant, I'm sorry.

think during my initial questioning to the parties I think I raised probably almost everything in your respective arguments, so rather than have a simply near rebuttal turn, what I'm going to ask is first from the government and then for Mr. Ferré, and then I'll allow the government to respond two minutes and Mr. Ferré two more minutes. Let's say anywhere from five to ten minutes. Anything that you wish to state to the Court that during any questioning I did not bring up, please so state. And then if you want to respond to anything in the amicus arguments please go ahead. I'll allow Mr. Ferré -- I believe Mr. Ferré

U.S. v. Vaello-Madero - Civil Hearing is going to be in agreement with the argument, so that should be shorter, and then I'll allow each of you. So we should be here about 15, 20 more minutes.

So let me hear first from Mr. Riess, anything you would like to add or comment.

MR. RIESS: Yes, Your Honor. The one topic that was bought up in our briefs that we didn't get to was the situation with the Northern Mariana Islands. And so let me make two points about that please. Number one, under rational basis review, this is the Katzenbach case, a statute is not invalid because it might have gone farther than it did; and legislation can take one step at a time, that's the Williamson v. Lee Optical case. So what that means is that line drawing and social benefits legislation, which is what we have here, means simply because Congress extends a benefit to residents of one territory, in the case the Northern Marianas, that doesn't mean it's constitutionally required to extend it to residents of all territories.

As we know, the federal law has long distinguished among territories in many ways, and the defendant has presented no authority that shows that the Constitution mandates that Congress needs to extend social benefits legislation to territories

U.S. v. Vaello-Madero - Civil Hearing uniformly. That's point number one.

THE COURT: Let me say, if that were the case -- and these are things that, for example, in Puerto Rico we have an Article III court, all the territories don't have an Article III court. So litigants there don't have the benefits of an Article III court, the citizens, U.S. citizens. If that rationale required the same treatment in all the territories, then you'd have to treat -- you know, everything that you get in Puerto Rico that you can get in the other jurisdictions Congress would have to treat everybody the same, that's your position, correct?

MR. RIESS: Precisely, Your Honor. That leads to my second point.

THE COURT: And before that, you mentioned the *Katzenbach* case what page of your brief are you citing to?

MR. RIESS: I don't have the page of the brief. I do have the citation which is 384 U.S. 657.

THE COURT: And what's the full name?

Katzenbach?

MR. RIESS: Katzenbach v. Morgan.

THE COURT: Okay. That's what I thought.

And let me ask, now that you mention it, because I

Just wanted to make sure it was that case you're alluding to, that is an interesting case because that was the case where U.S. citizens who moved from Puerto Rico to New York were deprived voting rights because there was an English literacy test and their language was -- so basically they were flunking it, they couldn't pass it, they were not voting.

And in that case which was argued by
Thurgood Marshall and the former governor of Puerto
Rico, then Attorney General, Rafael
Hernández-Colón -- who happens to be from Ponce -the Supreme Court ruled that while that language test
perhaps on its face may not be discriminatory, the
effect was that it was discriminatory. And it was
targeted towards U.S. citizens from Puerto Rico who
were U.S. citizens by birth. So wouldn't that case
strengthen the defendant's argument because here
again it's the U.S. citizens in Puerto Rico who are
being affected?

MR. RIESS: I don't think so, Your Honor, and here's why. The difficulty is that would be a disparate impact argument, and we've already explained why that doesn't work in the discrete and insular minority context. Under equal protection too --

THE COURT: That would be under *Quiban* for, example.

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Exactly. If the argument too is MR. RIESS: that the basis for disparate impact is that Puerto Rico residents are predominately Hispanic, that also The Quiban court rejected that as well, and I fails. would note so does the Court in this district. was the Hospital San Rafael case, 784 F. Supp. 939 to There was an allegation that it was facially 40. There was a classification about a Medicare payment system, that it discriminated against Hispanics because Puerto Rico hospitals -- it would result in a lower level of payment to the Puerto Rico hospitals. And the Court here said yes, Hispanics are a suspect class, but disparate impact is not enough for equal protection purposes and you need to show proof of a discriminatory purpose. That was a 1991 case by Judge Laffitte.

THE COURT: Continue.

MR. RIESS: So on the second point on the Northern Marianas, this is similar to the Segovia case recently decided where the district court said that for purposes of UOCAVA, The Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act, The fact that Congress drew a distinction between U.S. citizens and

U.S. v. Vaello-Madero - Civil Hearing former state residents in NMI versus citizens and former state residents who reside in other territories, that doesn't mean it was required to extend absentee voting across the board to all the territories.

THE COURT: And that case is still pending Cert granted or Cert denied, correct?

MR. RIESS: I believe Cert was denied.

THE COURT: Cert was denied, okay.

MR. RIESS: Yes, very recently, Your Honor.

THE COURT: And that Segovia case is based on Romeo verus Cohen case also for the Second Circuit. And, as a matter of fact, I know Mr. Xavier Romeo happens to be here in the audience. So I guess these cases, like Mr. Igartúa, have a collective gathering of former plaintiffs. Okay, anything else?

MR. RIESS: Very briefly, Your Honor. In response to the argument of amici, which were powerfully presented, policy arguments as to disagreements as to the policy not to extend SSI benefits to Puerto Rico residents, questions as to the wisdom or the fairness of the law, that doesn't make it unconstitutional. The Supreme Court made clear in the Beach Communications case rational basis is not a license for courts to judge the wisdom or

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And also in that case it said, A legislative choice isn't subject to courtroom factfinding. There was a lower court that sought legislative facts in the Supreme Court reversed. It said, Legislative choice can be based on rational legislation unsupported by evidence or empirical data. So as long as there's a facially valid reason and it's not wholly irrational, it survives rational basis.

THE COURT: Let me make an analogy. Assume we're pre-1954 Brown has not been decided and let's assume the Federal Government issued a law that in the Commonwealth -- yes, 1952, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico there can be schools for black and white children respectively, and let's assume then -- again, obviously Brown had not been decided. That's not a fair, that's not a wise law of course, I'm sure everybody would be in agreement nowadays. But in those days the federal court, before Brown had been decided, would have no constitutional prerogative to make that ruling, am I correct, because it would have had to apply Plessy at the time?

MR. RIESS: Unfortunately a district court would need to apply the Supreme Court --

I can't grant the remedy, of course a different judge could've written all the -- I guess that would have been Clemente Ruiz Nazario in those days -- all the dictum necessary, but it would have to go to the Circuit, probably Circuit would have had to uphold, and then it would've had to have been the Supreme Court, or maybe Brown would have intervened at the time, am I correct?

MR. RIESS: Yes, Your Honor. I would make absolutely certain I'm not at all defending *Plessy versus Ferguson*.

THE COURT: Oh, I note that for the record. This is just a historical hypothetical. That's not the U.S. DOJ's position. Those statutes were state statutes and never the Federal Government. To the contrary, the Federal Government and the U.S. DOJ promoted the Civil Rights Act. That is just a speculative hypothetical --

MR. RIESS: Thank you, Your Honor. I just wanted to make that clear.

THE COURT: -- which could have been a law school example. Well, thank you very much, Counsel. Let me hear from Mr. Ferré, some closing arguments. And if there's anything you wish to respond after

U.S. v. Vaello-Madero - Civil Hearing that one or two minutes, I will allow you.

MR. FERRÉ: Thank you, Your Honor. I just want to come to a couple of points that have been raised. The government argues that in areas of social policies a statutory classification would --should be upheld against an equal protection challenge, but this is if it does not proceed along suspect lines or infringes on fundamental constitutional rights. And we would argue here that of course it does.

Your Honor asked or actually asked a number of questions pertaining to the consent of the government. And we wanted to comment that one of the basic precepts of our constitutional system are those proclamations in the Declaration Independence which of course includes that all are to be treated equally -- "We hold certain truths to be self-evident." So we would say that the consent of the government should be something that is --

THE COURT: That would be along the lines, I remember when Justice Ginsburg was confirmed, one of her questions was, You just can't go to the Constitution, you have to go to the Declaration of Independence as well because that's the basis for the whole government.

MR. FERRÉ: Exactly.

THE COURT: Anything else?

MR. FERRÉ: Yes. The other point that I wanted to raise and I didn't raise it earlier is, there are additional cases, and perhaps we can include it in our supplementary brief, and that is, I wanted to highlight the Torres v. Puerto Rico case in which Justice Brennan in his concurrence, joined by Justices Stewart, Marshall, and Blackmun, observes that any implicit limits based on the Insular Cases on the basic rights guaranteed by the Constitution were anachronistic in the 1970s. So certainly if they were anachronistic in the 1970s we would expect that they would be so today.

THE COURT: And there's also a dissent in, I think it's, Igartúa, III or IV, from Judge Torruella which even expands on Torres.

MR. FERRÉ: Yes. In addition, we would like to comment that certainly when the Supreme Court invalidates a law as unconstitutional, it doesn't then go on to determine if there is nevertheless some basis to have that law apply to the territories. So we think that's not quite the analysis that the Court should engage in.

Finally, I would just like, as a closing

U.S. v. Vaello-Madero - Civil Hearing comment, to highlight that in 1898 in this very city of Ponce, General Nelson A. Miles, commanding general of the United States Army, upon entering the city is reported to have proclaimed to the people of Puerto Rico in a speech that's reflected in Karl Stephen Hermann's book, "A recent Campaign in Puerto Rico," that was published in 1907 -- in that book he reports, quotes the proclamation of General Miles and it goes as follows:

"The people of the United States in the cause of liberty, justice, and humanity come bearing the banner of freedom inspired by a noble purpose to seek the enemies of our country and yours and to destroy or capture all who are in armed resistance. They bring you — that is, the United States brings you — the fostering arm of a free people whose greatest power is in its justice and humanity to all those living within its fold. Hence, the first effect of this occupation will be the immediate release from your former relations and it is hoped with cheerful acceptance of the government of the United States."

Now, the rest of the book of course shows the racial animus in the author's -- you can see that in the author's commentaries at the time. But

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General Miles' promise of the blessings to be

bestowed by our government of the United States, I

think the Court should consider at what point does

"our government" include Puerto Rico.

THE COURT: Let me just add that based on that quote in *Downes versus Bidwell* Justice Harlan in his dissent he says it's a mockery planting the U.S. flags and saying that you have all these liberties while at the same time you retain the power to shape the destiny of these now free people. So, again, that's another historical fact.

So with that in mind, Mr. Riess, any two-minute final comments or anything else? If not, we have December 4th simultaneous deadline -- I mean, January 4, 2019, to file any supplemental briefs on anything you may have forgotten or anything that I asked that you find out there's other jurisprudence or any other argument, but if there's anything you would like to close, please go ahead.

MR. RIESS: Just to follow up on my very last right remark. I just wanted to make sure that my point is that only a Supreme Court can overturn another Supreme Court decision and so that was why Brown v. Board of Education --

THE COURT: Amply understood. And, again, I

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brought the argument and it was a hypothetical. It
may be hypothetical, but it could have been
Obergefell, it could have been any other Supreme
Court decision.

MR. RIESS: That's fine. I just want to make clear.

THE COURT: Mr. Ferré, anything else?

MR. FERRÉ: No thank you, Judge.

THE COURT: Well, I thank everybody. Safe travels back. I'm not going to issue a ruling. I'm going to wait until I have your final supplemental perhaps, let's call it, closing briefs. Let me say, I think let's limit it to ten pages each. I think you probably may not need the whole ten pages.

again, Mr. Riess I know from your division a U.S. DOJ this is not the only challenge to the situation in Puerto Rico, there are several other cases. I have two or three of these -- Social Security, Medicare, other entitlements. I also have a death-penalty case where the issued consent of the government is being raised. So I think it's important for U.S. DOJ and for you to get the message back there that -- because, again, the death penalty is a criminal case, but I think that it's important for the U.S. DOJ

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But it's important for U.S. DOJ to ensure that everybody knows what's going on because there's only one U.S. government, only one U.S. DOJ, and it's important for everybody at DOJ to keep in mind that there's -- again, these are just the cases before me. I believe before some of my colleagues there are some other types of these constitutional challenges. And whether I'm able to address them affirmatively or against the United States, that's a question that I will have to decide. But if not, probably there's going to be a waive of appellate challenges in the next couple of years, and that apparently is the trend. At least I know the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico and United States have been appearing as amicus in all these briefs.

And, again, I thank the Commonwealth,

Congresswoman González, as well as counsel, and

Mr. Ferré and counsel from New York thank you for

coming here. And once I have the supplemental briefs

I will work on this as diligently as possible in

light of the extensive criminal docket that I have.

Court is adjourned. Thank you very much. Happy

holidays all.

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10	I, EVILYS E. CARRIÓN-ESQUILÍN, hereby
11	certify that the proceeding is contained fully and
12	accurately, to the best of my ability, in the notes
13	recorded stenographically by me, at the civil hearing
14	in the above matter; and that the foregoing is a true
15	and accurate transcript of the same.
16	
17	/s/ Evilys E. Carrión-Esquilín
18	EVILYS E. CARRIÓN-ESQUILÍN, RPR Official Court Reporter
19	United States District Court Federal Building, Room 200
20	San Juan, Puerto Rico 00918 787-772-3377
21	101 112 3311
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